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Abstract
The global trend of shifting from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC)
workplace pension plans is putting growing pressure on individuals to take more ownership
in retirement planning and financial decision-making. The essence of the DB is the life-long
income guarantee, which requires limited financial planning decisions to be made, either
in the accumulation or decumulation phase. The DC on the other hand, is significantly
more complex. The lump sum payment at retirement burdens individuals with the task of
income generation, in the presence of challenges stemming from an uncertain future lifetime,
economic conditions, and evolving consumption needs. The average retiree has limited
competency to navigate these challenges, due to low financial literacy, lack of willpower, or
deteriorating cognitive abilities with older ages. The high stake of these challenges calls
for a normative solution to be proposed – a solution that considers the intricacy of risks,
preferences, and normative objective formulations. The objective of this thesis is to explore
such a solution.
This thesis comprises three inter-related research directions: long-term economic scenario
generators (ESGs), recursive preferences in life-cycle portfolio selection, and retirement
objective formulation. A brief description of the subsequent chapters will now follow.
The first chapter conducts a review of Wilkie’s ESG, with analysis restricted to series
pertinent to retirement planning. Our main findings indicate that there exist challenges
in modelling long-term economic series due to the presence of multiple structural shifts in
the historical time series. Consequently, certain assumptions of stationarity are violated,
and parameters are sensitive to the calibration period. A backtest based on 30-year out-of-
sample data indicated that over that period the model had tended to overestimate inflation,
underestimate total return on stocks, and performed relatively well for long-term interest
rates. Additionally, Wilkie’s ESG can be under-representative of the risk in long-term stock
investment, particularly in the tails.
The second chapter provides an introductory discussion of Epstein-Zin preferences, which
are adopted in the succeeding chapter as a normative preference model. The purpose is
to first investigate the implied optimal behaviour and its plausibility. We pay particular
attention to whether the output leads to plausible behaviour given the context of retirement
planning. Specifically, analytical solutions for a simple consumption problem are derived,
isolating the impact of relative risk aversion (RRA), elasticity of intertemporal substitution
(EIS), time discounting, and risks stemming from mortality, investment, and inflation.
We investigate three Epstein-Zin models employed in the literature, which differ in their
treatment of mortality risk, and find that some lead to normatively implausible solutions.
Importantly, we find that the EIS is not always monotone in its effect on consumption
volatility over time, meaning that its interpretation can be ambiguous when considering
an uncertain future lifetime. This has been misinterpreted in the literature to date. We
also show that one particular Epstein-Zin specification is not necessarily a generalization of
expected utility maximization under constant relative risk aversion, as many works wrongly
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claim.
The third chapter investigates the normative validity of the optimal consumption and
investment strategies of a discrete-time Epstein-Zin utility maximizing DC retiree who wishes
to benefit from stock investment, longevity insurance, and inflation protection. A comparison
of three Epstein-Zin specifications is conducted. We use a combination of qualitative and
quantitative criteria to evaluate the adequacy of the optimal consumption profile, with
special attention paid to the downside risk at extreme old ages. We find that it remains
optimal to fully annuitize, but agents with high relative risk aversion hold precautionary
savings, the level of which is impacted by the EIS and the preference specification. As
discussed in the preceding chapter, the interpretation of EIS on consumption volatility is
found to be ambiguous. Investigations of the optimal consumption profile reveal that agents
are exposed to relatively high levels of downside risk in the long run. This is partially
attributed to a time discounting factor less than 1, which implicitly (and contradictorily)
assumes myopia in normative decision-making. An investigation of zero time discounting is
conducted, with downside risk found be to significantly reduced in the long run.
The fourth chapter focuses on retirement objective formulation. This chapter is motivated
by the unsatisfactory normative solutions found in the preceding chapter under mathe-
matically convenient objective functions. In order to develop more actionable prescriptive
solutions, we seek to holistically explore actual retirement decision-making. To this end, we
conduct a survey study of 1,000 Canadian (pre-)retirees age 50 to 80, on topics of retirement
consumption, wealth, income, risk perception, decision making, and planning objectives.
Additionally, we investigate the descriptive validity of the expected lifetime discounted
utility maximization framework in predicting optimal planning behaviours. Overall, there
is overwhelming evidence of heterogeneity in wealth, income, concerns, and objectives. We
find a prevalence of low retirement assets, a severe underestimation of survival probabilities
to an extreme old age of 95, and a strong aversion toward life annuities. Pre-retirees appear
to have reasonable expectations regarding income and assets in retirement, with the median
retiree relying heavily on public pension sources. (Pre-)retirees are primarily concerned
with liquidity needs, consumption smoothing, inflation, and longevity in retirement, and
are least concerned with bequests. We elicited risk and time preferences, and found an
average RRA parameter between 1.74 to 2.48 for pre-retirees and 2.48 to 3.74 for retirees,
and a median subjective time discount factor of 0.997. A study of decision-making under
risky scenarios reveals dramatic differences between the actual and implied choices under
the expected utility maximization framework. Particularly, in the presence of inflation risk,
agents lack the understanding of the long-term cumulative impact of inflation on the cost
of living. In the presence of investment risk, the upside gain drives decision-making, and
the presence of minimum income protection effectively provided by public pension income
induces more risk-taking behaviour.
The last chapter concludes the thesis, and proposes general directions for future work in
retirement planning research.
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Introduction
The global trend of shifting from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) workplace
pension plans is putting growing pressure on individuals to take more ownership in retirement
planning and financial decision-making. The essence of the DB is the life-long income
guarantee, which requires limited financial planning decisions to be made, either in the
accumulation or decumulation phase. The DC on the other hand, is significantly more
complex. The lump sum payment at retirement burdens individuals with the task of
income generation, in the presence of challenges stemming from an uncertain future lifetime,
economic conditions, and evolving consumption needs (Bodie et al., 1988). The average
retiree has limited competency to navigate these challenges, due to low financial literacy
(Van Rooij et al., 2012; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a), lack of
willpower (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004), or deteriorating cognitive abilities with older ages
(Agarwal et al., 2009). The high stake of these challenges calls for a normative solution to
be proposed – a solution that considers the intricacy of risks, preferences, and normative
objective formulations. The objective of this thesis is to explore such a solution.
First, let us clarify what a normative solution entails. The term ‘normative’ suggests how
one should or ought to behave, and gives rise to rationality and the prescription of actions.
It is to be contrasted with ‘positive’ or ‘descriptive’ solutions, which attempt to describe or
explain human behaviour, often associated with irrationalities, errors or imperfections (Bell
et al., 1988). This is an important distinction, as there are substantial differences in the
implications of the two lines of work.
Rational studies of life-cycle investing in the decumulation phase date back to the seminal
work of Yaari (1965), where the optimal decisions are obtained using time-additive expected
discounted utility maximization. The vast majority of the later work follows this framework,
and branches out in two directions. The first, and possibly the most widely known line
of work in this field, surrounds the theoretical explanations of the annuity puzzle. The
annuity puzzle refers to the stark contrast between theoretical predictions in life-cycle
theory, where full or high annuitization is shown to significantly improve welfare, and
the empirical observation of extremely low demand for annuities around the globe. The
most cited conclusion of Yaari (1965) is the normative optimality of full annuitization
with no bequest motive (under certain assumptions), which is later extended by Davidoff
et al. (2005) with less restrictive conditions. The puzzle has attracted significant attention,
following the remark made by the Nobel laureate Franco Modigliani in Modigliani (1986)
that,
It is a well known fact that annuity contracts, other than in the form of group
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insurance through pension systems, are extremely rare. Why this should be so
is a subject of considerable current interest. It is still ill-understood.
This phenomenon remains true to date (Bütler and Teppa, 2007; Mitchell et al., 1999) and
significant effort has been made to shed light on this puzzle from a descriptive perspective
through behavioural economic theory. For a detailed discussion, see Benartzi et al. (2011)
and the references therein. Normative theoretical work focuses on the impact of preferences
(Iskhakov et al., 2015; Kingston and Thorp, 2005), the objective function (Lockwood,
2012; Milevsky, 1998; Peijnenburg et al., 2016), liquidity concerns (Sinclair and Smetters,
2004; Brugiavini, 1993), the existence of involuntary annuitization through defined benefit
pensions (Dushi and Webb, 2004) and social insurance income (Bütler et al., 2017), market
imperfections or adverse selection (Brugiavini, 1993; Yagi and Nishigaki, 1993), or some
combinations of these factors (Yogo, 2016). No compelling answers have been found.
The second line of work centers around normative retirement consumption and asset
allocation, which often times involves annuitization decisions. This line of work does not
aim to reconcile theoretical results with empirical observations (either from a rational
or behavioural perspective), but rather focuses on the prescription of rational retirement
planning decision-making. Such purpose can be either implicit or explicit, depending on the
narrative of the work. Both Yaari (1965) and Davidoff et al. (2005) fall under this category.
There is a proliferation of work in this area, following two broad frameworks of 1) utility
maximization and 2) shortfall risk minimization. For a comprehensive overview of this
research, see MacDonald et al. (2013), Horneff et al. (2008a) and the references therein. In
more recent years, studies have been primarily conducted in the utility maximization frame-
work, focusing on the investigation of optimal annuitization ratios, including ratios among
varying types of annuities (e.g. real or nominally fixed, variable, group self-annuitization)
(Boyle et al., 2015; Hanewald et al., 2013; Horneff et al., 2010; Maurer et al., 2013; Milevsky
and Young, 2007), and the timing of annuitization (Horneff et al., 2008c; Horneff et al.,
2008a; Milevsky and Young, 2007). Others investigate the impact of the preferences or
objective formulation on the consumption or asset allocation (Boyle et al., 2015; Butt and
Khemka, 2015; Blake et al., 2008). Some, motivated by the empirically observed aversion
to annuities, investigate optimal phased withdrawal strategies (Emms, 2010; Horneff et al.,
2008a; Bateman and Thorp, 2008; Emms and Haberman, 2008), including the impact of
social insurance pension income (Wiafe et al., 2017; Hulley et al., 2013).
This thesis belongs to the second line of work, which is normative retirement planning
decision-making. Our primary focus is not on the reconciliation of theoretical and empirical
decision-making in retirement (though this is briefly touched on in the fourth chapter), but
rather the exploration of the notion of ‘optimality’ in retirement planning, with the aim
of making a practicable contribution to the improvement of retirement financial welfare.
This involves the exploration of the inter-relationship among financial risk factors in the
long term, normative preference models for intertemporal decision-making, and retirement
objective formulations across varying demographics.
2
Introduction
This thesis comprises three inter-related research directions: economic scenario generators
(Chapter 1), recursive preferences in intertemporal portfolio selection (Chapter 2 and 3),
and retirement consumption, risk perception, and objective formulation (Chapter 4). A
brief description of the subsequent chapters will now follow.
Economic scenario generators (ESGs) are integrated stochastic models developed for risk
aggregation and dependency modelling. They are used to simulate joint observations of
financial risk factors and economic variables such as inflation, stock returns, and interest
rates. Chapter 1 provides a review of Wilkie’s ESG, which is the first such model presented to
the actuarial profession. We restrict our analysis to economic series pertinent to retirement
planning. The model is updated to 2014 using U.S. data, and used for the subsequent
chapters for the projection of economic scenarios.
Chapter 2 provides an introductory discussion of recursive preferences, which are adopted
in Chapter 3 as a normative preference model in solving problems in optimal retirement
planning. A special case of the recursive specification – the Epstein-Zin utility function is
discussed. To set the scene for Chapter 3, this chapter considers a simplified problem, in
which analytical expressions of the optimal consumption profile can be derived. This allows
one to isolate the impact of the preference, economic, and mortality assumptions, and to
appropriately interpret the results presented in Chapter 3.
Chapter 3 investigates the normative validity of the expected discounted lifetime utility
(EDLU) maximizing framework, by solving a discrete time optimal consumption-investment
strategy of a DC retiree who wishes to benefit from stock investment while seeking longevity
insurance and inflation protection. We use a combination of qualitative and quantitative
criteria to evaluate the adequacy of the optimal consumption profile, paying particular
attention to downside risk at extreme old ages.
Chapter 4 conducts a large-scale survey study on Canadian (pre-)retirees on retirement
consumption, risk perception and objective formulation. This work is motivated by an
assessment of the normative (and in part, descriptive) validity of traditional applications
of mathematical optimization to retirement planning problems. In particular, the study
explores three key areas. The first is the difference between expectations and experience
among Canadian retirees, as it relates to longevity (life expectancy and survival rates),
consumption (annuity prices and expected savings required to maintain a given level of
income), and risk and variability of income (expectations of future income requirements and
their variability). The second area relates to the current level of wealth in retirement, or
savings pre-retirement (in particular in contrast to expectations). The third area addresses
preferences and objectives, in particular in assessing whether the revealed preferences are
well-represented by commonly employed utility functions and objectives.
Chapter 5 concludes the thesis, and proposes general directions for future work in
retirement planning research.
3

Chapter 1
Wilkie’s Economic Scenario Generator
1.1 Introduction
Economic scenario generators (ESGs) are integrated stochastic models developed for sim-
ulations of long-run joint distributions of financial risk factors and economic variables.
They are powerful tools for risk aggregation and dependency modelling. ESGs have been
gaining popularity in recent years as a pricing and risk management tool and have often
lent themselves to applications such as asset liability management and the computation of
economic capital requirements.
There are many proprietary ESGs being used for actuarial risk management in all areas
of practice, but for the independent researcher the field is quite limited. It may be difficult
to access the proprietary models, and even with access, if the details of the model are not
fully disclosed (or disclosable) for commercial reasons, it may not be possible to interpret
model output satisfactorily. For example, if the approach to modelling dependencies is not
disclosed then the results of an investigation where tail dependency is critical may be in
doubt.
For independent research then, it is highly desirable to utilize a model that is open access
– that is, the model specification is fully disclosed without restrictions. Even if a proprietary
model outperforms an open access model in certain metrics, the open access model may be
preferred, as the researcher can assess and adjust for model limitations. The Wilkie model
is an open access ESG that was introduced in Wilkie (1986). It was the first comprehensive
ESG to be formally presented to the actuarial profession. The model distinguishes itself
from other ESGs in that it has been subjected to a high level of public scrutiny, to a degree
that no proprietary model has experienced. However, it is thirty years since the introduction
of the Wilkie model, and if it is to continue to be of use to researchers, particularly in a
US context, it is appropriate to backtest its performance, and explore the potential for
future use, particularly to independent researchers, but possibly also to practitioners to
benchmark their own models.
The groundwork of the model was laid back in 1980 in a report by the Maturity Guarantees
Working Party of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries (Benjamin et al., 1980). The full
model, in its 1986 form, was fitted to UK data and contains retail price index, stock yield,
stock dividends, and long-term interest rates (‘consols’ yield). The model was later updated
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and extended in Wilkie (1995) with the inclusion of five additional variables: wages index,
short-term interest rates, property rentals and yields, index-linked stock yields and currency
exchanges rates, and was also calibrated to other countries, including Australia, Canada,
Switzerland and the US. Since 2011, a series of updates was introduced: Wilkie et al.
(2011), updated parts of the UK model to 2009, discussed the model performance since
1994, and studied the stability of the parameters; Wilkie and Şahin (2016) discussed the
experience of the model since 2009, selecting initial conditions, and using “select periods”
for shorter-term forecasts; Wilkie and Şahin (2017a), Wilkie and Şahin (2017b) and Wilkie
and Şahin (2017c) discussed stochastic interpolation by Brownian and Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
bridges; Wilkie and Şahin (2017d) extended the model to include stock earnings.
Numerous reviews and extensions of the Wilkie model have been published, with most
focused on Wilkie (1986) and Wilkie (1995). Those relevant to our study are referenced in
sections 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4. Following Wilkie, several researchers have developed ESGs for
countries other than the UK, including, among many others, Carter (1991) for Australia,
Thomson (1996) for South Africa, and Huang et al. (2014) for China. These studies focus
on the development of ESGs for these economies using the ‘Wilkie’ framework, rather than
testing Wilkie’s ESG for country-specific applications. The contribution of this chapter is
to present the model in a US context, with US data, and to analyze the performance of
the model historically, and the relevance of the model going forwards, for North American
applications. Our main contribution is the backtesting of the model for the past 30 years,
and the testing of stationarity assumptions and parameter stability in the US context.
We further compare the output of Wilkie’s ESG with a generic ESG. The generic ESG is
constructed to include features that are, to our best knowledge, commonly found in both
public access and proprietary ESGs.
Our main findings indicate that there exist challenges in modelling long-term economic
series due to the presence of multiple structural shifts in the historical time series. Conse-
quently, certain assumptions of stationarity are violated; and parameters are sensitive to
the calibration period. These challenges can be mitigated by performing a change point
analysis; and selecting an appropriate sample period for the parameter estimations. It
is critical that these tasks be facilitated by a qualitative understanding of the true data
generating process (e.g. historical economic events and economic theories). A backtest
based on 30-year out-of-sample data indicated that over that period the model had tended
to overestimate inflation (due to a structural shift in an implicit inflation targeting decision
by the Federal Reserve in the 1980s), underestimate total return on stocks (due to the
unprecedented dot-com bubble in the 1990s), and performed relatively well for long-term
interest rates. The comparison to a generic ESG reveals that in the long run, Wilkie’s ESG
generates a wider range of scenarios for inflation and long-term interest, but a narrower
range for stock returns. Wilkie’s ESG can be under-representative of the risk in long-term
stock investment, particularly in the tails.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model and reports the fitted
parameters. Section 1.3 examines model robustness. Section 1.4 compares the performance
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of Wilkie’s ESG with a generic ESG.
1.2 Model Description
The Wilkie model is a P (real-world) measure model with an annual frequency. It adopts
a cascade structure, with inflation being the driver of other economic variables. It can
be expressed diagrammatically as shown in Figure 1.1. Note that total stock returns are
modelled by combining dividend yield and index, hence the dotted lines. We use subscripts
to distinguish the series: q for inflation; y for dividend yield; d for dividend index; and c for
long-term bond yield.
Price Inflation
Dividend YieldDividend Index Long-Term Bond Yield
Total Stock Return
Figure 1.1 Wilkie’s ESG – Model Structure
1.2.1 Inflation
Inflation is measured by the continuously compounded rate of change of the Consumer
Price Index. The deviation from the long-run mean is modelled by a stationary1 AR(1)
process:
δq(t) = log
Q(t)
Q(t− 1) ,
δq(t)− µq = aq · {δq(t− 1)− µq}+ zq(t),
|aq| < 1, zq(t) i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2q ),
where δq(t) is the force of inflation in the year [t− 1, t), Q(t) is the Consumer Price Index at
time t, µq is the long-run, unconditional mean, aq is the parameter governing the strength
of autoregression to the long-run average, and σq is the standard deviation of the innovation
term.
1Stationarity refers to ‘weak’ or ‘covariance’ stationarity.
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The June series of non-seasonally adjusted US City Average All Items Consumer Price
Index (CPI) for All Urban Consumers (CPURNSA) from January 1926 to December
2014 (monthly), obtained from Bloomberg, is used. We have 89 observations of CPI, and
88 inflation observations due to log differencing. The fitted parameters are reported in
Table 1.1.
Wilkie (1995) US Estimated Parameter (SE)
1926–1989 1926–1989 1926–2014
µq 0.03 0.0333 (0.0118) 0.0307 (0.0084)
aq 0.65 0.5843 (0.1009) 0.5731 (0.0862)
σq 0.035 0.0389 (0.0035) 0.0337 (0.0026)
Table 1.1 Parameter estimates of the US inflation model: 1926-2014. Standard errors are
in parentheses.
Extensions to the UK inflation model include: Clarkson (1991), which investigated the
impact of three non-linear components that allow inflation scenarios to exhibit ‘quiescent’
and ‘active’ phases; Wilkie (1995), which investigated an autoregressive conditionally
heteroscedastic (ARCH) extension to allow for more fat-tailed residuals, and noted several
other possible distributions for modelling residuals, including t and gamma distributions;
and Chan and Wang (1998), which proposed a revised model that incorporates outliers in
inflation. Wilkie (1995) also proposed a vector autoregressive (VAR) approach that jointly
models price and wage inflation.
1.2.2 Dividend Yield
The log-transformed dividend yield, taking away its long-run mean, is described as a transfer
function model with input inflation and an AR(1) noise.
log y(t)− logµy = wy · δq(t) + yn(t),
yn(t) = ay · yn(t− 1) + zy(t),
|ay| < 1, zy(t) i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2y),
where y(t) is the dividend yield in the year [t−1, t), µy is the long-run mean of the dividend
yield, ay is the autoregressive factor of the noise process, and σq is the standard deviation
of the innovation term of the noise process.
The June series of price index and total return index of the S&P500 from January 1926
to December 2014 (monthly) are used. Data up to December 2009 are obtained from
Morningstar, Inc., with later series obtained from Bloomberg. We have 88 observations for
fitting the dividend yield model. The fitted parameters are reported in Table 1.2.
The reduced model in Table 1.2 refers to the model with insignificant parameters (at 5%
level) omitted.
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Wilkie (1995) Estimated Parameter (SE)
US Full Reduced
1926–1989 1926–1989 1926–2014 1926–1989 1926–2014
wy 0.5 −0.2683 (0.5219) −0.4405 (0.4686) – –
µy 0.043 0.0449 (0.0048) 0.0313 (0.0101) 0.0444 (0.0047) 0.0309 (0.0097)
ay 0.7 0.7985 (0.0763) 0.9382 (0.0384) 0.7985 (0.0762) 0.9368 (0.0387)
σy 0.21 0.1669 (0.0150) 0.1624 (0.0123) 0.1673 (0.0150) 0.1632 (0.0124)
Table 1.2 Parameter estimates of the US dividend yield model: 1926-2014. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
The inclusion of inflation as an input reflects the cascade structure of the model. (Wilkie,
1986) argued that ‘...dividends, which are measured in money terms, ought, other things
being equal, to be related to the general level of money prices elsewhere in the economy’.
Hence, a high rate of inflation should theoretically result in a high dividend yield (i.e.
wy > 0). However, the estimated wy for 1926–1989 and 1926–2014 are below zero and far
from Wilkie’s estimate of 0.5. This is inconsistent with the original model assumption. The
high standard error associated with the estimate further suggests that inflation does not
drive dividend yields in the way the model specifies. Wilkie (1995) acknowledges that it is
not essential to include wy. It appears that real dividends do not necessarily perform well
in times of unstable prices (i.e. high and uncertain inflation). Huber (1997) showed that wy
only captures an extreme relationship between the two and is sensitive to outliers. Hence a
reduced model is estimated in Table 1.2. Dropping wy, the model reduces to an AR(1) for
log y(t).
1.2.3 Dividend Index
The dividend index process is modelled through the exponential rate of dividend growth.
It is described as a transfer function model with multiple inputs from inflation, from the
random shocks to previous dividend yields, and an independent invertible MA(1) process.
δd(t) = log
D(t)
D(t− 1) ,
δd(t)− µd = wd · dm(t) + (1− wd) · δq(t) + yd · zy(t− 1) + bd · zd(t− 1) + zd(t),
dm(t) = (1− dd) · dm(t− 1) + dd · δq(t),
0 ≤ dd ≤ 1, |bd| < 1, zd(t) i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2d),
where δd(t) is the dividend growth in the period [t − 1, t), D(t) is the dividend index at
time t, µd is the long-run mean of dividend growth in excess of inflation, dm(t) is the
exponentially weighted average of inflation up to time t, dd governs the smoothness of
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dm(t) (the smaller the value, the more responsive it is to current inflation), yd measures the
effect of the previous shocks to the dividend yield, and σd is the standard deviation of the
innovation. Consistent with Wilkie (1995), wd is set to 1 and dd to 0.38. See Section 1.2.5
for a note on pre-selecting these weights.
The total return index assumes reinvestment of gross dividends. The Dividend Index,
D(t), is constructed from the Price Index, P (t), and the Total Return Index TR(t), as
D(t) = TR(t)TR(t−1)P (t−1)−P (t). The implied annual dividend yield is calculated by y(t) = D(t)P (t) .
We have 88 observations for dividend index, and 87 dividend growth observations due to
log differencing. The fitted parameters are reported in Table 1.3.
Wilkie (1995) Estimated Parameter (SE)
US Full Reduced
1926–1989 1926–1989 1926–2014 1926–1989 1926–2014
dd 0.38 0.38 – 0.38 – 0.38 – 0.38 –
µd 0.0155 0.0095 (0.0080) 0.0128 (0.0073) 0.0096 (0.0078) 0.0129 (0.0069)
yd −0.35 0.0539 (0.1008) 0.0880 (0.0901) – – – –
bd 0.5 −0.6370 (0.0995) −0.5753 (0.1083) −0.6474 (0.0967) −0.6004 (0.1062)
σd 0.09 0.1671 (0.0151) 0.1572 (0.0120) 0.1675 (0.0152) 0.1581 (0.0121)
Table 1.3 Parameter estimates of the US dividend growth model: 1926–2014. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
The inflation effect on the dividend growth rate is captured in the first two terms, with
the total weight assigned to current inflation being 1−wd +wd · dd, and the weight assigned
to inflation going back τ years being wd · (1− dd) · dτd. It is immediate that past inflation
has a diminishing effect on the current rate of dividend growth.
The dividend yield effect is modelled through the inclusion of yd · zy(t− 1). Note that
zy(t− 1) is lagged by 1. This reflects the assumption that ‘investors can take into account
the unexpected change in dividend yield in the previous period, in order to forecast changes
in dividends in the coming year, as dividends are declared early’. This is consistent with
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Huber, 1997). Wilkie (1986) states that ‘an unexpected
fall in yields results in an upwards change in the dividend index in the following period’,
which implies yd < 0. Note that the reported parameters are not estimated under such a
constraint. If so, the resulting estimate is very close to zero.
The inclusion of bd · zd(t− 1) assumes that ‘companies pay out only part of any additional
earnings in dividends in one year, with a further part in the following year’ (Wilkie, 1986).
This implicitly assumes that the sign of bd is positive. Mathematically, this means that
a shock in dividend growth in the previous year will carry forward the same effect to
the current period. However, our estimated bd is uniformly below zero. This indicates a
dividend smoothing effect – previous shocks are carried forward as having opposing effects
in the next period.
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The dividend yield and index are combined to give the total return on stocks:
py(t) = log
{
D(t)/y(t) +D(t)
D(t− 1)/y(t− 1)
}
where py(t) is the annual total log return on stocks for the period [t− 1, t).
1.2.4 Long-Term Interest Rate
The long-term interest rate is modelled as a combination of inflationary and real components
through a transfer function model with a single input.
c(t) = wc · cm(t) + cr(t),
cm(t) = (1− dc) · cm(t− 1) + dc · δq(t),
log cr(t)− logµc = ac · {log cr(t− 1)− logµc}+ yc · zy(t) + zc(t),
0 ≤ dc ≤ 1, |ac| < 1, zc(t) i.i.d.∼ N(0, σ2c ),
where c(t) is the long-term interest rate at time t, wc is a factor moderating the impact of
current and past inflation, cm(t) is the exponential weighted moving average of inflation
up to time t, cr(t) is the real interest rate component at time t, µc is the long-run average
of the real interest rate, ac is the autoregressive parameter, yc measures the sensitivity of
the real interest rate to the current shocks to the dividend yield. Evidently the model is
nonlinear.
Huber (1997) pointed out that the parameters wc and dc cannot be determined using the
method of maximum likelihood or least squares, thus they are set to plausible values and
are set such that the inferred real interest rate is above zero. An alternative specification of
cm(t) is proposed by Wilkie et al. (2011):
cm(t) = min (dc · δq(t) + (1− dc) · cm(t− 1), c(t)− cmin) ,
where cmin = 0.5%. Note that with the changed form, cr(t) is at least cmin so that we can
always take the logarithm. To be consistent with Wilkie (1995), we set dc to be 0.058 and
wc to be 1.0. See Section 1.2.5 for a note on pre-selecting these weights.
The June series of Moody’s Seasoned AAA Corporate Bond Yield from January 1927
to December 2014 (monthly), obtained from federalreserve.gov, is used. We have 88
observations. The fitted parameters are reported in Table 1.4.
The Fisher Relation (Fisher, 1930) is explicitly assumed here through wc · cm(t). Wilkie
in his 1986 paper remarked that ‘as inflationary expectations have risen, so have interest
rates...[we] assume that the market’s expectations are influenced by the past history of
inflation’.
The dividend yield contribution is captured in the term yc · zy(t). It suggests that
an unexpected change in dividend yield has an effect on the real long-term interest rate
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Wilkie (1995) Estimated Parameter (SE)
US Full Reduced
1926–1989 1926–1989 1926–2014 1926–1989 1926–2014
dc 0.058 0.058 – 0.058 – 0.058 – 0.058 –
ac 0.96 0.9598 (0.0372) 0.9176 (0.0439) 0.9953 (0.0077) 0.9175 (0.0439)
µc 0.0265 0.0339 (0.0396) 0.0237 (0.0097) 0.0339 (0.0396) 0.0238 (0.0097)
yc 0.07 0.1060 (0.1265) 0.0237 (0.1398) – – – –
σc 0.21 0.2247 (0.0200) 0.2831 (0.0213) 0.2277 (0.0203) 0.2832 (0.0213)
cmin – 0.005 – 0.005 – 0.005 – 0.005 –
Table 1.4 Parameter estimates of the US long-term interest rate model: 1926-2014.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
(although the sign of yc is not stated). The log-transformed real component can be
alternatively seen as an AR(1) process. This implicitly gives rise to the assumption that
cr(t) is strictly positive.
Recall that yc captures the dividend yield effect on the long-term bond yield. We see that
the inclusion of yc has little effect on the other parameters, and the estimate is insignificant
at the 5% level. This indicates that in the sample periods studied, we do not tend to observe
any significant impact on long-term bond yields from unexpected changes in the dividend
yield. Dropping the term, the real component of the long bond yield reduces to an AR(1).
1.2.5 Fitting
Parameters reported are maximum likelihood estimates fitted using R. One can use a least
squares approach, which gives a close approximation to the maximum likelihood estimates
under normality assumptions on the noise processes. Details on estimation methods are well
described in Shumway and Stoffer (2010) and Brockwell and Davis (2013), among others.
We note that inconsistent data sources may contribute to the discrepancies between our
estimates and Wilkie’s. Starting values prior to the commencement of the series are set to
the unconditional means.
Certain parameter values were pre-selected (i.e. wd and dd in the dividend index model,
and wc and dc in the long-term interest rate model). This is done to 1) impose certain
dependence assumptions, and 2) simplify the estimation process. The values for wd and
wc are set to 1 to reflect the assumption that expected future inflation (expressed as an
exponentially weighted average of past inflation) has a unit impact on the dividend growth
and long-term interest rates processes. Pre-selecting dd and dc allows the model to be
conveniently estimated using pre-existing statistical software packages. In practice, dd can
be empirically determined by maximizing the likelihood function (numerically) within a
feasible domain of values (e.g. [0, 1]). The parameter dc on the other hand, cannot be
estimated using MLE (Huber, 1997).
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1926–2014 1951–2014
PSR Statistic p-value PSR Statistic p-value
Inflation 54.88 0.0000 17.50 0.0015
Log Dividend Yield 6.43 0.2668 6.20 0.1849
Dividend Growth 12.77 0.0257 6.89 0.1419
Log Real Long Bond Yield 5.04 0.4113 5.26 0.2619
Table 1.5 PSR Test for Stationarity
1.2.6 Selected Extensions to Wilkie’s ESG
Much work has been conducted extending Wilkie’s UK model as a whole. Notably, Chan
(1998) presented a continuous-time model constructed using stochastic differential equations
driven by Lévy processes; Whitten and Thomas (1999) and Chan et al. (2004) described
threshold autoregressive models; and Chan (2002) developed a general vector autoregressive
moving average (VARMA) model.
1.3 Model Robustness
This section assesses the robustness of Wilkie’s ESG, with particular attention paid to the
assumption of stationarity, structural breaks in the empirical processes, and parameter
stability. In general, model robustness refers to the insensitivity of the model specifications
to slight changes in the input data. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 plot the data.
1.3.1 Stationarity and Structural Breaks
Stationarity is a key assumption in real world economic scenario generators. It implies that
the economic series has a constant mean and an auto-covariance function independent of
time. This is important when projecting in the long term, since time trends in both the
mean and variance may result in explosions, yielding a significant number of implausible
scenarios. Recall that in Section 1.2, Wilkie’s ESG assumes stationarity for the processes of
inflation δq(t), log dividend yield log y(t), dividend growth δd(t), and log real long bond
yield cr(t). We test these assumptions using the Priestley-Subba Rao (PSR) method, a
nonparametric test of the overall stationarity of the complete second-order properties of a
time series. For details, see Priestley and Rao (1969)2. Results are summarized in Table 1.5.
Inflation and Dividend Growth fail the stationarity test at the 5% significance level.
The p−value for inflation is extremely small – time-varying volatility is suspected to be
the primary cause. Inflation appears to fluctuate around a constant mean, but prior to
the 1950s – during the world wars and postwar recessions – it is highly volatile. We see
2We used the R package fractal with default inputs for this analysis.
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Figure 1.2 Inflation, dividend yield, long-term bond yield (1927-2014)
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Figure 1.3 Inflation, dividend yield, dividend growth (1927-2014)
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similar results for the dividend yield and growth rates. At this stage, one may question the
relevance of data prior to the late 1950s, as there appears to be a shift in the dynamics
among series around this time. There is little evidence that dividend yields or interest
rates are positively driven by inflation prior to the late 1950s. However, shortly after,
dividend yields and long-term interest rates begin to follow inflation more closely, in a
mildly lagged manner. This raises the question of a structural shift in the underlying data
generating process. To assess whether structural shifts were present, we examined the data
for statistically significant change points.
Our analysis on structural shifts is relevant in assessing model robustness, since the
construction of the model does not assume the presence of change points. In essence, we
know that the ESG is an approximation to the true data generating process, but the true
process may not be stationary as assumed by Wilkie’s ESG, evidently shown in Figures 1.2
and 1.3. The literature on change point analysis is rich, using both parametric and non-
parametric methods. For a comprehensive introduction to change point analysis, see for
example Basseville and Nikiforov (1993) and Brodsky and Darkhovsky (2013). We have
used a univariate multiple change point detection for the individual series, in the absence
of an appropriate multivariate method. This will indicate changes in the structure of the
individual series, but will not identify changes in the relationships between series.
We use Auto-PARM3 to detect structural breaks in the inflation, dividend yield, and
long-term bond yield models. This method is selected due to its simple execution, and
because its parametric assumptions are largely consistent with the Wilkie model. We note
that in this study, the procedure can only be applied to series with AR(1) assumptions.
Structural breaks in the dividend index model remain to be investigated.
Results are reported in Table 1.6. Change points are estimated to exist for inflation at
years 1952 and 1992, and for the log real interest rates at year 2003. This is illustrated in
Figure 1.4.
Segmentation AR order
Inflation 1926-1951 1
1952-1991 1
1992-2014 0
Log Dividend Yield 1926-2014 4
Log Real Interest Rate 1926-2002 1
2003-2014 0
Table 1.6 Auto-PARM output: 1926-2014
The 1952 inflation breakpoint marks the end of large-scale, post-world-war recessions.
The 1992 break in inflation signifies the beginning of the ‘modern experience of US inflation’
3See Davis et al. (2006) for a detailed description of the method. We would like to thank Professor Davis
for providing us with the executable file.
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Figure 1.4 Inflation, dividend yield, and long-term bond yield, with estimated structural
breaks.
(Reed, 2014). Since 1992, we see very modest volatility in inflation. The deflation in 2009 is
caused by the global financial crisis. We also see lesser momentum (that is, no significant
serial correlations), which suggests an AR model may have become inappropriate. It is
argued that, after the inflation experience in the 1970s and early 1980s, the Federal Reserve
system has focused more strongly on maintaining price stability through implicit and explicit
(post 2012) inflation-targeting procedures. Price inflation since then has been dramatically
more tamed than any other time in the past 90 years (see, e.g., Goodfriend, 2004).
We could reduce the influence of data before the change points by restricting the period
of data used to calibrate the model. However, if we are to use the model for long-term
projections of economic scenarios, which in actuarial terms means perhaps 10-30 years,
we prefer to retain as much data as possible for model calibration. In Table 1.5 a small
improvement in the p−value for inflation is observed for the data set 1951–2014, though
there is still strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity. It is suspected
that the remaining non-stationarity comes from the high inflation period during the 1970s,
largely attributed to the oil crises. The remaining series pass the PSR test.
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1.3.2 Parameter Stability
In practice, it would be undesirable to have a model with parameters that are highly
sensitive to changes in the input data. This implies high model uncertainty, which leads to
unreliable interpretation of the model’s output. Wilkie et al. (2011) studied parameter
stability for UK data using an iterative approach, considering successive starting dates
from 2004 back to 1926, with each data set ending in 2014 (Huber (1997) used a similar
approach). We repeated the calculations for US data, and found that results were very
similar to the UK experience.
Using an increasing sample window means that the fitted parameters have a tendency to
stabilize. We also considered stability using a moving window approach, with fixed 30-year
data periods. Note that 30 years of raw data generates 29 observations of inflation, dividend
yield, long-term interest rates, and 28 observations of the dividend growth rate. The
estimates along with 95% CIs are plotted in Figures 1.5, 1.6, 1.7, and 1.8. The line labeled
estimates represents parameters fitted to the intervals [u, u+ 29], where 1926 ≤ u ≤ 1985.
Inflation
In Figure 1.5, it is observed that the estimates are not smooth over time, due to small
numbers of observations. Note that the very high inflation experience during the 1970s
causes a considerable rise in aq, which lasts 30 consecutive periods due to the length of
the window. This gives rise to the question of whether these data should be included. A
study with observations 1974-1981 removed was conducted with no significant improvement
observed.
Dividend Yield
The [1973, 2002] and [1976, 2005] parameters are estimated using conditional least squares,
due to the non-convergence of the MLE estimates in the feasible domain of parameters (i.e.
|ay| < 1). The [1974, 2003] to [1976, 2005] models have µy highly inflated, due to ay being
near its boundary. The parameter wy rises as late 1970s observations enter the window,
indicating a strengthened inflationary effect. This mirrors the conclusion of Huber (1997)
which argues that wy is sensitive to outliers and tends to capture co-movements between
inflation and the dividend yield in extreme conditions.
Dividend Growth
The estimates for the dividend growth model change quite sharply compared to the other
models. This is due to the MA(1) coefficient, which is more difficult to estimate than the
AR(1) coefficient. Overall, we observe considerable uncertainty surrounding the dividend
growth model, especially bd and yd.
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Figure 1.5 Inflation: moving window (30 years) of estimates and 95% CIs. Top to bottom:
µq, aq, and σq.
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Figure 1.6 Dividend yield: moving window (30 years) of estimates and 95% CIs. Left to
right: wy and µy (top), ay and σy (bottom).
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Figure 1.7 Dividend index: moving window (30 years) estimates and 95% CIs. Left to
right: µd and yd (top), bd and σd (bottom).
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Figure 1.8 Long-term interest rate: moving window (30 years) of estimates and 95% CIs.
Left to right: µc and ac (top), yc and σc (bottom).
Long-Term Bond Yield
The moving estimates for long-term bond yields are shown in Figure 1.8. Large uncertainty
is seen for the high inflation period, in particular for ac and σc. Parameters are relatively
stable for the remaining sample periods.
1.3.3 Backtesting
The performance of the Wilkie model is assessed in this section. To backtest the model for
30 years, we first fit to data from 1951–1984; we use these parameters to project 10,000
scenarios of thirty years, and compare the path of the historical observations since 1985 with
the distribution of paths generated by the model. Parameters can be found in Table A.2.
The simulation results are illustrated in Figures 1.9 and 1.10. Figure 1.9 shows the 5%,
25%, 50%, 75% and 95% quantiles of inflation, total log return on stocks, and long-term
bond yield, along with three selected (joint) random paths. Scenarios A and C start with
similar experiences in inflation, and then differ after around three years. We observe that
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higher inflation tends to translate to higher volatility in total stock return, with more
emphasis on the upside. This is attributed to the positive inflation effect on dividend growth.
Dividend yield, which is also positively affected by inflation, is less able to counteract the
positive inflation effect on dividend growth. Further note that in the longer term, higher
inflation translates to higher long-term interest, whereas shorter term projections (i.e. less
than 10 years) appear more random.
Figure 1.10 compares the accumulated simulated quantiles with the out-of-sample data
(1985–2014). Let A(0) = 1, and let the subscript py denote total return on stocks. The
accumulation factors A(t), t > 0 are defined as follows:
Aq(t) = exp
(
t∑
s=1
δq(s)
)
, Apy(t) = exp
(
t∑
s=1
py(s)
)
, Ac(t) =
t∏
s=1
(1 +Rc(s))
where Aq(t) is the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Apy(t) is the total stock returns index, and
Ac(t) is the value of a $1 10-year bond portfolio assuming annual repurchasing4, respectively
at time t.
We observe that the model has tended to overestimate inflation, underestimate total
return on stocks, and performed relatively well for long-term interest. It is worth pointing
out that the 1990s bull market was historically unprecedented, with persistent returns on
stocks between 15% and 20% each year. Inflation also experienced a structural shift, which
impacts predictive accuracy. These findings are also apparent in Figure 1.10 (plotted in log
scale). Inflation is projected to be much more volatile than observed, and simulated long-
term bond yields exhibit behaviour in the right tail that is not reflected in the out-of-sample
data. This, together with the study of parameter stability, highlights that regime changes
have a discernible impact on the performance of the model and hence the validity and
power of its projections. This is a common problem when one uses fixed model structures
and parameters for long-term scenario projections.
We illustrate the dependency structure in the model in a scatterplot of pairwise rank
pseudo-observations. The pseudo-observations are computed by scaling the rank of each
observation by n+ 1, n being the total number of observations (see Figures 1.11 and 1.12).
We additionally report the estimated Kendall’s Taus in Table 1.7. We see that total stock
returns appear essentially independent of inflation and long-term interest rates, and that
bond yields are mildly positively correlated with inflation. So far, we are unable to comment
on whether such dependence structure is reasonable – a much larger data set is required.
This study is conducted for all 1 ≤ t ≤ 30 with similar results obtained.
The purpose of updating the parameters, and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of
the model is to allow us to use the model with a better understanding of the underlying
assumptions. Although we know that structural changes in the underlying processes may
not be well captured, still, the model allows us to investigate potential asset and liability
paths over long terms.
4Rc(t) = (1+c(t−1))
10
(1+c(t))9 − 1.
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Figure 1.9 Wilkie’s ESG (fitted to 1951–1984): Funnel-of-doubt plots of simulated obser-
vations with three illustrative joint scenarios. Top to bottom: inflation, total stock returns,
long-term bond yields.
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Figure 1.10 Wilkie’s ESG (fitted to 1951–1984): Funnel-of-doubt plots (log-scale) of
simulated accumulation factors, with out-of-sample (1985-2014) observations. Top to
bottom: inflation, total stock returns, long-term bond portfolio returns.
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Figure 1.11 Wilkie’s ESG (fitted to 1951–1984): Simulated 30-year-forward observations
(333 simulations for each year) with out-of-sample observations (1985–2014) overlaid and
marked in grey.
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Figure 1.12 Wilkie’s ESG (fitted to 1951–1984): 10,000 pseudo observations (component-
wise ranks scaled by 1/10001) of simulated observations for year 30.
26
1.3 Model Robustness
1.3.4 Other ESGs in the Public Domain
While some research focused on extending Wilkie’s ESG by addressing some of its limitations
(as referenced in sections 1.2 and 1.3), there exist alternative ways of jointly modelling
economic series for long-term use. Here, we briefly comment on how Wilkie’s ESG compares
with three selected ESGs for which some details are in the public domain: Ahlgrim et al.
(2005), Hibbert et al. (2001) and Sherris and Zhang (2009). Our interest in these ESGs
primarily stems from their alternative modelling approach.
Hibbert et al. (2001) describe a flexible ESG with four economic series: inflation, real
interest rates, the equity risk premium (returns over the risk free short rate) and dividend
yields. The frequency of the models varies; the real interest and inflation models are
continuous time, two factor models which create a term structure for both real interest and
inflation. The equity model is specified as a regime switching Markov model with generic
time step, but it is used as a monthly model in the illustrations. The specification as a
monthly model does not translate to the same model in other frequencies, however.
The Hibbert et al. (2001) model is influenced by Wilkie (1986), Wilkie (1995), Chan
(1998) and Hardy (2001). The parameter estimation method used by Hibbert et al. (2001)
is not explicit, which creates a barrier to independent assessment of the model, and to
updating and backtesting the model and parameters. They do compare their model with
sample scenarios from the Wilkie model, and in particular critique the possibility of low
inflation and high interest rates, or low interest rates and high inflation in the Wilkie model.
They also opine that the Wilkie model underestimates the probability of significant equity
losses over longer terms, as a result of the mean reversion in the Wilkie equity processes.
The Ahlgrim et al. (2005) ESG considers six economic variables: inflation, interest rates,
stock returns, dividend yield, property and unemployment rates. It is a P measure model,
calibrated to US data, with different sample periods for each series. It employs a monthly
frequency. The model is influenced by Hibbert et al. (2001), with similar mathematical and
economic assumptions. The real and nominal interest rate models in the Ahlgrim et al.
(2005) ESG are identical to the Hibbert et al. (2001) ESG, except that inflation is described
as a one-factor model. It too models the excess return on stocks with a regime-switching
process, only it distinguishes between large cap and small cap stocks. Similar to the Hibbert
et al. (2001) ESG, the overall dependence is captured by the interplay of the driving forces
(i.e. correlated Brownian motions).
The Sherris and Zhang (2009) ESG is a P measure, multivariate and global Regime-
Switching Vector Autoregressive Model (RS-VAR) of a quarterly frequency, calibrated
to Australian data from 1979 to 2006. It simultaneously models the log return of eleven
economic variables, namely, GDP, CPI, equity, dividend, 90-day treasury notes yields, 2-year
treasury bond yields, 10-year treasury bond yields, average weekly earnings, unemployment,
property, and US 2-year treasury bond yields. Among these, CPI (i.e. inflation) and the
unemployment rates are selected to be regime-switching. The dependencies among the
variables are modelled through a regime-switching multivariate normal innovation process.
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Similar to the Wilkie model, the Hibbert et al. (2001) and Ahlgrim et al. (2005) ESGs
assume the Fisher relation, in that inflation and real interest rates are combined to give
nominal interest rates. However, instead of modelling short term and long-term interest
rates as the Wilkie model and the Sherris and Zhang (2009) ESG, the Hibbert et al. (2001)
and Ahlgrim et al. (2005) ESGs model the entire yield curve. Further, in the Ahlgrim
et al. (2005) and Hibbert et al. (2001) ESGs, total returns on equity are directly modelled,
as opposed to Wilkie’s inferred total returns through dividends. The total stock return
in Sherris and Zhang (2009) is obtained from combining price return and dividend yield.
The Sherris and Zhang (2009) ESG stands out as being explicitly data driven, whereas the
Wilkie model, the Ahlgrim et al. (2005) and Hibbert et al. (2001) ESGs to some extent,
combine economic theory and empirical experience.
1.4 Comparison to a generic ESG
To investigate the relative performance of Wilkie’s ESG, we construct a generic ESG. The
generic ESG is constructed based on the model specifications in Hibbert et al. (2001) and
Ahlgrim et al. (2005), which share numerous similarities as described in section 1.3.4, and
include features that are, to our best knowledge, commonly found in both public access
and certain proprietary ESGs. The generic ESG is simplified yet it captures the essence
of these models in that it is a continuous-time model and that dependence is partially
captured by correlated Brownian motions. We are interested in the performance of this
generic ESG compared to the Wilkie model, particularly in the long-term. This leads to
the investigation of the joint distribution of future variables (i.e. the simulated scenarios).
Model specification of the generic ESG is given below.
1.4.1 Model Specification of the Generic ESG
i. Inflation: δq(t)
dδq(t) = κq {µq − δq(t)} dt+ σqdBq(t)
ii. Real interest rates: short-term rate r(t), long-term rate l(t)
dr(t) = κr {l(t)− r(t)} dt+ σrdBr(t)
dl(t) = κl {µl − l(t)} dt+ σldBl(t)
iii. Total equity returns: s(t), regime switching excess returns x(t)
s(t) = δq(t) + r(t) + x(t)
x(t) | ρ(t) i.i.d.∼ N
(
µρ(t), σ
2
ρ(t)
)
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where ρ(t) is the regime at time t. The model is governed by the transition matrix
P =
(
p11 p12
p21 p22
)
where pij denotes the probabilities of changing regimes, namely,
pij = Pr [ρ(t+ 1) = j | ρ(t) = i] , i, j = 1, 2.
The unconditional probability pii of being in state i at any point in time is
pii =
pji
pji + pij
.
iv. The underlying dependence among the economic series is captured by correlated
standard Brownian motions (Bq(t), Br(t), Bl(t))T with correlation matrix
Σ =
 1 ρqr ρqlρqr 1 ρrl
ρql ρrl 1
.
v. The generic ESG (excluding stock returns) can be alternatively expressed using
independent standard Brownian motions (W1(t),W2(t),W3(t))T , as
dδq(t) = κq{µq − δq(t)}dt+ σqdW1(t)
dr(t) = κr{l(t)− r(t)}dt+ ρqrσrdW1(t) + σr
√
1− ρ2qrdW2(t)
dl(t) = κl{µl − l(t)}dt+ ρqlσldW1(t) + σl ρrl − ρqlρqr√
1− ρ2qr
dW2(t)
+ σl
√√√√1− ρ2ql − (ρrl − ρqlρqr)21− ρ2qr dW3(t)
1.4.2 Data and Fitting of the Generic ESG
The generic ESG is fitted to the same data source as described in section 1.2.5 except on a
monthly frequency. The choice of using monthly observations is due to the regime-switching
component of the equity model, which requires a large sample size. We additionally use
the monthly series of the 3-month US treasury bill, obtained from federalreserve.gov, to fit
the short rate model. The reported parameters are maximum likelihood estimates. The R
package yuima is used to calibrate the inflation and interest rate models, and MSwM for
the stock returns model.
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1.4.3 Backtesting the Generic ESG
As with section 1.3.3, we fit the generic ESG to data from 1951–1984 and project 10,000
scenarios 30 years forward. The estimated parameters are reported in Table A.2. Since the
ESG is fitted to monthly observations, the projections are simulated on a monthly basis
and combined to produce annual observations, such that the output is comparable with
Wilkie’s ESG. Figure 1.13 gives the funnel-of-doubt plots with three in-sample simulated
paths (figure 1.9 is scaled and positioned to the left for the ease of comparison). Figure 1.14
(plotted in log scale) plots the funnel-of-doubt of the simulated accumulation process from
the Wilkie and the generic ESG. In the following subsection, we highlight key observations
when comparing the output to Wilkie’s ESG.
Comparison to Wilkie’s ESG
Inflation:
The generic ESG outputs close medians with Wilkie’s ESG, but a much narrower range
of scenarios, especially in the lower tail. In the long run, deflations are projected to
occur 3.5% of the times under the generic ESG, compared to 10.5% under Wilkie’s ESG.
The simulated accumulation process for the generic ESG yields lower uncertainties (i.e.
a thinner funnel): the out-of-sample accumulation path falls below the 5% quantile after
15 years. The difference is caused by the stronger mean reversion in the generic ESG.
Total stock returns:
Stock returns scenarios generated by the generic ESG have moderately higher medians.
The distribution in each future year is left-skewed, with a thicker left tail than the right.
Wilkie’s ESG, on the other hand, is almost symmetric. In each projection year, the
generic ESG gives a narrower range of scenarios than Wilkie’s ESG. However, in the
accumulation process, the range of scenarios produced is wider with a thicker left tail
(see figure 1.16 for a comparison of estimated densities at year 10). This is due to serial
dependence. The out-of-sample path falls consistently above the 25% quantiles.
Long-term interest rates:
The bond yields scenarios produced by the generic ESG have lower medians than Wilkie’s
ESG. Overall, a smaller range of scenarios is generated, particularly in the right tail.
In year 30, the generic ESG projects a 3.1% chance of yields exceeding 0.1, which is
significantly lower than Wilkie’s projection of a 22.2% chance. Volatility in a single path is
high, resulting in bond yields that change drastically from year to year. The distribution
at each year is symmetric, whereas Wilkie’s ESG gives significant right-skewness.
Pairwise dependence:
The generic ESG outputs similar pairwise dependence to Wilkie’s ESG. Table 1.7 compares
the estimated Kendall’s Taus with Wilkie’s ESG. Figure 1.12 plots the 30-year-forward
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observations overlaid with out-of-sample data. We observe positive dependence between
inflation and nominal long-term interest rates, and very weak dependence between stock
returns and inflation/nominal long-term interest rates. We additionally provide the
following comments:
I The generic ESG introduces dependence through addition and correlated driving
forces. The former creates dependence based on economic theory; the latter captures
leftover dependence that is not explained by the construction. This setup is rigid, with
dependence imposed. It is also different from the Wilkie model, under which certain
parameters governing dependence may be set to zero (or estimated to be statistically
insignificant from zero, implying little evidence to support such a relationship).
I The correlation matrix Σ in the generic model could alleviate, if necessary, the
degree to which dependence is imposed. For example, a (highly) negative correlation
coefficient estimate is obtained for the driving forces underlying inflation and the real
short rate, since the real short rate is constructed ex post by subtracting inflation
from the nominal short rate.
Inflation & Stock Inflation & Bond Stock & Bond
Wilkie’s ESG 0.0557 0.1723 0.0539
Generic ESG −0.0102 0.2465 0.0613
Table 1.7 Estimated Kendall’s Tau at year 30: based on 10,000 simulated observations
(models fitted to 1951–1984).
1.4.4 Numerical Challenges
The generic ESG requires a total of 17 parameters, and joint estimation of the full model is
computationally challenging due to the large number of parameters involved. The stock
returns model can be estimated separately. One may also break down the estimation
procedure by first considering the inflation model, then the long rate model, the short rate
model, and lastly the correlation parameters. Nonetheless, a large number of parameters
(a total of 7) are required to be estimated under the short rate model. In this case, the
calibration process is sensitive to the provided initial values for the parameters in the
estimation procedure. Wilkie’s full model requires 20 parameters, but the model can be
more easily calibrated due to the cascade structure. Some parameters are not necessarily
required. For example the model fitted to the 1991–2014 data requires 13 parameters.
One additional challenge of fitting the generic ESG lies in the estimation of the variance-
covariance matrix of the estimated parameters. This numerically estimated matrix can be
non-positive definite. In our analysis, the R function nearPD is used to obtain an estimate of
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a positive-definite variance-covariance matrix. Noise in monthly data (for example, inflation
prior to 1966) may also affect the plausibility of the fitted parameters.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12
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0.5 WilkieGeneric
Figure 1.16 Estimated probability density functions for an accumulated unit stock invest-
ment at year 10 (models fitted to 1951–1984).
1.5 Conclusion
We have updated Wilkie’s ESG to 2014 using US data and assessed its performance since
its introduction. We found that due to multiple structural shifts in the historical time series,
inflation most strongly violates the assumption of stationarity, and that parameters are
sensitive to the calibration period. We studied the dependency among the simulated obser-
vations and conclude that the model outputs total stock returns that appear independent of
inflation and long-term interest rates, and bond yields that are positively driven by inflation.
A backtest based on 30-year out-of-sample data indicated that over that period the model
had tended to overestimate inflation (due to a structural shift in inflation targeting policy
in the early 1990s), underestimate total return on stocks (due to the unprecedented dot-com
bubble in the 1990s), and performed relatively well for long-term interest rates. An analysis
that compares Wilkie’s ESG with a generically constructed ESG reveals that in the long
run, Wilkie’s ESG generates a wider range of scenarios for inflation and long-term interest,
but a narrower range for stock returns. Wilkie’s ESG can be under-representative of the
risk in long-term stock investment, particularly in the tails.
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Figure 1.13 Funnel-of-doubt plots of simulated observations with three illustrative joint
scenarios. Top to bottom: inflation, total stock returns, long-term bond yields. Left:
Wilkie’s ESG. Right: Generic ESG. Fitted to 1951–1984.
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Figure 1.14 Funnel-of-doubt plots (log-scale) of simulated accumulation factors, with
out-of-sample (1985–2014) observations. Top to bottom: inflation, total stock returns,
long-term bond portfolio returns. Left: Wilkie’s ESG. Right: Generic ESG. Fitted to
1951–1984.
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Figure 1.15 Generic ESG (fitted to 1951–1984): Simulated 30-year-forward observations
(333 simulations for each year) with out-of-sample observations (1985–2014) overlaid and
marked in grey.
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For investigating asset-liability management strategies for pension plans, the Wilkie
model is quite suitable, because the assessment is long-term and the pension assets are
relatively passively invested, so the annual time-step suffices5. Additionally, the relationship
between the assets and liabilities of a Defined Benefit pension plan is critically connected to
future inflation, real rates of interest, and real rates of return on stocks, so the multivariate
approach is a good fit to the problem. The uncertainties around the long-term stability
of the processes and parameters are relevant, however, there are benefits to a relatively
simple, static model, and Wilkie’s ESG does offer some insight into risk and volatility of
pension plans, taking into consideration the known limitations such as potentially thin left
tails for equity returns. Parameter uncertainty may be addressed using sensitivity analysis,
and model risk can also be explored, for example, by comparing results using the Wilkie
model with more crude independent models for the various processes, or with the Hibbert
et al. (2001) model with suitably adjusted parameters.
5Where a more frequent time step is required, Wilkie et al. (2003) suggest using a Brownian bridge, or
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) bridge, which create paths constructed to follow a Brownian or OU process, but
which are constrained to start and finish at the specified (year end) points generated by the annual model.
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Recursive Preferences
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an introductory discussion of recursive preferences, which are adopted
in Chapter 3 as a normative preference model in solving problems of optimal retirement
planning. Recursive preference models were first introduced by the seminal work of Epstein
and Zin (1989), and in essence, characterize the tradeoff between the current-period utility
and the utilities to be derived from all future periods, summarized with a single index
which is referred to as the certainty equivalent of all future utilities. The most commonly
adopted model of this general class of utility functions is the homothetic, constant elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (CES) case of Kreps and Porteus (1978) preference with an
expected-utility certainty equivalent. We refer to this as the Epstein-Zin utility.
Traditionally, life-cycle and long-term portfolio selection problems consider the decision-
making framework of a rational agent who seeks to maximize her time-additive expected
discounted lifetime utility (EDLU). The intertemporal aspect of EDLU is the discounted
utility (DU) framework, which was introduced by Samuelson (1937). In this work, it was
explicitly assumed that future gratification can be discounted and aggregated in a fashion
that resembles the present value of future cash flows. This, combined with the expected
utility theory formulated by Bernoulli in 1738 and Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944),
gives the time-additive EDLU.
The Epstein-Zin preference characterizes an important extension to this framework in
the case of the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. The model relaxes
the assumption that the parameter governing relative risk aversion (RRA) is set to the
reciprocal of the parameter governing the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS),
disentangling risk and time preferences. This separation is considered important, since
RRA and EIS describe entirely different behaviour, and there is no obvious reason why
such a restriction should be imposed. When separately parameterized, the model gains
flexibility in describing preferences across time and possibilities.
To date, the Epstein-Zin utility is typically used as a generalization of the traditional
approach of time-additive EDLU-CRRA. This extension is straightforward to incorporate
numerically in stochastic optimization, since its recursive nature allows multi-period prob-
lems to be solved sequentially as multiple single-period problems (i.e. today versus the
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future), which naturally complements the framework of dynamic programming. In this
thesis, we consider Epstein-Zin agents and the implications of this preference model to be
used for normative optimal retirement planning.
Before considering a full-blown problem, this chapter first sets the scene by considering
a simplified problem, where the agent is age 65 and just about to retire, and has unit
wealth to invest (in a single asset) and consume throughout her remaining lifetime. Note
that the Epstein-Zin preference is intertemporally homothetic, meaning that behaviour is
scale-invariant. The implication is that rich and poor agents have identical preferences,
rendering wealth irrelevant. In this case, we are able to derive analytically the optimal
consumption decisions, allowing one to isolate the impact of the preference, economic, and
mortality assumptions on the optimal solutions. This allows the reader to appropriately
interpret the results presented in Chapter 3.
A key contribution of this chapter is on the impact of EIS on the smoothness of the optimal
consumption profile. In the literature on life-cycle investing, there exists a misconstrued
notion that in the presence of an uncertain future lifetime, the EIS is a parameter that
governs consumption smoothing or substitutability over time (see e.g. Horneff et al., 2015;
Blake et al., 2008; Horneff et al., 2008b). We show that this does not, in general, hold
true. Additionally, we show that the most widely used Epstein-Zin specification (used in:
Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Horneff et al., 2015; Horneff et al., 2009; Horneff et al.,
2008b; Horneff et al., 2008c; Blake et al., 2008) is not a generalization of the time-additive
EDLU-CRRA model: imposing the reciprocal relationship between the RRA and the EIS
does not necessarily give rise to the solutions underlying the time-additive EDLU-CRRA
models. This implies that it is inaccurate for these works to state that freeing this reciprocal
relationship is a relaxation of the time-additive EDLU-CRRA preference. These key findings
imply that many existing works using the Epstein-Zin utility model should be revisited,
and their conclusions should be reinterpreted with caution.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces notation and defines the
Epstein-Zin utility function. In section 2.3, a risk-free, single-period problem is solved,
and later extended to consider financial risk. In section 2.4, we consider a multi-period
problem, and derive analytical expressions for the optimal strategies under 1) risk-free, 2)
risky investment, and 3) risky inflation scenarios. In section 2.5, the problem is extended to
include a uncertain future lifetime, where three recursive preference specifications that differ
in the treatment of mortality risk, are considered, with results of the optimal strategies
shown and compared. The key conclusion of this chapter is highlighted in this section. The
last section concludes the chapter.
2.2 Definition and Notation
The Epstein-Zin preference model is rigorously defined in Epstein and Zin (1989). Here, we
provide a description of the utility function without going into the rigorous mathematical
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details. Let t = 0, 1, ..., n denote time. Consider an agent aged x at time 0 who dies with
probability 1 at time n+ 1. Let Ct and C˜t be the nominal and real consumption for the
period [t, t+ 1), respectively. We assume consumption occurs at the beginning of the period.
Similarly, let Wt and W˜t be the nominal and real wealth before consumption at time t,
respectively; W0 = W˜0 = 1.
The class of recursive preferences is defined by characterizing the time-t utility index as,
Vt = A
[
C˜t, µt(Vt+1)
]
,
where A[u, v] is the time aggregator function, and µt(w) is the certainty equivalent of a
random payoff w at time t. The Epstein-Zin utility function has a CES aggregator and an
expected-utility certainty equivalent, namely
A(u, v) =
[
u1−
1
α + βv1−
1
α
]1/(1− 1
α
)
, µt(w) =
[
Et
(
w1−ρ
)]1/(1−ρ)
,
where α ∈ (0,∞) \ {1} is the parameter governing the EIS1, ρ ∈ (0,∞) \ {1} the RRA, and
β ∈ (0, 1] the subjective impatience factor. The optimal consumption strategy is therefore
{C˜∗0 , C˜∗1 , ..., C˜∗n} = arg max V0.
Here, we use the superscript ∗ to denote the optimal strategies. It can be easily shown that
when ρ = 1/α,
max V0 ≡ maxE0
[
n∑
t=0
βt
(
C˜1−ρt
1− ρ
)]
,
which yields the maximization of time-additive EDLU-CRRA with exponential discounting
factor β.
2.3 Single-Period
2.3.1 Risk-free
Consider a simple single-period problem where n = 1. First, suppose there is no risk
associated with the future, no inflation, and that the investment return (i.e. interest rate)
rf over the period is deterministic. As such, C˜t = Ct. Consider an Epstein-Zin utility
maximizing agent. Using Bellman’s principle of optimality, the optimization problem can be
solved using backward induction. At time 1, it is optimal to consume all remaining wealth
thus C∗1 = (1− C0)(1 + rf ). The utility derived from a given consumption path (C0, C∗1 ) is
U(C0, (1− C0)(1 + rf )) = {C1−
1
α
0 + β[(1− C0)(1 + rf )]1−
1
α }
1
1− 1α .
1The derivation of EIS is shown in Appendix B.1. Havranek et al. (2015) collected 2735 estimates of the
EIS from 169 published studies covering 104 countries, and found majority of these estimates to be less
than 1. Hence, we pay particular interest to the parameter range 0 < α < 1.
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For fixed α and rf , we seek to maximize U with respect to C0, which yields the optimal
consumption at time 0:
C∗0 = arg max
C0
U = β
−α(1 + rf )1−α
1 + β−α(1 + rf )1−α
= 11 + βα(1 + rf )α−1
.
Note that the optimal savings at time 0 is implied, as 1− C∗0 .
In the risk-free case, we focus on investigating the impact of α on the optimal consumption
path. In particular, we are interested in the volatility of the optimal consumption over time,
since EIS governs intertemporal substitutability. In the single period case, it suffices to look
at the slope of the consumption path since it gives a measure equivalent to consumption
volatility. Here, the slope can be computed as
S∗ = C∗1 − C∗0 = 1 + rf +
2 + rf
1 + βα(1 + rf )α−1
.
The higher its absolute value, the higher the consumption volatility. Figures 2.1 and 2.2
plot C∗0 as a function of α and rf for two choices of β. Figures 2.3 and 2.4, similarly, plot
|S∗| = |C∗0 − C∗1 |. Table 2.1 summarizes (C∗0 , C∗1 ) for some key parameter combinations.
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Figure 2.1 Optimal consumption at time 0 as a function of α and rf . Left: β = 1.0. Right:
β = 0.96.
β = 1.0 β = 0.96
α = 0.2 α = 0.5 α = 0.2 α = 0.5
rf (C∗0 , C∗1 ) Slope (C∗0 , C∗1 ) Slope (C∗0 , C∗1 ) Slope (C∗0 , C∗1 ) Slope
0.00 (0.500, 0.500) 0.000 (0.500, 0.500) 0.000 (0.502, 0.498) −0.004 (0.505, 0.495) −0.010
0.02 (0.504, 0.506) 0.002 (0.503, 0.508) 0.005 (0.506, 0.504) −0.002 (0.508, 0.502) −0.005
0.04 (0.508, 0.512) 0.004 (0.505, 0.515) 0.010 (0.510, 0.510) −0.000 (0.510, 0.510) −0.000
0.06 (0.512, 0.518) 0.006 (0.507, 0.522) 0.015 (0.514, 0.516) 0.002 (0.512, 0.517) 0.005
Table 2.1 Optimal consumption paths: a single-period model
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Figure 2.2 Contour plot of optimal consumption at time 0 as a function of α and rf
(lighter shades imply higher C∗0 ). Left: β = 1.0. Right: β = 0.96.
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Figure 2.3 Slope of optimal consumption path as a function of α and rf . Left: β = 1.0.
Right: β = 0.96.
41
Chapter 2 Recursive Preferences
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
,
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
rf
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
,
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
rf
Figure 2.4 Contour plot of slope of optimal consumption path as a function of α and rf
(lighter shades imply higher |S∗|). Left: β = 1.0. Right: β = 0.96.
We first consider the special case where β = 1.0 and rf = 0, so that there is no subjective
discounting of consumption in the future and that consuming less today will not result
in an increase in the aggregate wealth. In this case, the retiree’s aggregate consumption
over the lifetime is unity regardless of her present consumption choice. We obtain that
C∗0 = C∗1 = 0.5, implying that the agent chooses the smoothest possible consumption path,
regardless of α which governs the strength of the smoothing preference.
We further summarize the following key observations:
As rf increases, the slope of the consumption paths rises and the income effect dominates
the substitution effect.
As α increases, the magnitude of the slope rises, implying a more volatile consumption
path.
In absence of subjective discounting, a higher α is associated with higher savings. In
the presence of subjective discounting, a higher α implies lower savings when rf is lower,
and higher savings when rf is higher. The implication is that higher savings behaviour
does not automatically translate to smoother consumption behaviour.
More generally, when β = 11+rf , the optimal consumption is independent of α. This
explains the observation that at rf = β−1 − 1, the contour plots shown in Figure 2.2
become flat. As a result, when the real interest rate is higher than β−1 − 1, a higher α
implies higher savings (and lower present consumption); when the real interest rate is
lower than β−1 − 1, a higher α implies lower savings (and higher present consumption).
Consumption and savings behaviour in the presence of a negative real interest rate follows
the same principle.
In the presence of subjective discounting, agents tend to consume more at time 0 and
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save less. This is intuitive as subjective discounting implies that future gratification is
considered less important than the present.
2.3.2 Risky investment
The problem can be extended to include a risky investment return. Suppose instead of
a risk-free interest rate rf , the investment return, R, is a random variable. In turn, the
optimal consumption at time 0 becomes:
C∗0 = arg max
C0
V0 = arg max
C0
{
C
1− 1
α
0 + β(1− C0)1−
1
α (1 + µ)1−
1
α
} 1
1−1/α
= 11 + βαµα−1
where µ =
{
E[(1 +R)1−ρ]
} 1
1−ρ − 1. We observe that this is a generalization of the result
obtained in the previous example, where µ is the certainty equivalent of the return on
investment for an agent with RRA ρ. For a fixed investment opportunity set, a higher RRA
translates to a lower certainty equivalent µ, and hence the agent effectively exhibits similar
behaviour to that when faced with a lower rf in the risk-free example. Similarly, for an
alternative investment opportunity set, the resulting certainty equivalent investment return
can be interpreted in the same vein as with the risk-free example.
2.4 Multiple-Period
2.4.1 Risk-free
Two-period
To further investigate the impact of α on consumption volatility, we extend the single-
period case to the n-period case. For illustrative purposes, we first solve the two-period
case. Suppose the risk-free rate for the first period and the second period are r1 and r2,
respectively. Let W1 denote the wealth before consumption at time 1. The time t utility
index, Vt, is therefore
Vt =
{
C
1− 1
α
t + βV
1− 1
α
t+1
} 1
1−1/α
, for t = 0, 1
V2 = C2.
Intuitively, we obtain the optimal consumption in the last period based on full consumption
of remaining wealth:
C∗2 = arg max
C2
V2 = (W1 − C1)(1 + r2). (2.1)
43
Chapter 2 Recursive Preferences
Hence,
max
C1
V1 =
{
C
1− 1
α
1 + β
[
max
C2
V2
]1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
=
{
C
1− 1
α
1 + βC∗2
1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
.
Then, the optimal consumption at time 1 is
C∗1 = arg max
C1
V1 = arg max
C1
{
C1
1− 1
α + βC∗2
1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
= arg max
C1
{
C1
1− 1
α + β[(W1 − C1)(1 + r2)]1−
1
α
} 1
1−1/α by Equation (2.1)
= W11 + βα(1 + r2)α−1
. (2.2)
Note that this is identical to solving the single-period problem, with starting wealth W1
instead of 1. We know that W1 = (1− C0)(1 + rf ), meaning that C∗1 and C∗2 can both be
expressed as functions of C0. Thus we have
C∗1 =
(1− C0)(1 + r1)
1 + βα(1 + r2)α−1
,
C∗2 = βα(1 + r2)α
( (1− C0)(1 + r1)
1 + βα(1 + r2)α−1
)
= βα(1 + r2)αC∗1 .
In turn, the optimal consumption at time 0 can be solved by
max
C0
V0 = max
C0
{
C
1− 1
α
0 + βC∗1
1− 1
α + β2C∗2
1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
= max
C0
C1− 1α0 + β
( (1− C0)(1 + r1)
1 + βα(1 + r2)α−1
)1− 1
α
+ β2
[
βα(1 + r2)α
( (1− C0)(1 + r1)
1 + βα(1 + r2)α−1
)]1− 1
α

1
1−1/α
.
Then, we obtain that
C∗0 = arg max
C0
V0 =
1
1 + βα(1 + r1)α−1 + β2α[(1 + r1)(1 + r2)]α−1
.
Figure 2.5 shows several pairs of consumption paths for varying β and rf . We clearly
observe that a larger α leads to a steeper slope, therefore larger changes in consumption
over time.
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Figure 2.5 Optimal consumption path: two-period example. r1 = r2 = rf .
n-period
Comparing the optimal consumption for the single-period and the two-period cases, it is
immediate that the optimal solution for an n-period problem can be generalized into an intu-
itive analytical expression. Consider an n-period problem with consumption {C0, C1, ..., Cn},
wealth before consumption {W0 = 1,W1, ...,Wn}, and risk-free interest rate {r1, r2, ..., rn}.
The time t utility index, Vt, is given by:
Vt =
{
C
1− 1
α
t + βV
1− 1
α
t+1
} 1
1−1/α
, for t = 0, ..., n− 1
Vn = Cn.
It is immediate that we can obtain the following (by full consumption of wealth at time n
and then solving the single-period problem with initial wealth Wn−1):
C∗n = Wn = (Wn−1 − Cn−1)(1 + rn),
C∗n−1 =
Wn−1
1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1
. (2.3)
By substitution, we can obtain the relationship between C∗n−1 and C∗n:
C∗n = (Wn−1 − C∗n−1)(1 + rn)
= Wn−1(1 + rn)
(
βα(1 + rn)α−1
1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1
)
= βα(1 + rn)αC∗n−1. (2.4)
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Moving backward to n− 2, we aim to maximize:
max
Cn−2
Vn−2
= max
Cn−2
{
C
1− 1
α
n−2 + βC∗n−1
1− 1
α + β2C∗n
1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
= max
Cn−2
{
C
1− 1
α
n−2 + βC∗n−1
1− 1
α + β2[βα(1 + rn)αC∗n−1]
1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
by Equation (2.4)
= max
Cn−2
{
C
1− 1
α
n−2 +
(
β + β2[βα(1 + rn)α]1−
1
α
)
C∗n−1
1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
= max
Cn−2
{
C
1− 1
α
n−2 +
(
β + β2
[
βα−1(1 + rn)α−1
])( Wn−1
1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1
)1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
by Equation (2.3)
= max
Cn−2
C1− 1αn−2 + (β + βα+1(1 + rn)α−1)
((Wn−2 − Cn−2)(1 + rn−1)
1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1
)1− 1
α

1
1−1/α
= max
Cn−2
{
C
1− 1
α
n−2 +
(
β + βα+1(1 + rn)α−1
[1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1]1−
1
α
)
[(Wn−2 − Cn−2)(1 + rn−1)]1−
1
α
} 1
1−1/α
.
Note that this takes a very similar form as Equation (2.2). We hence obtain that
C∗n−2 =
Wn−2
1 +
(
β+βα+1(1+rn)α−1
[1+βα(1+rn)α−1]1−
1
α
)α
(1 + rn−1)α−1
= Wn−2
1 + βα(1 + rn−1)α−1 + β2α [(1 + rn)(1 + rn−1)]α−1
. (2.5)
Consequently, the relationship between C∗n−2 and C∗n−1 can be obtained by combining
Equations (2.3) and (2.5):
C∗n−1 =
Wn−1
1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1
= (Wn−2 − C
∗
n−2)(1 + rn−1)
1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1
=
(
Wn−2 − Wn−21+βα(1+rn−1)α−1+β2[(1+rn)(1+rn−1)]α−1
)
(1 + rn−1)
1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1
= ...
= βα(1 + rn−1)αWn−2
(
1 + βα(1 + rn−1)α−1 + β2 [(1 + rn)(1 + rn−1)]α−1
)−1
= βα(1 + rn−1)αC∗n−2. (2.6)
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In general, it can be shown that, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
C∗k = βα(1 + rk)αC∗k−1,
C∗k−1 =
Wk−1
1 +∑n−k+1i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−1+j)α−1 .
We prove these relationships by mathematical induction, as follows.
Proof. We have shown that the following hold true:
C∗n = βα(1 + rn)αC∗n−1, (2.7)
C∗n−1 = βα(1 + rn−1)αC∗n−2. (2.8)
And also,
C∗n = Wn, (2.9)
C∗n−1 =
Wn−1
1 + βα(1 + rn)α−1
, (2.10)
C∗n−2 =
Wn−2
1 + βα(1 + rn−1)α−1 + β2α [(1 + rn)(1 + rn−1)]α−1
. (2.11)
Suppose that for some 1 < k < n, the following hold true:
C∗l = βα(1 + rl)αC∗l−1, k ≤ l ≤ n (2.12)
C∗k−1 =
Wk−1
1 +∑n−k+1i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−1+j)α−1 (2.13)
We need to show that,
C∗k−1 = βα(1 + rk−1)αC∗k−2, (2.14)
C∗k−2 =
Wk−2
1 +∑n−k+2i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−2+j)α−1 . (2.15)
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We begin by expressing the optimization problem at time k − 2,
max
Ck−2
Vk−2 = max
Ck−2
C1− 1αk−2 + β
[
max
{Ck−1,...,Cn}
Vk−1
]1− 1
α

1
1− 1α
= max
Ck−2
{
C
1− 1
α
k−2 + βC
∗
k−1
1− 1
α + β2C∗k
1− 1
α + ...+ βn−k+2C∗n
1− 1
α
} 1
1− 1α
= max
Ck−2
{
C
1− 1
α
k−2 + βC
∗
k−1
1− 1
α + β2
(
βα(1 + rk)αC∗k−1
)1− 1
α + ...
...+ βn−k+2
β(n−k+1)α n−k+1∏
j=1
(1 + rk−j)αC∗k−1
1− 1α

1
1− 1α
= max
Ck−2
C1− 1αk−2 + C∗k−11− 1αβ
1 + n−k+1∑
i=1
βiα
i∏
j=1
(1 + rk−j)α−1

1
1− 1α
Let A = 1 +∑n−k+1i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−j)α−1. Substituting Equation (2.13), we obtain,
max
Ck−2
Vk−2 = max
Ck−2
{
C
1− 1
α
k−2 + βA
(
Wk−1
A
)1− 1
α
} 1
1− 1α
= max
Ck−2
{
C
1− 1
α
k−2 + βA
1
α [(Wk−2 − Ck−2)(1 + rk−1)]1−
1
α
} 1
1− 1α
⇒ C∗k−2 =
Wk−2
1 + βαA(1 + rk−1)α−1
= Wk−2
1 + βα(1 + rk−1)α−1(1 +
∑n−k+1
i=1 β
iα
∏i
j=1(1 + rk−j)α−1)
= Wk−2
1 +∑n−k+2i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−2+j)α−1 . (2.16)
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Hence, we have shown that Equation (2.15) holds. To prove Equation (2.14), we take
C∗k−1β
−α(1 + rk−1)−α =
Wk−1β−α(1 + rk−1)−α
1 +∑n−k+1i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−1+j)α−1
=
(Wk−2 − C∗k−2)(1 + rk−1)β−α(1 + rk−1)−α
1 +∑n−k+1i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−1+j)α−1
=
(
Wk−2 − Wk−21+∑n−k+2
i=1 β
iα
∏i
j=1(1+rk−2+j)
α−1
)
(1 + rk−1)β−α(1 + rk−1)−α
1 +∑n−k+1i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−1+j)α−1
=
Wk−2
( ∑n−k+2
i=1 β
iα
∏i
j=1(1+rk−2+j)
α−1
1+
∑n−k+2
i=1 β
iα
∏i
j=1(1+rk−2+j)
α−1
)
βα(1 + rk−1)α−1 +
∑n−k+1
i=1 β
(i+1)α∏i
j=1(1 + rk−1+j)α−1(1 + rk−1)α−1
=
Wk−2
( ∑n−k+2
i=1 β
iα
∏i
j=1(1+rk−2+j)
α−1
1+
∑n−k+2
i=1 β
iα
∏i
j=1(1+rk−2+j)
α−1
)
∑n−k+2
i=1 β
iα
∏i
j=1(1 + rk−2+j)α−1
= Wk−2
1 +∑n−k+2i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−2+j)α−1
= C∗k−2
Hence, (2.14) is shown. By mathematical induction, it must be true that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n,
C∗k = βα(1 + rk)αC∗k−1,
C∗k−1 =
Wk−1
1 +∑n−k+1i=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rk−1+j)α−1 .
The optimal consumption solution for the n-period problem is thus summarized by:
C∗0 =
1
1 +∑ni=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rj)α−1 , (2.17)
C∗t = βα(1 + rt)αC∗t−1, t = 1, ..., n. (2.18)
It can be additionally deduced that the optimal savings can be expressed as follows:
W0 − C∗0 =
∑n
i=1 β
iα∏i
j=1(1 + rj)α−1
1 +∑ni=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rj)α−1 , (2.19)
Wt − C∗t =
(1 + rt)
∑n−t
i=1 β
iα∏i
j=1(1 + rt+j)α−1
1 +∑n−ti=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + rt+j)α−1
(
Wt−1 − C∗t−1
)
. (2.20)
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The impact of α on the consumption path is shown in Figures 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8, where the
volatility in consumption is expressed as a function of α, for short and long period examples.
Here, consumption volatility is computed by taking the sample standard deviation, namely√∑n
t=0(C
∗
t −C∗)2
n . It is shown that in general, consumption volatility is positively related to
the value of α. Hence, a lower parameter α leads to a stronger preference for consumption
smoothing over time.
Figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 plot the optimal consumption paths for n = 45 for varying
interest rate assumptions. We choose 45 to illustrate the consumption profile for a life aged
65 and living to age 110. It is apparent that in all three cases α = 0.02 gives a smoother
consumption path, in the sense that consumption is least volatile.
In the case of constant interest rates, we have the following observations:
i. When β(1 + rt) > 1, consumption rises over time (as per Equation (2.18)). To consume
more in the present is perceived2 as more “costly”, in the sense that this effectively
reduces the perceived aggregate consumption over the lifetime. In this case, a higher
α leads to a lower consumption in the present due to a higher willingness to substitute
(i.e. replacing the more expensive good/choice with a less expense alternative).
ii. When β(1 + rt) < 1, consumption declines over time (as per Equation (2.18)). To
consume less in the present is perceived as more “costly”, since perceived returns on
savings are negative. In this case, a higher α leads to a higher consumption in the
present.
iii. When β(1 + rt) = 1, consumption stays constant and maximum smoothing is attained
regardless of the value of α. In Figure 2.6 where β = 0.96, rt = 0.04, and β(1 + rt) ≈ 1,
α has a negligible impact on volatility.
In the case of changing interest rates, we simulate a sequence of interest rates from
U(−0.04, 0.06) of size 45 (plotted in Figure 2.13). Note that this is treated as a deterministic
sequence of returns. Similar observations are made as with constant interest rates, only that
the overall direction of the consumption path depends on the combined effect of β(1 + rt),
∀t.
Figure 2.12 plots the optimal savings in the case of r1 = ... = r45 = 0.02. The main take
away is that a lower α does not always imply lower savings when interest rates are positive.
Savings again depend on the combined effect of β and rt.
2The term ‘perceived’ is used due to the presence of subjective discounting β. When β = 1, the perceived
aggregate consumption over lifetime equals the actual aggregate consumption.
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Figure 2.6 Consumption volatility: r1 = ... = r45 = 0.04.
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Figure 2.7 Consumption volatility: r1 = ... = r45 = 0.02.
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Figure 2.8 Consumption volatility: rt generated from U(−0.04, 0.06).
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Figure 2.9 Consumption: 45-period example. r1 = ... = r45 = 0.04.
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Figure 2.10 Consumption: 45-period example. r1 = ... = r45 = 0.02.
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Figure 2.11 Consumption: 45-period example. rt generated from U(−0.04, 0.06).
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53
Chapter 2 Recursive Preferences
2.4.2 Risky investment
The problem can be further generalized by stochastic interest rates or returns on investment.
Consider again an n-period problem with stochastic interest rates {R1, R2, ..., Rn}. Note
that when interest rates are random variables, at any time t, for all u > t, Cu and Wu are
random variables (and by extension so is Vu). For simplicity, we assume that interest rates
are independent over time. We do not, however, require them to be identically distributed.
The time t utility index, Vt, is given by:
Vt =
C1− 1αt + βEt (V 1−ρt+1 )
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
, for t = 0, ..., n− 1,
Vn = Cn.
The optimal consumption solution takes the following form,
C∗0 =
1
1 +∑ni=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + µj)α−1 ,
C∗t = βα(1 + µt)α−1(1 +Rt)C∗t−1, t = 1, ..., n,
µt =
[
Et(1 +Rt)1−ρ
] 1
1−ρ − 1.
The proof of this result follows analogously from the risk-free case, hence it is omitted. For
an agent with RRA ρ, 1 + µt is the certainty equivalent of the return 1 +Rt. The higher
the RRA, the lower the certainty equivalent. Thus, solutions involving investment risk can
be interpreted similarly to a risk-free problem. This result can be further generalized to
a time-evolving RRA, where µt =
[
Et(1 +Rt)1−ρt
] 1
1−ρt − 1 and ρt is the RRA for period
[t− 1, t). This extension only holds true if the function ρt is known to the agent at time 0,
which ensures that preferences are time-consistent (hence Bellman’s principle of optimality
applies).
2.4.3 Risky inflation
We can further incorporate a risky inflation process, since it is more reasonable that utility
be derived from real consumption, rather than the nominal level. Consider again an n-period
problem with stochastic interest rates {R1, R2, ..., Rn}, and let {δ1, δ2, ..., δn} be the annual
inflation rates that are independently but not necessarily identically distributed. Note
that Rt and δt need not be independent. Let {I0, I1, ..., In} denote the cumulative inflation
process such that,
I0 = 1; It =
t∏
s=1
(1 + δt) , 1 ≤ t ≤ n,
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Thus, we can define the real consumption and wealth before consumption to be, respectively,
C˜t =
Ct
It
, W˜t =
Wt
It
, 0 ≤ t ≤ n.
The time t utility index based on real consumption, Vt, is given by:
Vt =
C˜1− 1αt + βEt (V 1−ρt+1 )
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
, for t = 0, ..., n− 1,
Vn = C˜n.
Note that when δ1 = δ2 = ... = δn = 0, this reduces to the zero inflation problem discussed
in the previous section. The optimal consumption solution is thus,
C˜∗0 =
1
1 +∑ni=1 βiα∏ij=1(1 + µ˜j)α−1 ,
C˜∗t = βα(1 + µ˜t)α−1
(1 +Rt
1 + δt
)
C˜∗t−1, t = 1, ..., n,
µ˜t =
[
Et
(1 +Rt
1 + δt
)1−ρ] 11−ρ
− 1.
It is immediate that 1+Rt1+δt yields the real rate of return on investment for the period [t−1, t).
It may be convenient to simply define a real return process. However, under such an
assumption all values are expressed in real terms. This would restrict the investment
opportunities or financial products that are made available to the agent. For example, a
nominally fixed life annuity is not properly defined without an inflation process.
2.5 Uncertain lifetime
So far, we have worked under the assumption of a certain lifetime. For life-cycle modelling
purposes, such a stringent assumption is highly undesirable. It is natural that the n-period
deterministic case be extended to include an uncertain future lifetime.
With all else being equal, suppose that instead of being n, the remaining lifetime of an
agent aged x at time t is a continuous random variable, denoted by Tx,t. The survival
probability of this agent at time t, for at least u years, is denoted by
upx,t =
u∏
s=1
(1− qx+s−1,t+s−1).
where qx+s−1,t+s−1 is the mortality rate of a life aged x+ s− 1 at time t+ s− 1. Note that
qω−1 = 1 where ω ∈ Z+ is the terminal age, and that there is no uncertainty associated
with the mortality rates.
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The original work of Epstein and Zin (1989) defines a class of recursive preference models
for an infinitely lived agent. To date, there is no general agreement on how an uncertain
lifetime can be incorporated into these specifications. In this section, we examine three
preference specifications that incorporate uncertain future lifetimes. In subsection 2.5.1, we
first work in the absence of consumption risks (contingent on survival) to isolate the effect
of mortality risk. We refer to this case as “risk-free”. We then present the general solutions,
in subsection 2.5.2, where consumption risks are included.
2.5.1 Risk-free
Córdoba and Ripoll (2016)
Suppose the agent has age x at time 0, and recall that ρ denotes relative risk aversion. The
following formulation was proposed by Córdoba and Ripoll (2016),
Vt =
C1− 1αt + β [px+t,tV 1−ρt+1 + (1− px+t,t)V 1−ρ]
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
, t = 0, ..., ω − x− 1,
(2.21)
where V ≥ 0 is the perceived utility in the death state. Mechanically fixing V 1−ρ = 0, it
ultimately yields that,
Vt =
C1− 1αt + β [px+t,tV 1−ρt+1 ]
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
, (2.22)
=
{
C
1− 1
α
t + β(px+t,t)
1− 1α
1−ρ [Vt+1]1−
1
α
} 1
1−1/α
. (2.23)
The optimal consumption, contingent on survival, is therefore (steps omitted due to
simplicity),
C∗0 =
1
1 +∑ω−x−1i=1 βiα(ipx,0)α−11−ρ ∏ij=1(1 + rj)α−1 , (2.24)
C∗t =
[
β (px+t−1,t−1)
1−1/α
1−ρ
]α
(1 + rt)αC∗t−1, t = 1, ..., ω − x− 1, (2.25)
The impact is that β (px+t−1,t−1)
1−1/α
1−ρ constitutes the new impatience factor for the agent,
which we denote as β?. Notice that 0 ≤ β? ≤ 1 only if 1 − 1α and 1 − ρ are of the same
sign. This means if one is not careful, certain parameter combinations can result in β?  1,
especially when mortality rates are high. In the case of CRRA where α = 1ρ , this cannot
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happen. As such, this preference formulation can potentially produce strange consumption
paths, where mortality risk reduces impatience, rather than adding to it as it intuitively
should. A simple example that illustrates this counterintuitive behaviour is that when
α = 0.2, ρ = 0.5 and px,t = 0.01, meaning that survival to the next period is extremely
unlikely, the impact of mortality on discounting is 1 × 1016, which effectively yields an
extremely small consumption in the present, whereas intuition dictates that the agent
should consume more today since no utility is derived upon death, which is an extremely
likely event in the immediate future. In an extreme case when px,t = 0, β? can take the
value ∞ which implies that Vt = 0 for all Ct, which contradicts the logical unique solution
that C∗t = Wt. These observations suggest that such a formulation may not be ideal for an
application in retirement planning, which involves modelling the behaviour of agents with
rising mortality rates. If used, one should be careful in choosing the parameters governing
RRA and EIS such that mortality does not reduce impatience. For commonly adopted
parameters, this translates to cases where ρ > 1, 0 < α < 1, and ρ < 1α .
Bommier et al. (2017) provides a more in-depth critique of this preference model (including
the above observations), which is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, we proceed to
investigate numerically the impact of α on the optimal consumption path, within the set of
parameters that are relevant to our studies. We are particularly interested in the cases where
ρ > 1 and 0 < α < 1, so that β? cannot be greater than 1 (resulting in peculiar consumption
profiles). A full-blown investigation is of interest, but beyond the scope of this thesis. It
suffices to point out the main finding that under this preference formulation, a smaller α
does not necessarily lead to higher smoothness in consumption contingent on
survival. This is due to the distortion produced by the mortality component of β?, which
acts against consumption substitution: for 0 < α < 1, a smaller α leads to higher impatience
(i.e. a smaller β?), which leads to higher consumption in the present; however, a smaller α
also means the agent is less willing to give up consumption today for consumption in the
future. The net effect of the two opposing forces yields the overall consumption smoothness,
which is no longer monotone in α. This gives rise to an important message: under this
preference formulation, it may be difficult to evaluate the impact of the parameter α on
the optimal solutions, since its net effect on intertemporal substitutability and smoothing
is ambiguous. While it is meaningful to separate the parameterization of RRA and EIS,
users of this preference model should be aware of the non-monotone net effect of EIS on
consumption substitution in the presence of mortality, in order to accurately interpret the
optimal solutions.
Below, we illustrate this finding numerically and graphically (Figure 2.14), assuming
mortality3 follows the Cairns et al. (2006) model described in Appendix C.1.
3Mortality rates are deterministic over time, computed based on the median best estimates.
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Figure 2.14 Consumption volatility: Córdoba and Ripoll (2016).
Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
A commonly adopted recursive preference model in studies of life-cycle investment takes the
following form, which was to our best knowledge first described in Gomes and Michaelides
(2005). This preference model is adopted in many other studies in similar contexts, including
Horneff et al. (2015), Horneff et al. (2009), Horneff et al. (2008b), Horneff et al. (2008c)
and Blake et al. (2008). For t = 0, ..., ω − x− 1, we have
Vt =
(1− βpx+t,t)C1−
1
α
t + β
[
px+t,tV
1−ρ
t+1 + (1− px+t,t)b
(Wt+1/b)1−ρ
1− ρ
] 1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
,
(2.26)
where b governs the strength of the bequest motive. Note that this is a very similar
formulation to Córdoba and Ripoll (2016), except that utility in the death state is defined
as the utility derived from bequesting the remaining wealth, and that current consumption
is being scaled by a time-dependent factor between 0 and 1. Considering a zero bequest
motive and the transformation V ?t = Vt
(1−βpx+t,t)
1
1−1/α
, the form is equivalent to (due to
intertemporal homotheticity),
V ?t =
{
C
1− 1
α
t + β
(
1− βpx+t+1,t+1
1− βpx+t,t
)
(px+t,t)
1− 1α
1−ρ V ?t+1
1− 1
α
} 1
1−1/α
. (2.27)
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The optimal consumption, contingent on survival, is therefore (steps omitted due to
simplicity),
C∗0 =
1
1 +∑ω−x−1i=1 βiα(ipx,0)α−11−ρ ∏ij=1 ( 1−βpx+j,j1−βpx+j−1,j−1)α(1 + rj)α−1 , (2.28)
C∗t =
[
β
(
1− βpx+t,t
1− βpx+t−1,t−1
)
(px+t−1,t−1)
1−1/α
1−ρ
]α
(1 + rt)αC∗t−1, t = 1, ..., ω − x− 1.
(2.29)
Unlike Córdoba and Ripoll (2016), the net impatience factor β? = β
(
1−βpx+t+1,t+1
1−βpx+t,t
)
(px+t,t)
1− 1α
1−ρ
can be greater than 1 even if 1− 1α and 1− ρ are of the same sign, since px+t+1,t+1 < px+t,t.
This also implies that mortality can result in lower4 impatience, which as discussed above
is counterintuitive.
Moreover, when ρ = 1α , maximizing the time 0 utility index is not necessarily equivalent
to maximizing the time-additive EDLU-CRRA with exponential discounting. Setting α = 1ρ ,
to maximize V ?0 from Equation (2.27) is equivalent to:
max
{C0,...,Cω−x−1}
[
ω−x−1∑
t=0
(
1− βpx+t,t
1− βpx,0
)
βttpx,0
(
C1−ρt
1− ρ
)]
,
which is not necessarily5 equivalent to max{C0,...,Cω−x−1}
[∑ω−x−1
t=0 β
t
tpx,0
(
C1−ρt
1−ρ
)]
due to
the extra factor
(
1−βpx+t,t
1−βpx,0
)
. Hence, it is inaccurate to suggest that freeing the parameter α
is to move away from the framework of EDLU-CRRA, since maximizing the two expressions
does not necessarily give the same optimal solutions.
Figure 2.15 plots the consumption volatility as a function of α, which results in a similar
behaviour as the specification described in Equation (2.21), since the distortion of the
survival rate persists. Comparing the optimal consumption paths (Figure 2.16), the two
preferences lead to rather different consumption behaviour. Regardless, both specifications
lose the interpretation of α as a parameter governing consumption smoothing.
Li and Smetters (2010)
The following preference model is considered in Li and Smetters (2010) and Blake et al.
(2014), in which mortality acts as a source of impatience:
Vt =
{
C
1− 1
α
t + βpx+t,tV
1− 1
α
t+1
} 1
1−1/α
, t = 0, ..., ω − x− 1. (2.30)
4For example, consider ρ = 5, α = 0.6, β = 0.96, p65,0 = 0.9862, and p66,1 = 0.9851. This yields
β? = 0.9769 > 0.96.
5The equivalence is established when mortality is described by a constant force model, which is rarely used
as a realistic mortality model due to its strong assumptions.
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Figure 2.15 Consumption volatility: Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
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Figure 2.16 Consumption: Left: Córdoba and Ripoll (2016); Right: Gomes and Michaelides
(2005).
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Figure 2.17 Consumption volatility and consumption: Li and Smetters (2010).
The optimal consumption solution is therefore,
C∗0 =
1
1 +∑ω−x−1i=1 βiα(ipx,0)α∏ij=1(1 + rj)α−1 ,
C∗t = βα (px+t−1,t−1)α (1 + rt)αC∗t−1, t = 1, ..., , ω − x− 1.
This circumvents the need to define a utility index in the state of death, which is beyond
the scope of this thesis. This specification assumes that mortality expectation, combined
with β, gives the overall time impatience. It has several desirable properties:
i. When survival to the next period has probability zero, a unique consumption solution
is given at C∗t = Wt, which is logically sound.
ii. The new impatience factor βpx+t,t is in [0, 1], and will not be inflated to produce
unrealistic consumption paths due to the unconstrained relationship between α and ρ.
iii. The interpretation of the parameter α is made clear, which is the preference on
consumption volatility over time. Hence, its sole impact on the optimal consumption
profile is straightforward to interpret.
An implication of this specification is that mortality increases impatience, and this impact
is not related to the degree of risk aversion. Specifically, in a world without financial risks
and fixing EIS, all agents behave identically. This effectively means that agents are risk
neutral towards mortality risks and risk averse towards financial risks, which implies that
mortality and consumption risk aversions are parameterized differently. This is a potential
flaw, if one wishes to study the varying mortality risk aversion, or if capturing mortality
risk aversion is of particular importance to the investigation.
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2.5.2 General solutions
Below, we present the general solution to an optimal intertemporal consumption problem
with unit wealth at time 0, assuming that the agent is age x at time 0, and faces investment
risk, inflation risk, and mortality risk. Assuming no utility is derived from the death state,
the following Epstein-Zin specifications are considered. For t = 0, ..., ω − x− 1, we have
S1: Córdoba and Ripoll (2016)
Vt =
C˜1− 1αt + β [px+t,tEt (V 1−ρt+1 )]
1− 1a
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
(2.31)
S2: Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
Vt =
(1− βpx+t,t)C˜1− 1αt + β [px+t,tEt (V 1−ρt+1 )]
1− 1a
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
(2.32)
S3: Li and Smetters (2010)
Vt =
C˜1− 1αt + βpx+t,t [Et (V 1−ρt+1 )]
1− 1a
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
(2.33)
Note that the Et[·] is the conditional expectation at time t, taken on consumption risks
upon survival, since mortality risk is treated separately. To obtain the optimal consumption
profile, we seek to maximize V0 with respect to {C˜0, C˜1, ..., C˜ω−x−1}, which yields the
following,
S1: Córdoba and Ripoll (2016)
C˜∗0 =
1
1 +∑ω−x−1i=1 βiα(ipx,0)α−11−ρ ∏ij=1(1 + µ˜j)α−1 , (2.34)
C˜∗t =
[
β (px+t−1,t−1)
1−1/α
1−ρ
]α
(1 + µ˜t)α−1
(1 +Rt
1 + δt
)
C˜∗t−1, (2.35)
µ˜t =
[
Et
(1 +Rt
1 + δt
)1−ρ] 11−ρ
− 1. (2.36)
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S2: Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
C˜∗0 =
1
1 +∑ω−x−1i=1 βiα(ipx,0)α−11−ρ ∏ij=1 ( 1−βpx+j,j1−βpx+j−1,j−1)α(1 + µ˜j)α−1 , (2.37)
C˜∗t =
[
β
(
1− βpx+t,t
1− βpx+t−1,t−1
)
(px+t−1,t−1)
1−1/α
1−ρ
]α
(1 + µ˜t)α−1
(1 +Rt
1 + δt
)
C˜∗t−1, (2.38)
µ˜t =
[
Et
(1 +Rt
1 + δt
)1−ρ] 11−ρ
− 1. (2.39)
S3: Li and Smetters (2010)
C˜∗0 =
1
1 +∑ω−x−1i=1 βiα(ipx,0)α∏ij=1(1 + µ˜j)α−1 ,
C˜∗t = βα (px+t−1,t−1)α (1 + µ˜t)α−1
(1 +Rt
1 + δt
)
C˜∗t−1,
µ˜t =
[
Et
(1 +Rt
1 + δt
)1−ρ] 11−ρ
− 1,
for t = 1, ..., , ω − x− 1. As discussed, this can be further generalized to consider a time-
changing RRA, where ρ is replaced with ρt > 0. The proof follows analogously from the
risk-free case described in Section 2.4.1, and is hence omitted.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we provide an introductory discussion of Epstein-Zin preferences, which are
cases of the recursive specification of Epstein and Zin (1989), under the CES aggregator
and expected-utility certainty equivalent. The Epstein-Zin preference model is more flexible
than the time-additive EDLU models in that it allows for the separation of risk and time
preferences, which is appealing given the intricacy and the long-term nature of optimal
retirement planning.
The purpose of this chapter is to first investigate the implied behaviour for the representa-
tive agent and its plausibility. This is especially important since the study is of a normative
nature, that is, to prescribe rational retirement planning strategies. In this investigation, we
pay particular attention to whether the output can be interpreted, that is, whether it leads
to plausible behaviour given the context and expert knowledge. This allows sanity checks to
be performed in order to verify the validity and convergence of a more involved numerical
procedure. Specifically, we derive analytical solutions for a simple optimal consumption
problem for Epstein-Zin agents. We isolate the impact of relative risk aversion, elasticity of
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intertemporal substitution, time discounting, mortality risk, investment risk, and inflation
risk on the optimal consumption profile. We find that in the absence of mortality risk,
i. RRA impacts the certainty equivalent of risky returns on investment, such that a
higher RRA gives a lower certainty equivalent. The implication is that risky problems
(including risky investment and inflation) can be interpreted similarly to risk-free
problems;
ii. EIS governs consumption smoothing over time such that a lower EIS leads to a higher
smoothing preference. The effect of EIS depends on the relationship between time
discounting and the certainty equivalent of return on wealth, such that in cases when
the perceived certainty equivalent of real returns is close to 1, EIS has an insignificant
effect on smoothing;
For studying uncertain lifetime, we investigate three Epstein-Zin specifications that are
used in the literature on life-cycle investment. These models differ in their treatment of
mortality risks. We find that the preference models lead to different consumption profiles,
and that models S1 and S2 can be normatively implausible. Particularly the most commonly
adopted model S2, first described in Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and later used in Horneff
et al. (2015), Horneff et al. (2009), Horneff et al. (2008b), Horneff et al. (2008c) and Blake
et al. (2008), is found to contain highly undesirable normative properties due to high time
discounting (greater than 1 in some instances). This results in extremely high savings
at the expense of low consumptions at younger ages. We further clarify that S2 is not
necessarily a generalization of expected discounted lifetime utility maximization in the case
of constant relative risk aversion. This has been wrongly understood by the users of this
model. Additionally, we find that under models S1 and S2, the EIS no longer governs
consumption smoothing, implying that the parameter is not monotone in its effect on
consumption volatility over time. This suggests that the effects of EIS are ambiguous and
have been misinterpreted by the users of these preference specifications. The model S3,
in contrast, does not exhibit these behaviours and is hence more preferable in retirement
planning applications.
These results set the scene for the interpretation of results in Chapter 3, where a more
complex optimal retirement planning problem is considered. In treatment of mortality risk,
all three Epstein-Zin preference models are considered with results compared.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Retirement Planning under
Recursive Preferences
3.1 Introduction
Much effort has been made in modelling life-cycle investment and consumption problems,
with the first work of such dating back to Yaari (1965). More recent studies include
Boyle et al. (2015), Hanewald et al. (2013), Maurer et al. (2013), Horneff et al. (2010),
Horneff et al. (2008c), Blake et al. (2008) and Horneff et al. (2008b), etc. These studies
differ in the bundles of investment opportunities, annuitization products, restrictions on
annuity purchases, treatment of systematic or idiosyncratic longevity risks, preferences, etc.
Regardless, there is significant ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of the optimal
solutions. Specifically as to whether the resulting optimal solutions ought to be adopted
as practicable financial planning strategies, given the limitations of the assumptions (with
exception of Boyle et al. (2015)). Fundamentally, this ambiguity stems from the obscurity
of whether these researchers subscribe to the normative validity of the adopted preference
models.
This chapter takes a step in the direction of addressing the above concern. We investigate
the normative validity of the optimal consumption and investment strategies of a discrete-
time utility maximizing DC retiree who wishes to benefit from stock investment, longevity
insurance and inflation protection. We use a combination of qualitative and quantitative
criteria to evaluate the adequacy of the optimal consumption profile. Particular attention
is paid to the downside risk at extreme old ages.
This chapter considers the following investment vehicles: stocks, bonds, traditional
annuities products such as fixed, escalating nominal and inflation-indexed annuities, and a
Variable Payout Annuity (VPA), which is a group self-annuitization scheme offered as a
retirement income option by some DC pension plans. Additionally, this chapter extends
previous work by
i. investigating a broader set of risks,
This chapter was made possible by the facilities of the Shared Hierarchical Academic Research Computing
Network (SHARCNET:www.sharcnet.ca) and Compute/Calcul Canada.
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ii. adopting an economic scenario generator model that better reflects the interdependence
of financial risk factors,
iii. using Epstein-Zin preferences that are more flexible for modelling intertemporal
decision-making.
Specifically, we extend Boyle et al. (2015) by considering inflation risk, a stochastic invest-
ment opportunity set and Epstein-Zin preferences. Similar to Horneff et al. (2010), this
chapter pays particular attention to the value of the VPA. However, systematic longevity
and inflation risks are also incorporated. This work also extends Hanewald et al. (2013)
such that instead of optimizing among a set of pre-specified options, it investigates all
strategies within the given assumptions and the investment opportunity set. Our work
further compares three Epstein-Zin utility functions used in the literature, which we refer
to as S1 (see Córdoba and Ripoll, 2016), S2 (see Gomes and Michaelides, 2005; Blake et al.,
2008; Horneff et al., 2008c; Horneff et al., 2008b), and S3 (see Li and Smetters, 2010; Blake
et al., 2014).
The key contributions of this chapter are threefold: 1) the comparison of three Epstein-Zin
models in the context of retirement planning involving annuitization decisions, 2) proposing
a quantitative criterion for assessing the normative adequacy of the resulting optimal
consumption profiles, 3) the evaluation of the impact of pure time discounting on old-age
financial security. Specifically to the third point, we bridge the gap between the literature
on normative life-cycle investment and the economics literature on intertemporal decision-
making, by highlighting the paradox of assuming myopia in prescriptive long-term planning.
This contribution is substantial, since it raises serious doubt over the conclusions of almost
all existing works on normative life-cycle investing that involve pure time discounting.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1.1 describes the background of VPAs,
including recent work on this topic. Section 3.2 lays out the investment, mortality and
economic assumptions. Section 3.3 describes the criteria used to assess the normative
adequacy of the optimal consumption strategies. Section 3.4 extends the work of Boyle et al.
(2015) by introducing inflation risk and considering Wilkie’s economic scenario generator
(ESG) under time-additive expected discounted lifetime utility maximization framework.
Section 3.5 describes the full problem under Epstein-Zin preferences, with numerical results
presented in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 examines the optimal consumption profile, paying
particular attention to comparison of Epstein-Zin specifications (refer to the discussions
in Chapter 2), the normative validity of the results, and model uncertainty of the ESG.
Section 3.8 discusses the pure rate of time discounting, and assesses its critical impact
on old-age financial security. Section 3.9 discusses numerical challenges. The last section
concludes the chapter and discusses future directions.
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3.1.1 Variable Payout Annuities
VPAs are also known as ‘Variable Income Annuities’ and ‘Variable Participating Life
Annuities’, and resemble a group self-annuitization (GSA) scheme. It is a life annuity
with benefit payments that vary subject to the mortality experience of the pool, and the
investment performance of the fund in which the underlying reserve assets are invested,
relative to a pre-determined interest rate. Depending on the treatment of longevity risk,
the underlying mortality assumptions can be either time-varying or pre-specified. VPAs
have flexible designs that vary depending on the presence of guaranteed minimum benefits
and annuitants’ exposure to investment and longevity risks. For a summary of common
VPA features, see Vittas (2011).
VPAs can act as an annuity option offered to members of a defined contribution pension
plan, or as a retirement income product that can be purchased directly from a private
annuity provider1. An open VPA has the advantage of allowing for participation in the
higher but more volatile returns of stocks while providing protection against diversifiable
longevity risk, as well as avoiding annuitization risk and being offered at cheaper prices
(Vittas, 2011). On the other hand, in the absence of guaranteed minimum benefits, surviving
annuitants are to share the nondiversifiable (or systematic) longevity risk, that is to say,
the impact coming from the unexpected increase in the average longevity is not protected.
VPAs are attracting attention in recent years. For a comprehensive treatment, see
Dellinger (2006) and Vittas (2011). Horneff et al. (2010) studies the value of the VPA to a
retiree who is given the option of dynamically investing in stocks and bonds, and gradually
purchasing a VPA. Their work, however, does not take into account systematic longevity
risk. Boyle et al. (2015) conducts a similar study, allowing for systematic longevity risk and
access to the fixed annuity market. Both works consider a constant investment opportunity
set and a zero inflation environment. Hanewald et al. (2013), on the other hand, studies
the management of longevity risk (both idiosyncratic and systematic) through optimally
selecting among ten pre-specified portfolios comprised of fixed immediate/deferred life
annuities, inflation-indexed annuities, self-annuitization with phased withdrawals and a
GSA. All of these works, at least in part, consider an EDLU maximizing framework with a
risk averse CRRA agent.
3.2 Assumptions
Suppose at the time of retirement, assumed to be fixed at age x? = 65, the individual has
wealth W ? and needs to determine the optimal wealth allocation among,
i. investing in the stock market,
1For example, the University of British Columbia Faculty Pension Plan offers members the option to
convert all or a part of their DC account balance to a Variable Payment Life annuity. Sun Life Assurance
Company of Canada offers a VPA policy under the name “Sunflex Retirement Income”.
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ii. investing in long term bonds,
iii. annuitizing with an open-fund2 VPA with αV invested in stocks and the rest in long
term bonds, and
iv. annuitizing with a k × 100%3 inflation-indexed annuity (IIA) with the fee load λ,
subject to some objective function and preference model. At the beginning of each year
during retirement, say time t, the individual needs to decide on the optimal level of
consumption, and a portfolio strategy between stocks and bonds. In addition to past events,
she has the knowledge of
i. her wealth at t,
ii. the probability of her survival to the next period, px+t,t,
iii. the true conditional distribution of the returns on stocks and bonds over the period
[t, t+ 1), and
iv. the true conditional distribution of inflation over the period [t, t+ 1).
The two-factor Cairns, Blake and Dowd (CBD) mortality model, introduced by Cairns
et al. (2006), is used to allow for systematic longevity risk. Parameter choice is consistent
with Boyle et al. (2015) and Maurer et al. (2013). No idiosyncratic mortality is considered,
assuming that the VPA fund is open and is large enough to fully diversify away this risk.
We further assume that the annuity factor used to determine the VPA benefit is adjusted
on an annual basis to reflect the most up to date mortality experience. More precisely, we
define the annuity factor for a life currently aged x at time t to be,
a¨x,t =
ω−x−1∑
u=0
vuupˆx,t|F(t) = 1 +
ω−x−1∑
u=1
(1 + AIR)−u
{
u∏
s=1
(1− qˆx+s−1,t+s−1|F(t))
}
where F(t) is the filtration process generated by all information up to time t, ω is the
terminal age, and AIR stands for the assumed (or annuity) interest rate. The symbol hat is
used to denote the best estimate of the random variable, which is defined as the median.
As such, upˆx,t|F(t) is the time t best estimate of the survival probability of a life aged x at
time t for at least u years, and qˆx+s−1,t+s−1|F(t) denotes the best estimate, at time t, of
the mortality rate of a life aged x+ s− 1 at time t+ s− 1. For more information on the
computation of the best estimates, see Appendix C.1. In essence, the annuity factors are
computed annually, based on the most up-to-date best estimate of future mortality rates
(i.e. the median of the projected mortality rates given the most up-to-date information).
2At t = 0, the VPA has a large number of survivors all aged 65, with an equal number of new entrants
allowed at the beginning of each year starting from t = 1. For details, including the derivation of benefit
adjustment factors at time t, denoted by jt, see Boyle et al. (2015).
3The indexing factor k governs the level of inflationary effects on benefits from an IIA. For example, k = 0.6
implies that benefits are indexed to 60% of inflation in each year. Note that when k = 0, the IIA is
equivalent to a nominally fixed annuity (FA).
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We use the superscripts V and I to distinguish the annuity factor associated with the VPA
(i.e. a¨Vx?,t) and the inflation-indexed annuity (i.e. a¨Ix?,t).
3.3 Criteria for Normative Adequacy in
Consumption
Clearly, retirement consumption adequacy is highly subjective to individual circumstances.
One feasible approach is to set a minimum consumption threshold that represents the very
basic bundle of goods and services, including food, shelter, health expenses, and leisure.
Such a measure is however not suitable in our study, due to the scale-invariance property of
the preference model. A comparison to a minimum consumption threshold would be ad
hoc. Certainly, an investigation of a varying wealth level can be conducted, as such, the
focus shifts to savings adequacy, which is not the focus of this chapter.
As a benchmark, we use the consumption profile implied by a fully-indexed IIA payment
purchased with full wealth at retirement with fee load λ. A fully-indexed IIA provides
a consumption path fully protected under longevity, investment, and inflation risks, and
implies maximum consumption smoothness. For each time t, we compute the following
quantity as a relative measure for downside risk in consumption,
VaRa(RCt) = VaRa
 C˜∗tW ?
a¨I
x?,0(1+λ)
 = VaRa(C˜∗t )W ?
a¨I
x?,0(1+λ)
(3.1)
where RCt stands for the real consumption at time t relative to the benchmark consumption,
and VaRa(·) denotes the Value-at-Risk operator at a. We compute this quantity for
a = 0.01, 0.05.
The implication of this benchmark is a flat consumption profile in retirement, which
may not be supported by empirical findings. Empirical studies on consumption do not
generally focus on adequacy, but rather patterns in retirement. The general finding is
that consumption as a function of age is hump shaped, tracking the age profile of income
(Attanasio and Weber, 2010); and that consumption declines in retirement (jointly with
income) in many countries, including the US (Bernheim et al., 2001), the UK (Banks et al.,
1998), Japan (Wakabayashi, 2008) and Germany (Lührmann, 2010). Hurd and Rohwedder
(2013) summarizes several explanations for this phenomenon, ranging from voluntary to
involuntary reduction in consumption. Voluntary reduction includes 1) the cessation of
work-related expenses and 2) the substitution of home-produced goods for purchased goods.
Involuntary reduction includes 1) less than anticipated retirement financial resources, hence
the need to reduce consumption, 2) under-saving due to myopia, or involuntary retirement.
Nonetheless, there appears to be significant heterogeneity in consumption change at
retirement (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2013). Hence, the benchmark is not meant to represent
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an ‘ideal’ consumption path, but rather as a maximally attainable consumption path with
zero risk. Further work on normative consumption adequacy is warranted, but beyond the
scope of this thesis.
3.4 EDLU-CRRA and Single-Variable Grid
Search
First, consider a representative agent with CRRA preference with relative risk aversion
parameter ρ = 2. Let C = (C0, C1, ..., CT ) be the vector of nominal consumptions,
ω = (ωV , ωF , ω0, ω1, ..., ωT ) be the vector of asset allocation decisions, where ωV and ωF
denote the proportion of wealth allocated in the VPA and FA at time 0, and ωt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
denotes the proportion of equity allocation in the liquid wealth being held at time t. At
each time t, the individual seeks to maximize her expected discounted lifetime utility
max
ω,C
E [U(C)] = max
ω,C
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct)
]
= max
ω,C
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βt
(
C1−ρt
1− ρ
)]
,
where 0 < β ≤ 1 is the impatience or time discounting factor, suggesting that the individual
prefers present to future pleasure. In this section, we take β = 0.96, which is a standard
parameter choice in the existing literature (see, e.g., Yogo, 2016; Horneff et al., 2015; Blake
et al., 2014; Horneff et al., 2010; Horneff et al., 2009). We later re-examine this assumption
in Section 3.8.
Boyle et al. (2015) shows that under a certain set of assumptions, the optimal portfolio
strategy involves full annuitization and full consumption of annuity benefits. In this
subsection, we follow their footsteps and work under the assumption that the retiree
optimizes within this subset of strategies. The optimization problem is solved using the
Monte Carlo single-variable grid search method. We use 10,000 simulations to approximate
the expectation of total discounted lifetime utility. Since the optimal controls are reduced to
the annuitization choice at time 0 (i.e. ωV + ωF = 1), a single-variable grid search method
should suffice.
3.4.1 Optimizing Under Normal Stock Returns
To make our results comparable with Boyle et al. (2015), Maurer et al. (2013), Blake et al.
(2008), and Horneff et al. (2010), we assume that the continuously compounded stock return
process follows an i.i.d. normal distribution with µ = 4.078% and σ = 18.703%, and a fixed
2% risk-free interest rate. Ignoring the impact of inflation, where the IIA reduces to a fixed
annuity (FA, denoted by superscript F ), we are able to reproduce the results of Boyle et al.
(2015).
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3.4.2 Optimizing Under Wilkie’s ESG
We repeat the grid-search procedure with Wilkie’s ESG with 1991-2014 parameters (see
Table A.2 (L)) and 2014 starting values. The parameter σc is adjusted from 0.3893 to
0.1 to obtain a smoother bond yield process. The equity log return process under the
Wilkie model has a similar mean return of 4.5% and standard deviation of 17.7% compared
to the LN(4%, 18%2). The bond yield process, on average, fluctuates around 4.4% with
standard deviation 0.86%. For justifications of parameter choice see Chapter 1. We first
consider the optimal annuitization choice under the VPA and FA, without taking into
account purchasing power. For AIRV = AIRF = 3%, it is found that there exists a range
of αV , [33%, 62%], under which it is always optimal for the retiree to invest 100% in the
VPA. This range widens as the fee load λ rises, for details see Table 3.1.
λ 0.000 0.025 0.05 0.075 0.100
αV [33%, 62%] [19%, 76%] [9%, 84%] [4%, 91%] [0%, 96%]
Table 3.1 Ranges of αV that result in optimal allocation being 100% in the VPA, based
on 10,000 simulations
The VPA becomes significantly more attractive, being a direct result of Wilkie’s more
optimistic projections of fund returns. A higher AIRF tilts the balance, since the FA
guarantees a higher annual benefit. Table 3.2 summarizes the optimal allocation under an
AIR of 4%, and αV = 60%. A 60-40 asset mix is common in VPAs offered in the market,
hence of particular interest.
λ 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100
ωV 0.29 0.50 0.70 0.88 1.00
ωF 0.71 0.50 0.30 0.12 0.00
B0($000) 76.1 75.2 75.0 75.5 76.1
BV0 ($000) 22.1 38.0 53.3 66.9 76.1
BF0 ($000) 54.0 37.2 21.7 8.6 0.0
Table 3.2 Optimal allocations between the VPA and the FA under Wilkie’s ESG, W ? =
$1,000,000, αV = 0.6, AIRV = AIRF = 0.04, 10,000 simulations.
3.4.3 Seeking Protection Against Inflation
The question remains what should the retiree do to maintain a decent lifestyle (i.e. a decent
level of purchasing power) throughout retirement. To achieve this, a retiree would seek
protection against longevity risk and inflation risk. In this section, we take into account the
impact of inflation and study a retiree’s optimal consumption-investment decision under
71
Chapter 3 Optimal Retirement Planning under Recursive Preferences
the objective of maximizing expected total lifetime utility derived from real consumption,
C˜t. Recall in Chapter 2 that C˜t is defined as the nominal consumption Ct divided by the
cumulative inflation, where δt is the annual inflation of year [t− 1, t), and {It}t=Tt=0 is the
cumulative inflation process, such that
I0 = 1; It =
t∏
s=1
(1 + δt) , 1 ≤ t ≤ T,
and that real consumption for year t, conditional on survival, is,
C˜t =
Ct
It
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Table 3.3 shows that when real consumptions are considered, the VPA remains attractive,
but to a lesser degree. This marginal difference is surprising as the FA does not provide an
inflation protection. However, this can be explained by the fact that, inflation on average
lowers consumption levels by roughly 2.4% per annum, which implies for each additional
unit of risk, the individual is gaining less, resulting in her moving away from the previous
optimal decision and adjusting the risk exposure.
λ 0.000 0.025 0.050 0.075 0.100
ωV 0.28 0.47 0.65 0.81 0.97
ωF 0.72 0.53 0.35 0.09 0.03
B0($000) 76.1 75.1 74.8 75.1 75.9
BV0 ($000) 21.3 35.8 49.5 61.6 73.8
BF0 ($000) 54.8 39.3 25.3 13.5 2.1
Table 3.3 Optimal allocations between the VPA and the FA under Wilkie’s ESG, W ? =
$1,000,000, αV = 0.6, AIRV = AIRF = 0.04, inflation adjusted, 10,000 simulations.
Consider two alternatives to a FA that provide some degree of inflation protection, an
escalating nominal annuity (ENA) and an fully- indexed IIA distinguished by the subscripts
E and I. In an ENA, the benefits increase at a pre-determined rate and are fully known at
the time of purchase. A fully-indexed IIA, on the other hand, provides benefits that vary
at the rate of inflation, which means benefits are effectively fixed in real terms.
For this section, we assume the current market AIR is at the long term government bond
yield of 2.6%. The first benefit payment is computed by W ?a¨x?,0(1+λ) . We note that retirees
are exposed to some level of annuitization risk, as the current long term interest rate is
very low compared to the observations in the past decade. Wilkie’s ESG projects the long
term nominal interest rate to be 4.4%, and a long run average inflation expectation of 2.4%,
hence the chosen AIR is close to the long term real rate of interest, which Vittas (2011)
indicates to be an appropriate discount rate.
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Escalating Nominal Annuities
Escalating Nominal Annuities provide partial protection against inflation, depending on the
pre-determined guaranteed rate. We first consider an ENA with benefits growing annually
at 2%. Suppose the retiree only has access to an open-fund VPA and the ENA. We are
interested in the optimal annuitization decision that maximizes the retiree’s EDLU when
previous wealth and utility assumptions are retained. Let ωE denote the optimal proportion
of initial wealth allocated in the ENA, and BEt denote the ENA benefit received at time t.
Table 3.4 summarizes the optimal annuitization decisions.
λ 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
ωV 0.00 0.18 0.54 0.84 1.00
ωE 1.00 0.82 0.46 0.16 0.00
B0($000) 66.9 64.3 64.1 65.5 66.9
BV0 ($000) 0.0 12.0 36.1 56.2 66.9
BE0 ($000) 66.9 52.3 28.0 9.3 0.0
Table 3.4 Optimal allocations between the VPA and the ENA at 2%, under Wilkie’s ESG,
W ? = $1,000,000, αV = 0.6, AIRV = AIRE = 0.026, inflation adjusted, 10,000 simulations.
It is within expectation that despite the lower AIR, the ENA is more attractive to the
retiree than a FA as it can be sold at a much higher fee load. Consider the case when
λ = 0.10. The annuitant would allocate half of her initial wealth in the VPA and half in
the ENA. Figure 3.1 shows the estimated mean, median, the 5% and 95% quantiles of the
projected real consumption paths as a proportion of the initial consumption at time 0,
based on 10,000 simulations. 50 simulated scenarios are also shown (see coloured paths),
which represent the same 50 joint mortality and economic scenarios. It can be observed
that on average, the individual is able to maintain roughly 80-85% of her purchasing power
throughout retirement. However, her downside risk is unprotected. The chance of declining
purchasing power is rapidly rising, whereas the upside potential is relatively flat, at 120%.
Despite being the optimal strategy, its downside risk, which stems from the high equity
investment in the VPA fund, may be seen to be too high while the upside is relatively
limited. The financial integrity of the retiree at older ages is not upheld with acceptable
confidence.
Inflation-Indexed Annuities
Fully-indexed inflation-indexed annuities provide full protection against inflation risk as
benefits are effectively fixed in real terms. Table 3.5 summarizes the optimal annuitization
decisions.
73
Chapter 3 Optimal Retirement Planning under Recursive Preferences
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Mean
Median
Upper Lower 5%
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
Mean
Median
Upper Lower 5%
Figure 3.1 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy as a proportion
of initial benefit under Wilkie’s ESG, λ = 0.10(L)/0.15 (R), with 54-46 (L)/ 55-45 (R)
allocation in the VPA and the ENA (L)/IIA (R), αV = 0.6, AIRV = AIRE = 0.026, 10,000
simulations.
λ 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
ωV 0.00 0.23 0.55 0.82 1.00
ωI 1.00 0.77 0.45 0.18 0.00
B0($000) 63.7 62.2 63.0 64.9 66.9
BV0 ($000) 0.0 15.4 36.8 54.9 66.9
BI0($000) 63.7 46.8 26.2 10.0 0.0
Table 3.5 Optimal allocations between the VPA and the IIA under Wilkie’s ESG, W ? =
$1,000,000, αV = 0.6, AIRV = AIRI = 0.026, inflation adjusted, 10,000 simulations.
The IIA is seen to be more attractive than the ENA considered, as it remains appealing
at higher fee loads up to λ = 0.25. Consider the optimal strategy when λ = 0.15, the retiree
allocates roughly half of her initial wealth in the VPA and the IIA – a similar strategy to the
one considered in the ENA case with λ = 0.10. The individual’s projected real retirement
income is shown in Figure 3.1, which indicates similar consumption paths. The IIA provides
a marginally better inflation protection and an upside potential, at the cost of a lower initial
benefit due to a higher fee charge. In both cases, the retiree’s purchasing power remains
above 85% of her initial wealth with more than 50% probability throughout retirement.
However, she still faces relatively sustained and increasing probability of purchasing power
falling below 70% starting from year 10 to 15.
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3.5 Epstein-Zin Preferences and Dynamic
Programming
In this section, we solve the optimal retirement planning problem using the following three
recursive/Epstein-Zin specifications.
S1: Córdoba and Ripoll (2016)
Vt =
C˜1− 1αt + β [px+t,tEt (V 1−ρt+1 )]
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
(3.2)
S2: Gomes and Michaelides (2005)
Vt =
(1− βpx+t,t)C˜1− 1αt + β [px+t,tEt (V 1−ρt+1 )]
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
(3.3)
S3: Li and Smetters (2010)
Vt =
C˜1− 1αt + βpx+t,t [Et (V 1−ρt+1 )]
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1−1/α
(3.4)
Note that the Et[·] is the short hand for the conditional expectation at time t, given past
observations up until time t, and is taken on risks that impact consumption upon survival,
including financial risks and systematic mortality risks that impact VPA payoffs. Mortality
of the agent is treated separately, as discussed in Chapter 2. In subsections 3.5.1, 3.5.2,
and 3.5.3, the problem is formulated using preference model S3. Formulations under S1
and S2 are analogous, hence omitted.
3.5.1 The Optimization Problem
Under S3, the individual has an Epstein-Zin preference that takes the following form,
Vt =
C˜1− 1αt + βpx+t,t [Et (V 1−ρt+1 )]
1− 1α
1−ρ

1/(1− 1
α
)
, (3.5)
where ρ ∈ (0,∞) \ {1} captures the level of relative risk aversion, and α ∈ (0,∞) \ {1} the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution. The expected discounted lifetime utility assuming
CRRA can be obtained by fixing ρ = 1α and computing V0. The conditional expectation
Et is taken with respect to the joint distribution of stock returns, long term bond returns,
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inflation and mortality rates. The probability of survival px+t,t is known at time t. Recall C˜t
is the real consumption at time t. The individual is additionally assumed to know her real
wealth at time t (i.e. inflation). We consider the problem under the settings of normal stock
returns, normally distributed force of inflation, and constant nominal risk-free interest rate.
We further generalize the retiree’s annuitization choice by allowing k, the inflation-indexing
factor, to vary between 0 and 1. This is determined at the time of purchase and is fixed
throughout the contract term.
Let Wt be the nominal liquid wealth process of the retiree at time t, after receiving
annuity benefits. Let BVt , BIt be the nominal annuity benefit received from the VPA and
the IIA at time t, respectively, and Ct be the nominal consumption of year t+ 1, assumed
to occur at the beginning of the year, immediately after annuity benefits are paid out. As
usual, we use the symbol ∼ on top to denote the corresponding real process. More precisely,
W˜t =
Wt
It
, B˜Vt =
BVt
It
, B˜It =
BIt
It
.
Note that when k = 1, the IIA is effectively fixed in real terms, hence {B˜t} becomes a
deterministic process as B˜It = BI0 , ∀t. Further, let ω = (ωV , ωI , ω0, ω1, ..., ωT ) be the vector
of asset allocation decisions, where ωV and ωI denote the proportion of wealth allocated in
the VPA and IIAs at time 0, and ωt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , denotes the proportion of equity allocation
in the liquid wealth being held at time t. Let C˜ = (C˜0, C˜1, ..., C˜T ) be the vector of real
consumptions. Suppose the individual has initial wealth W ? and age x?. The optimization
problem becomes,
max
ω,C˜
V0,
with wealth process,
W˜0 = W0 = (1− ωV − ωI)W ? +BV0 +BI0 ,
W˜t = (W˜t−1 − C˜t−1)
(
1 +RWt
1 + δt
)
+ B˜Vt + B˜It , 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where,
RWt = ωt−1[1 +R
Eq
t ] + (1− ωt−1)[1 +RLBt ];
and benefits B˜Vt , B˜It that follow,
B˜V0 = BV0 =
ωVW
?
a¨Vx?,0
, B˜Vt = B˜Vt−1
(1 + jt
1 + δt
)
,
B˜I0 = BI0 =
ωIW
?
a¨Ix?,0(1 + λ)
, B˜It = B˜It−1
(1 + kδt
1 + δt
)
,
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subject to the following constraints that for all t,
0 ≤ C˜t ≤ W˜t, 0 ≤ W˜t, B˜Vt , B˜It ;
0 ≤ ωV , ωI , ωt ≤ 1, ωV + ωI ≤ 1.
Note that jt = B
V
t
BVt−1
denotes the adjustment factor at time t, which is used to compute the
VPA benefits based on the investment performance and the mortality experience of the
VPA fund. The derivations of the adjustment factors are described in Appendix C.2.
3.5.2 The Normalized Optimization Problem
The complexity associated with dimensionality can be alleviated by solving the equivalent
normalized optimization problem. Define c˜t = C˜tB˜t , w˜t =
W˜t
B˜t
, b˜t = B˜
V
t
B˜t
and c˜ = (c˜0, c˜1, ..., c˜T ).
It is equivalent to solve,
max
ωV ,ωI
[(
ωV
a¨Vx?,0
+ ωI
a¨Ix?,0(1 + λ)
)
max
ω,c˜
v0
]
, (3.6)
where,
vt =
c˜
1− 1
α
t + βpx+t,t
Et
(1 + b˜tjt+1 + kδt+1(1− b˜t)
1 + δt+1
vt+1
)1−ρ
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1− 1α
, (3.7)
with normalized wealth process,
w˜0 = w0 = 1 +
(1− ωV − ωI)
ωV
a¨V
x?,0
+ ωI
a¨I
x?,0(1+λ)
,
w˜t = 1 +
(w˜t−1 − c˜t−1)(1 +RWt )
(1 + kδt) + b˜t−1(jt − kδt)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
where,
RWt = ωt−1[1 +R
Eq
t ] + (1− ωt−1)[1 +RLBt ]− 1;
and normalized benefits that follow,
b˜0 = b0 =
ωV /a¨
V
x?,0
ωV
a¨V
x?,0
+ ωI
a¨I
x?,0(1+λ)
, b˜t =
(
b˜t−1(1 + jt)
(1 + kδt) + b˜t−1(jt − kδt)
)
,
subject to the constraints,
0 ≤ c˜t ≤ w˜t, 0 ≤ ωV , ωI , ωt ≤ 1, ωV + ωI ≤ 1.
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3.5.3 Value Function Iteration
The value function iteration method is used to numerically approximate the optimal solution.
Due to the fact that the terminal optimal decisions are known, and that recursive preferences
allow the separation of a multi-period problem into numerous single-period problems, one
can apply backward induction and Bellman’s principle of optimality to iteratively arrive at
the optimal decision to time 0.
Because there is no bequest motive, at time T , it is optimal to consume all remaining
wealth, as the individual’s death is certain at time T + 1,
max
ωT ,c˜T
vT = max
ωT ,c˜T
(c˜1−
1
α
T )
1/(1− 1
α
) = max
ωT ,c˜T
c˜T = w˜T .
We obtain that the optimal controls at time T , which we denote using c˜∗T and ω∗T , are
c˜∗T = w˜T , 0 ≤ ω∗T 4 ≤ 1.
Moving back one period to T − 1,
max
ωT−1,c˜T−1
vT−1
= max
ωT−1,c˜T−1
c˜
1− 1
α
T−1 +βpx+T−1,T−1
ET−1
(
1 + b˜T−1jT + kδT (1− b˜T−1)
1 + δT
vT
)1−ρ
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1− 1α
= max
ωT−1,c˜T−1
c˜
1− 1
α
T−1 +βpx+T−1,T−1
ET−1
(
1 + b˜T−1jT + kδT (1− b˜T−1)
1 + δT
max
ωT ,c˜T
vT
)1−ρ
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1− 1α
.
Note that the one-period conditional survival probability px,t is governed by the two-
dimensional stochastic process At from the CBD mortality model. We thereby denote px,t
as px(At), and after some rearranging, maxωT−1,c˜T−1 vT−1 can be rewritten as,
max
ωT−1,c˜T−1
c˜
1− 1
α
T−1 +βpx+T−1(AT−1)
ET−1
(
1 + b˜T−1jT + kδT (1− b˜T−1)
1 + δT
w˜T
)1−ρ
1− 1α
1−ρ

1
1− 1α
.
We need to evaluate a conditional expectation ET−1[·], which cannot be obtained analyt-
ically but is relatively simple to approximate numerically (using Monte Carlo methods
4Note that given c˜∗T , the objective function is maximized for all possible ωT , due to liquid wealth being
fully consumed at time T immediately after annuity payments.
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or numerical integration) under the current setting of normally distributed stock returns,
inflation and fixed risk-free rate, due to the i.i.d. assumption. The expectation is a function
of T − 1, w˜T−1, b˜T−1, AT−1 and the controls c˜T−1, ωT−1. Consequently, we define the
normalized value function J (·) to be
J (t, w˜t, b˜t,At) = max
ωt,c˜t
vt, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ T.
It is immediate that we have the following relationship,
max
C˜,ω
V0 = W ? max
ωV ,ωI

(
ωV
a¨Vx?
+ ωI
a¨Ix?(1 + λ)
)
J
0, 1 + (1− ωV − ωI)ωV
a¨V
x?,0
+ ωI
a¨I
x?,0(1+λ)
,
ωV /a¨
V
x?,0
ωV
a¨V
x?,0
+ ωI
a¨I
x?,0(1+λ)
, A0
 .
The two-dimensional state vector At follows, At = τ +At−1 + VZt. The optimal controls
are obtained from value function iteration using backward induction as in Carroll (2011).
We begin with discretizing the state variables w˜t, b˜t, A0,t, A1,t,
[1, 1000]× [0, 1]× [−12,−10]× [0.09, 0.11]
by constructing a four-dimensional non-equidistant grid of size 13×101×4×4. The first three
grid points for w˜t are concentrated near 1 (i.e. [1, 1.5, 2]) to obtain a closer approximation
near full annuitization. The remaining are grids are equidistant (i.e. [100, 200, ..., 1000]×
[0, 0.01, ...1]× [−12,−11.3333,−10.6667,−10]× [0.09, 0.0967, 0.1033, 0.11]). The value func-
tion in between and outside the grid points is evaluated using multilinear interpolation and
extrapolation.
3.6 Numerical Results under Epstein-Zin
Preferences
Assumption 1 Assumption 2
Total Stock Returns LN(0.04078, 0.187032) LN(0.06078, 0.187032)
Force of Inflation Nil N(0.02, 0.012)
Risk-Free Interest Rate 0.02 0.03
AIRV 0.03 0.03
AIRF 0.03 0.03
AIRI (k = 1) Nil 0.0096
AIRI (k = 0.5) Nil 0.0198
Table 3.6 Economic scenario assumptions (two sets) used for numerical optimization.
The assumptions of normal stock returns and fixed risk-free interest rate are retained.
This greatly simplifies the optimization numerically. We consider an additional set of
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assumptions (Assumption 2) under which inflation varies stochastically over time according
to N(0.02, 0.012). The parameters are selected based on historical observations5 in the U.S.
from 1991 to 2014. Note that although this implies a low inflation environment, the long
term accumulated effect of inflation on purchasing power is not trivial. In a 10-year horizon,
inflation will on average wear off 18% of an individual’s purchasing power; this rises to 45%
in a 30-year horizon.
We consider four types of retirees6 in Table 3.7.
Lower RRA Higher RRA
ρ = 2 ρ = 5
Lower EIS Type 1: Less risk averse Type 3: More risk averse
α = 0.2 Stronger smoothing preference Stronger smoothing preference
Higher EIS Type 2: Less risk averse Type 4: More risk averse
α = 0.5 Weaker smoothing preference Weaker smoothing preference
Table 3.7 Types of retirees (description in relative terms)
As shown in Chapter 2, the elasticity of intertemporal consumption governs the individ-
ual’s preference towards different types of consumption paths over time, or ‘consumption
smoothing’, contingent on survival. This effect can be directly observed from the marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution (see Appendix B.1), which governs the rate of change
of the indifference curve between present and future consumption. A lower α results in
more curvature in the indifference curve, therefore suggesting that the same drop in current
consumption is to be compensated by a higher level of future consumption to remain
indifferent. This is of course all given the fact that consumption is not subject to mortality
risk, or when preference model S3 is considered. As shown, under an uncertain lifetime, the
impact of EIS on consumption smoothing can be ambiguous under preferences S1 and S2.
In the following subsection, we proceed by solving the optimal retirement planning
problem. We first investigate a reduced problem, aiming to reproduce the results of Boyle
et al. (2015) to check the validity of the numerical procedure. We then gradually relax the
assumptions of preferences (from time-additive EDLU-CRRA to Epstein-Zin), systematic
longevity development (from zero to stochastic), and inflation (from zero to stochastic).
The goal is to investigate the impact of these assumptions on the optimal decision variables.
We pay particular attention to the normative adequacy of the resulting consumption paths.
5For inflation, we use non-seasonally adjusted U.S. City Average All Items Consumer Price Index (CPI) for
All Urban Consumers (CPURNSA), obtained from Bloomberg. For total stock returns, we use the total
return index of the S&P500, obtained from Morningstar, Inc. (prior to 2010) and Bloomberg (2010–2014).
6The representative agents are consistent with Blake et al. (2008). The magnitude and sign of EIS are a
source of debate. See for example Hall (1988) and Havranek et al. (2015).
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3.6.1 Working in Absence of Inflation – Assumption One
Working in Absence of Stochastic Systematic Longevity Development
To be consistent with Boyle et al. (2015), we first work in absence of stochastic systematic
longevity development to reproduce their results for time-additive EDLU-CRRA retirees. In
this case, the optimization problem becomes a simple one with two state variables w˜t and b˜t.
The IIA reduces to a conventional fixed annuity. Figure 3.2 plots the optimal annuitization
level in the VPA against the fee load on the FA, for all four representative agents.
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Figure 3.2 Optimal annuitization in a 40-60 VPA under assumption 1, without systematic
longevity development.
The following key results are obtained
under S1 and S3:
i. full annuitization in the VPA and the FA;
ii. full consumption of annuity benefit throughout retirement, which implies zero
precautionary savings;
iii. the retiree’s liquid wealth at t, prior to consumption, is equal to the sum of the
VPA and FA benefits;
under S2:
i. full annuitization in the VPA and the FA;
ii. partial consumption of annuity benefit throughout retirement, which implies positive
precautionary savings;
iii. the retiree’s liquid wealth at t, prior to consumption, is equal to the sum of annuity
benefits and return on savings in [t− 1, t).
Boyle et al. (2015)’s findings for time-additive EDLU-CRRA agents correspond to cases
where ρ = 1/α under S1 and S3, for which we obtained consistent results. As discussed in
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Chapter 2, setting ρ = 1/α under S2 does not necessarily yield solutions consistent with
time-additive EDLU-CRRA, which is clearly shown in Figure 3.2.
We further find that the optimal annuitization decision is highly sensitive to RRA, where
a high RRA significantly reduces VPA purchase. Under S1 and S2, a lower EIS leads to
a higher incentive to purchase the VPA; whereas under S3, EIS has an almost negligible
impact on the annuitization decisions, except when the fee load is high, then a lower EIS
gives a slightly lower VPA incentive. In a way, the impact of EIS under S3 contradicts
that under S1 and S2. This is due to the differences in the treatment of mortality risk. In
Chapter 2, we have extensively discussed the impact of EIS on consumption smoothing
under all three preference specifications. We re-iterate that under S1 and S2 (but not S3), α
is not a parameter that governs preferences over consumption smoothing. This means that
a lower α can lead to higher consumption volatility over time, as is often the case under
a higher annuitization in VPA at retirement. We expand the discussion on consumption
smoothing in later sections.
Working Under Stochastic Systematic Longevity Development
We extend the problem to allow for stochastic systematic longevity development, under
which there are a random number of survivors in the VPA pool, and a stochastic annuity
factor that is adjusted annually to reflect the most up-to-date mortality experience.
Boyle et al. (2015) derives the expression for the adjustment factor for an open-fund VPA in
the presence of systematic longevity development. The expression, shown in Equation (3.8),
remains unchanged under our best estimate approach. The mortality component of the
adjustment factor becomes random, since at time t − 1, the value of a¨Vxk+t,t is unknown.
The computation of the adjustment factor in this case requires keeping track of the benefits
paid to each surviving member in the previous period. This is computationally expensive,
even under the assumption of homogeneous new entrants, since the adjustment factor is
frequently computed in the optimization process. Thus, we simplify its computation by
an approximation, which assumes homogeneous new entrants (i.e. enter at age 65 with
equal wealth) and all survivor benefits at time t are equal. This gives an acceptable
tradeoff between accuracy and efficiency, since the variation of the mortality component
has an insignificant impact on the adjustment factor compared to the dominating impact of
investment returns. Mathematically, this yields
1 + jt =
∑k∈S+t−1 BVk (t− 1)pxk+t−1,t−1 a¨Vxk+t,t−1∑
k∈St B
V
k (t− 1)a¨Vxk+t,t
( 1 +RVt
1 + AIR
)
≈
(∑t−1
c=0 a¨
V
x+t−c,t−1∑t−1
c=0 a¨
V
x+t−c,t
)(
1 +RVt
1 + AIR
)
.
(3.8)
The mortality component is approximated by the expected over actual ratio of the sum of
the annuities factors for all cohorts. The approximation gradually deteriorates as t→ T .
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This is caused by survivor benefits at older ages having a higher variation which more
strongly violates the assumption of equal benefits among cohorts. Effectively, due to
their small magnitudes, combined with time discounting and higher mortality rates, these
deviations have a negligible impact on the optimal decisions at time 0. Figure 3.3 shows
the mean error for the approximation for the mortality component. In fact, we are able to
reproduce the result of Boyle et al. (2015) for a retiree with ρ = 1/α = 2, which suggests
the approximation is reasonably accurate.
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Figure 3.3 Mean error: approximation of the mortality component of jt.
Figure 3.4 shows the optimal annuitization decisions. In the presence of stochastic
systematic longevity where annuity factors are adjusted annually, retirees optimal decisions
generally remain unchanged except opting for lower annuitization in the VPA. This is
because systematic longevity risk cannot be diversified away. Consequently, annuitants are
fully exposed to the risk of the members in the pool being longer-lived over time, resulting
in the VPA being a riskier choice. The VPA and the FA both yield lower initial benefits
due to the positive trend in longevity development. The annuity factor at time 0 is 14.7673
(instead of 14.3898 in the case of a zero trend).
3.6.2 Working under Risky Inflation – Assumption Two
In the previous two sections, we solved two simplified problems in order to gradually
build upon previous work, and to break down the effect of EIS and systematic longevity
risk. Here, we solve the full problem introduced in Section 3.5. We assume a stochastic
systematic mortality process and a risky inflation process as described in assumption set
2. We adopt a different set of economic assumptions from previous work (i.e. assumption
set 1) due to our interest in investigating the impact of risky inflation and the value of
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Figure 3.4 Optimal annuitization in a 40-60 VPA under Assumption 1, with stochastic
systematic longevity development. x-axis: λ, y-axis: ωV .
inflation protection instruments. We consider three values of inflation-indexing factor
k = 0, 0.5 and 1.0. Figures 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 summarize the optimal annuitization decisions
for the representative agents under preference model S1, S2, and S3.
We highlight the following key observations.
In general:
i. it is optimal to fully annuitize at retirement; for ρ = 2, optimal annuitization in the
VPA is 100%;
ii. for ρ = 5,
a) it is optimal to hold some precautionary savings, the level of which depends on
α;
b) the need to hold precautionary savings is lower when inflation-indexed products
are available (i.e. k > 0).
c) the parameter α has a small effect on the annuitization ratios; the effect increases
as k and λ increase.
under S3:
i. for ρ = 2 and α = 0.2, when k = 0, the agent holds a very small amount of savings to
cushion consumption volatility over time. This behaviour is not observed for other
ρ = 2 agents. Nonetheless, this has a negligible impact on the optimal consumption
profile.
Retirees with RRA ρ = 5
For the rest of this section, we discuss the solutions for retirees with RRA parameter ρ = 5.
We focus on the impact of α, k, and the preference specification, on the optimal consumption,
savings, and investment behaviour. We pay particular attention to the smoothness of the
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Figure 3.5 Optimal annuitization in a 40-60 VPA under assumption 2. k = 0.0.
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Figure 3.6 Optimal annuitization in a 40-60 VPA under assumption 2. k = 0.5
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Figure 3.7 Optimal annuitization in a 40-60 VPA under assumption 2. k = 1.0
85
Chapter 3 Optimal Retirement Planning under Recursive Preferences
consumption path over time. The simulated results are based on 10,000 scenarios and a fee
load assumption of λ = 0.1. IIAs tend to be more costly but quotes are difficult to obtain.
We first comment on the optimal annuitization decisions. There are several factors at
play and together the net effect gives the overall annuitization ratio. The first, and the
most intuitive, is RRA ρ, which drives the agent toward the IIA since it is less risky than
the VPA, and when k > 0 creates protection against inflation risk. The second is the fee
load λ. The higher the fee, the more expensive the IIA is and this in turn creates a higher
incentive for the VPA. The third is k, which determines the level of initial IIA benefits.
The higher k is, the lower the initial IIA benefits are compared to the VPA, which creates
an incentive for a higher VPA allocation since lifetime is uncertain (i.e. the agent faces
the risk of a low income stream in the case of a short lifespan). The fourth factor, and
the most complex, is α, since α impacts both the agent’s preference over intertemporal
substitutability and impatience (this is discussed at length in Chapter 2). In S1 and S2, the
impact of α on consumption smoothing in the presence of mortality risk is not necessarily
monotonic, meaning that α cannot be interpreted as a parameter that governs consumption
smoothing. This is due to the impact of α on impatience, which can create an opposite
force to smoothness. In S3, α has no impact on impatience, hence its interpretation of
being a consumption smoothing parameter is retained. This is an important point when
interpreting the numerical results in this section.
Precautionary savings
We first investigate savings. Figures 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 plot the median optimal savings
under S1, S2, and S3 for α = 0.1 to 0.6 and λ = 0.1. We observe that under all three
preference specifications, retirees gradually build up savings which peak after 10–20 years,
and deplete them towards the end of their lifetime. This is a direct result of declining
survival probabilities with age, since zero utility is derived from wealth upon death and
the benefit of savings is less likely to be realized with age. In general, the overall savings
are significantly higher under S2 compared to S1 and S3. This is interesting since the
annuitization decisions are fairly close. In S2, the kink in savings at age 109 is due to the
sudden drop in survival probability at age 110. The impact of α on savings level is also
dramatically different in S2, in that a lower α gives higher savings. This is opposite to the
solutions under S1 and S3.
Note that, regardless of the relative sizes of 0 < α < 1, a consumption smoothing response
is triggered and agents with strong enough net smoothing preference would build up savings
to cushion consumption volatility over time (as we observe that some agents acting under
S1 and S3 do not prefer to save, indicating insufficiently strong smoothing preference to
generate savings behaviour). Savings significantly drop for higher k since consumption
volatility is partially mitigated through receiving IIA benefits.
In Chapter 2, we have shown that higher savings do not necessarily lead to smoother
consumption, depending on the perceived expected rate of return on savings. We are
ultimately interested in the consumption behaviour, which we investigate in the next
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subsection.
Consumption volatility
Figures 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 show the median optimal consumption profile under S1, S2, and
S3 for α = 0.1 to 0.6 and λ = 0.1. We highlight the following key observations regarding
median optimal consumption:
i. S1 and S3 yield very similar consumption paths, especially for high α’s. It is also
evident that when α = 0.2, the two median consumption paths are identical since the
two preference models reduce to the same time-additive EDLU-CRRA case.
ii. When α is lower, all three preference models appear to yield relatively smoother
consumption paths prior to reaching age 85–90, which is roughly around the agent’s
expected age at death (85.4). The difference in average consumption smoothness
reduces when agents can access higher inflation protection through a higher k.
iii. Under S2, the agent with higher α holds significant savings to ensure higher consumption
later in life. This behaviour is counterintuitive but mirrors the analytical solution
presented in Chapter 2. This behaviour is caused by the fact that the impatience
factor can be greater than 1 at older ages when the mortality rate rises quickly7. This
means the agent would more strongly value consumption later in life at the expense
of consumption in the present. This explains the significantly higher savings under
S2 compared to S1 and S3, and the resulting higher consumption levels at older ages.
This observation provides further evidence that the preference specification S2 exhibits
undesirable properties and is inappropriate for retirement planning applications.
iv. We further note that the sudden rise in consumption at age 110 under S2 is due to the
sudden drop in survival probability to the terminal age.
Figures 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16 show the boxplots of consumption volatility which is defined
as the sample standard deviation taken over each simulated consumption path. In Chapter 2,
we showed that the interpretation of α is ambiguous under S1 and S2 due to its impact
on impatience, which acts against its effect on preferences over consumption smoothing;
whereas under S3, α governs consumption smoothing over time. Here, consistent results
are obtained. We highlight key observations below:
i. In general, the impact of α on consumption volatility is more pronounced for a higher
k. This is due to the higher sensitivity of income level to the decision variables, since
a higher k results in lower IIA benefits compared to VPA benefits.
ii. Under S1, a lower α leads to higher consumption volatility. Nonetheless, the impact is
very small and only visible for higher k.
iii. Under S2, the impact of α on consumption volatility is V shaped, which mirrors the
findings in the analytical case in Chapter 2.
7The impatience factor under S1 and S3 cannot be greater than 1 when 1− 1
α
and 1− ρ are of the same
sign. For details, see Chapter 2.
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Figure 3.8 Median optimal real savings: assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0,
W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: W˜t − C˜t.
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Figure 3.9 Median optimal real savings: assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.5,
W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: W˜t − C˜t.
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Figure 3.10 Median optimal real savings: assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0,
W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: W˜t − C˜t.
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iv. Under S3, a lower α yields lower consumption volatility over time. This is as expected
since α governs intertemporal substitutability and does not impact impatience.
Stock holdings
The median optimal investment strategies are shown in Figures 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19. The
plots show the smoothed allocation in stocks (i.e. 10-year moving average of ωt). We plot
the smoothed process due to the high volatility in the median of ωt in the first 25 years.
This is a result of 1) error accumulation in dynamic programming, which is an inherent issue
and is difficult to mitigate; and 2) high absolute tolerance level set for ωt in the iterations
in order to improve computational efficiency. Regardless, this is not a major concern since
small variations in ωt do not have a significant impact on the optimal consumption and
annuitization choice, which we are primarily interested in. The key takeaway is that in
general, stock allocation is sensitive to the precautionary savings, such that higher savings
(compared to consumption) are associated with lower stock allocation.
3.7 Optimal Consumption
We show and discuss the long-term real consumption scenarios (C˜t) under varying assump-
tions of
i. RRA (ρ),
ii. EIS (α),
iii. inflation protection (k), and
iv. economic scenarios.
We examine results obtained from assumption set 2. All estimated quantiles and moments
are based on 10,000 simulations. We show scenarios for ages 65 to 95 only, due to high
uncertainties in estimated mortality rates at advanced ages. We show results for λ = 0.1.
We further comment on the normative adequacy of the optimal consumption profile,
using the measure introduced in Section 3.3. For each time t, we compute the following
quantity as a relative measure for downside risk in consumption,
VaRa(RCt) =
VaRa(C˜∗t )
W ?
a¨I
x?,0(1+λ)
(3.9)
where RCt stands for the real consumption at time t relative to the benchmark consumption,
and VaRa(·) denotes the Value-at-Risk operator at a. We compute this quantity for
a = 0.01, 0.05, which represents the threshold that relative consumption falls below with
probability 0.01 and 0.05 at each point in time. The benchmark consumption profile is
defined as the benefit of a fully-indexed IIA implied under full annuitization, which is, in
real terms, constant over one’s lifetime.
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Figure 3.11 Median optimal real consumption: assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1,
k = 0.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t.
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Figure 3.12 Median optimal real consumption: assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1,
k = 0.5, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t.
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Figure 3.13 Median optimal real consumption: assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1,
k = 1.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t.
90
3.7 Optimal Consumption
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
,
0.5
1
1.5
2
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
vo
la
til
ity
#104 S1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
,
0.5
1
1.5
2
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
vo
la
til
ity
#104 S2
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
,
0.5
1
1.5
2
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
vo
la
til
ity
#104 S3
Figure 3.14 Boxplot: consumption volatility, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0,
W ? = $1million.
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Figure 3.15 Boxplot: consumption volatility, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.5,
W ? = $1million.
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Figure 3.16 Boxplot: consumption volatility, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0,
W ? = $1million.
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Figure 3.17 Median optimal stock allocation: Assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1,
k = 0.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: ωt. 10-year Moving average.
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Figure 3.18 Median optimal stock allocation: Assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1,
k = 0.5, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: ωt. 10-year Moving average.
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Figure 3.19 Median optimal stock allocation: Assumption 2, ρ = 5, αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1,
k = 1.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: ωt. 10-year Moving average.
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3.7.1 Under Assumption 2
Figures 3.20 to 3.23 plot the mean, median, the 5% and 95% estimated quantiles of the
real consumption paths, under Assumption 2. 50 simulated consumption scenarios are also
shown (see coloured paths), which in each plot represent the same 50 joint mortality and
economic scenarios.
RRA (ρ)
Overall, the real average consumption appears constant over time, suggesting that the
expected rate of growth of VPA benefits closely matches the rate of inflation. Comparing
Figures 3.20 and 3.21, a stronger RRA leads to lower consumption volatility, at the expense
of lower average consumption across all ages. An agent with ρ = 2 faces higher downside
risk, which increases with age, but such prospects are being compensated by the upside
scenarios with low frequencies but high magnitudes.
The left and right of Figure 3.20 appear almost identical. As mentioned in the previous
section, under S3, the agent holds a very small level of savings to substitute consumption
in the first 10–15 years. This effect is very small but it is visible that the agent trades off
early consumption for lower volatility in the earlier years of retirement.
In Figure 3.21, S1 and S3 yield identical results since the model reduces to the time-
additive EDLU-CRRA. Under S2, the agent consumes less in the earlier years in order
to have higher consumption in the future. This, as discussed, is due to the effect of α on
reducing impatience under the preference specification.
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Figure 3.20 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 2, α = 0.2,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Assumption 2.
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Figure 3.21 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.2,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Assumption 2.
EIS (α)
Comparing Figures 3.21 and Figure 3.22, we observe that the impact of α on the optimal
consumption paths is more pronounced under S2, where a higher α leads to a drop in earlier
consumption in exchange for higher consumption in the future (this has been discussed at
length earlier). Under S1 and S3, the initial consumption levels are higher; the distributions
of future consumption are highly similar. This reflects the highly comparable annuitization
and savings decision when k = 0.
Inflation protection (k)
Comparing Figures 3.23 and 3.22, we see that a fully indexed IIA reduces consumption
volatility in general. The average consumption is more smooth for k = 1. This difference is
more visible under S1 and S2. Regardless, the overall differences are small since in the case
of k = 0 the agent can purchase more VPA to achieve higher average consumption growth
that matches the inflation rates. The results shown assume that the IIA and the FA are
subject to the same fee load. In practice, the IIA may be sold at a much higher price to
compensate for the extra inflation risk born by the provider.
Consumption downside risk
Figures 3.24 and 3.25 plot the estimated 5% and 1% Value-at-Risk (quantiles) of real
consumption relative to the benchmark consumption profile. It is found that in all three
preference models, downside risk in consumption is high and rises with age. The exposure of
downside risk is higher for lower k, due to the cumulative impact of inflation on purchasing
power. Comparing across preference models, downside risk in consumption is the lowest
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Figure 3.22 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.5,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Assumption 2.
95
Chapter 3 Optimal Retirement Planning under Recursive Preferences
65 70 75 80 85 90 95
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
S1
Mean
Median
Upper/Lower 5%
65 70 75 80 85 90 95
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
S2
Mean
Median
Upper/Lower 5%
65 70 75 80 85 90 95
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
120000
140000
160000
180000
S3
Mean
Median
Upper/Lower 5%
Figure 3.23 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.5,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Assumption 2.
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under S2, since the model yields lower impatience, hence higher savings. Under S1 and S3,
downside risk in consumption is similar across RRA and EIS parameters. Figures 3.33 and
3.34 repeat the analysis under Wilkie’s ESG, with similar observations.
3.7.2 Under Wilkie’s ESG
Here, we investigate the optimal consumption behaviour in the presence of model uncertainty.
Suppose that the optimal strategies are unchanged, and are executed by the agent as implied
under the economic conditions specified in Assumption 2 (see Table 3.6). We are interested
in the impact of model uncertainty on the resulting consumption profile.
Suppose that the ‘actual’ economy follows Wilkie’s ESG fitted to historical data from
1991 to 2014, with parameters specified in Table A.1. We adjust the parameter σc = 0.1
to reduce the volatility in the long-term bond yields. The distribution of the force of
inflation, total log-returns on stocks, and annual returns on long-term bonds are shown in
Figures 3.26, 3.27, and 3.28, respectively. The agent behaves according to optimal strategies
solved under Assumption 2.
Before examining consumption, we note the following key points regarding the scenarios
of Wilkie’s ESG:
i. the economic scenarios are generated based on biased (rather than ‘neutral’) starting
points: the latest observations in 2014 are used as initial values,
ii. the force of inflation scenarios are effectively i.i.d. N(0.024, 0.012),
iii. the total stock log-returns are approximately i.i.d. N(0.048, 0.182),
iv. the long-run mean for annual nominal returns on long-term bonds is 0.039; the standard
deviation is 0.044.
First consider an agent with RRA ρ = 2, Figure 3.29 plots the optimal consumption
behaviour under an economy described by Wilkie’s ESG. Compared to Figure 3.20, there is
an evident rapid decline in average future consumption. This decline is a combined effect of
higher average inflation and a lower average return on stocks. The differences are small
when considered separately, but combined in the long term, they have a material impact
on the agent’s real consumption due to the high annuitization ratio (100%) in the VPA.
Some of this impact is offset by higher returns on long-term bonds. Additionally, there is a
considerable reduction in consumption volatility in each year (note the difference in axis
scale). This reduction stems from the mild positive dependence between inflation and stock
returns (through a negative wy), and the negative dependence between stock and bond
returns (through inflation). Recall that the VPA invests in a combination of stocks and
bonds, implying that the volatility of VPA fund returns is lower.
Similar observations are made for ρ = 5, as agents still have relatively high exposures in
the VPA and are consequently influenced by the higher erosion in purchasing power and
the lower returns from stocks. The impact is however smaller compared to RRA ρ = 2,
since the agents carry out less risk-taking strategies.
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Figure 3.24 Consumption downside risk VaRa(RCt): αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0,
BI0 = 49, 746. Assumption 2.
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Figure 3.25 Consumption downside risk VaRa(RCt): αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0,
BI0 = 49, 746. Assumption 2.
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Figure 3.26 Force of inflation: Wilkie’s ESG 1991–2014 (2014 starting point).
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Figure 3.27 Total log-returns on stocks: Wilkie’s ESG 1991–2014 (2014 starting point).
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Figure 3.28 Annual returns on long bonds: Wilkie’s ESG 1991–2014 (2014 starting point).
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Figure 3.29 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 2, α = 0.2,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Wilkie’s ESG.
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Figure 3.30 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.2,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Wilkie’s ESG.
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Figure 3.31 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.5,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Wilkie’s ESG.
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Figure 3.32 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.5,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Wilkie’s ESG.
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Figure 3.33 Consumption downside risk VaRa(RCt): αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 0.0,
BI0 = 49, 746. Wilkie’s ESG.
104
3.7 Optimal Consumption
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Va
R
a(
R
C
t)
S1
; = 2; , = 0:2; a = 0:05
; = 2; , = 0:5; a = 0:05
; = 5; , = 0:2; a = 0:05
; = 5; , = 0:5; a = 0:05
; = 2; , = 0:2; a = 0:01
; = 2; , = 0:5; a = 0:01
; = 5; , = 0:2; a = 0:01
; = 5; , = 0:5; a = 0:01
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Va
R
a(
R
C
t)
S2
; = 2; , = 0:2; a = 0:05
; = 2; , = 0:5; a = 0:05
; = 5; , = 0:2; a = 0:05
; = 5; , = 0:5; a = 0:05
; = 2; , = 0:2; a = 0:01
; = 2; , = 0:5; a = 0:01
; = 5; , = 0:2; a = 0:01
; = 5; , = 0:5; a = 0:01
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
t
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
Va
R
a(
R
C
t)
S3
; = 2; , = 0:2; a = 0:05
; = 2; , = 0:5; a = 0:05
; = 5; , = 0:2; a = 0:05
; = 5; , = 0:5; a = 0:05
; = 2; , = 0:2; a = 0:01
; = 2; , = 0:5; a = 0:01
; = 5; , = 0:2; a = 0:01
; = 5; , = 0:5; a = 0:01
Figure 3.34 Consumption downside risk VaRa(RCt): αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0,
BI0 = 49, 746. Wilkie’s ESG.
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3.8 Time Discounting
One significant source of complexity in life-cycle problems stems from the modelling
of long-term economic scenarios, as discussed in Chapter 1 and the previous sections.
Another involves choosing an appropriate intertemporal preference model. This is a
particularly challenging task, as the future inherently involves risks, uncertainties, and
evolving preferences. The exploration of normative and descriptive models for choice over
time has been an ongoing effort for economists.
The two pillars of the expected discounted lifetime utility (EDLU) used in intertemporal
decision-making under uncertainty are the EU (expected utility) and the DU (discounted
utility). The EU was first formulated by Bernoulli in 1738, and axiomatized in Von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944). To date, it has been accepted as the right normative model for
decision-making under uncertainty, supported by numerous works including Broome (2017),
Edwards (2013), Baron (1996), and many others. The DU, on the other hand, was first
mathematically formulated by Samuelson (1937), which explicitly assumes that future
gratification (utility) can be discounted and aggregated in a fashion that resembles the
present value of future cash flows.
Both the EU and the DU have been criticized on normative grounds. Critics of the EU
include Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961), Tversky (1975), and Schmeidler (1989), among others.
The focus of this section, however, is on DU. The original intent of DU is to propose a
generalized intertemporal choice model that can be used in many applications. Although
the author demonstrated serious cautiousness regarding the normative and descriptive
validity of this formulation, stressing the arbitrariness of these underlying assumptions, the
DU was quickly accepted as an adequate normative or descriptive model for applications
ranging from savings behaviour, labour supply, security valuation, education decisions, and
crime (Loewenstein and Prelec, 1992).
The DU in its most restrictive form includes the exponential discounting of future util-
ity governed by the parameter β, which often reflects the “pure rate of time preference”.
Loewenstein and Elster (1992) provides a thorough historical overview of the psychological
explanations of the fundamental question of “why do people discount the future?”. Ex-
planations include, among others, the brevity and uncertainty of human life, the pain of
abstinence, and imperfections in the translation of future events into the present. These
propositions evolve over time, at times reflecting conflicting philosophical beliefs about
what constitutes human rationality. Among these scholarly discussions, some viewed equal
treatment of present and future as a norm of behaviour, and strived to understand why
human behaviour deviated from it (Loewenstein and Elster, 1992). For instance, the 19th
century economist and logician, William Stanley Jevons, makes the following remark in
Jevons (1871):
To secure a maximum of benefit in life, all future events, all future pleasures or
pains, should act upon us with the same force as if they were present, allowance
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being made for their uncertainty. The factor expressing the effect of remoteness
should, in short, always be unity, so that time should have no influence. But no
human mind is constituted in this perfect way: a future feeling is always less
influential than a present one.
This remark points to the paradox of the inclusion of time discounting in a normative
setting, where it fundamentally is a manifestation of irrationality (i.e. arguably a deviation
from “optimality”). This raises serious doubt over the normative validity of the classical
approach of EDLU maximization involving a pure time discounting rate smaller than 1.
In the current literature, the parameter governing the pure rate of time preference, β, is
often assumed to be in the range of 0.95 to 0.98 (see e.g. Horneff et al., 2015; Hanewald
et al., 2013; Horneff et al., 2010; Blake et al., 2008; Li and Smetters, 2010). These parameter
values are rarely justified, nor is the implication on the preference of the representative
agent. Considering a simple time-additive EDLU model, a β value of 0.96 suggests that
gratification or utility in t years’ time is 0.96t times as important as the utility at the
present. Specifically, this means the agent values gratification in 10 years as 34% less
important than happiness today, and in 30 years, 71% less important. This assumption
leads to a significant devaluation of consumptions at extreme-old ages. This is on top of the
devaluation due to mortality risk, which in itself was historically argued as an explanation
for the discounting of future events by the 18th century economist John Rae (i.e. the
above-mentioned “the brevity and uncertainty of human life”). This devaluation of the
future is highly contradictory to any rational description of long-term planning, due to the
implicit myopia in the model assumptions.
This section proceeds to quantify the impact of pure time discounting on the optimal
consumption profile. In previous sections, a β = 0.96 is assumed so that our results are
comparable with the existing literature. Here, we set β = 1.0, assuming that the pure rate
of time preference is unity, such that the agent equally values the happiness throughout her
remaining lifetime. This reflects the philosophical belief cited above in Jevons (1871).
Setting β = 1.0
Setting β = 1.0 yields zero discounting stemming from pure time preferences. Here, we
repeat the analysis in Section 3.5 and compare the optimal consumption path for β = 0.96
and β = 1.0. We show the results for S1 and S3 only, since the impact of mortality on time
discounting can be highly inflated under S2; and for ρ = 5.0 and α = 0.5. For simplicity,
we consider the case where k = 1.0. The impact of β on other agents and the parameter k
is similar, hence these cases are omitted.
Figure 3.35 is to be compared with Figure 3.7, and it shows the optimal annuitization
decisions for the representative agents with zero pure time discounting. While full annuiti-
zation remains optimal, equal or less wealth is allocated in the VPA. Intuitively, a lower ωV
gives lower downside risk in the long run, mirroring the fact that higher weight is placed on
consumption at older ages.
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Figure 3.35 Optimal annuitization in a 40-60 VPA under Assumption 2, with stochastic
systematic longevity development. β = 1.0. k = 1.0.
Comparing Figure 3.36 with Figure 3.23, we observe less volatility in the consumption
due to the lower exposure in the VPA, and hence lower downside risk at older ages. This
is more clearly shown in Figure 3.37 where downside risk in consumption is quantified.
We repeat the optimization study for a more aggressively invested VPA with αV = 0.6
and AIRV = 0.06, with the resulting consumption profile shown in Figures 3.38 and 3.39.
In this case, the impact of β is more pronounced. Under zero time discounting, agents
have a flatter consumption profile on average since future gratification is treated equally
as present gratification (in absence of mortality), and lower downside risk in consumption.
For instance, in Figure 3.40 under S1, one can clearly observe that for β = 1.0, after t = 17,
the downside risk measured at a = 0.01 is even lower than the downside risk measured
at a = 0.05 for β = 0.96, indicating a significant reduction in the risk of old-age poverty.
This clearly motivates that, in a normative setting, pure time discounting should be set to
unity, especially when a source of time discounting, mortality, is already accounted for in
the model specifications.
3.9 Numerical Challenges
Numerical challenges centre around the computational speed, which is found to be linear
in the number of optimizations being solved, hence linear in the number of grid points.
Solutions are found to be more sensitive to the fineness of the b˜t grid than the w˜t grid,
hence a coarser w˜t grid is used, especially since it becomes readily apparent that the
optimal solution is concentrated around w˜t = 1. The adopted optimization algorithm
is Constrained Optimization by Linear Approximations (COBYLA), described in Powell
(1994) and implemented by Johnson (2014) through NLopt.
The total number of optimization problems is approximately the number of grid points ×
(T − 1) which is, for example, 13× 101× 4× 4× 45 = 945,360. Efficiency is highly sensitive
to the initial values of the controls. We find that dynamically setting the initial values using
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Figure 3.36 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.5,
αV = 0.4, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0, W ? = $1million. β = 1.0. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t. Assumption
2.
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Figure 3.37 Consumption downside risk VaRa(RCt): ρ = 5, α = 0.5, αV = 0.4, AIRV =
0.03, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0 , BI0 = 49, 746. Assumption 2.
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Figure 3.38 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.5,
αV = 0.6, AIRV = 0.06, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0, W ? = $1million. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t.
Assumption 2. Left: β = 0.96. Right: β = 1.0.
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Figure 3.39 Simulated real consumption paths following optimal strategy: ρ = 5, α = 0.5,
αV = 0.6, AIRV = 0.06, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0, W ? = $1million. β = 1.0. x-axis: age, y-axis: C˜t.
Assumption 2. Left: β = 0.96. Right: β = 1.0.
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Figure 3.40 Consumption downside risk VaRa(RCt): ρ = 5, α = 0.5, αV = 0.6, AIRV =
0.06, λ = 0.1, k = 1.0, BI0 = 49, 746. Assumption 2.
optimized controls in the previous period dramatically improves computational efficiency.
Runtime is linearly proportional to the number of simulations used to approximate the
conditional expectation of the continuation values. It is further found that when RRA is
high, finer grids are required to obtain more stable solutions. We report that on a 4-core
AMD Opteron @2.2GHz, jobs with 4-dimensional state space take on average 40–60 hours.
The program is written in the C++ language.
The problem of efficiency can be improved through the quadrature method in evaluating
the conditional expectations, and through parallel computing. At each time step of the
backward recursion, the grids can be separated and solved simultaneously, subject to the
condition that it does not access unknown values at the previous step. This is in strict
sense not parallel computing, due to the reliance on recursions. At each time step the
program cannot proceed if it tries to access an unsolved grid point in the previous period.
This can be improved by either dynamically assigning optimizations to different positions
in the grid, or considering alternative sequential arrangements. The computation speed will
theoretically be improved by a factor equal to the number of threads, plus some overhead
arising from the communication of information among processing elements.
3.10 Conclusion
We solved an optimal consumption-investment problem for a retired individual facing
longevity and inflation risks in the presence of VPAs. We found that, assuming full
annuitization and consumption of wealth, and under stochastic economic conditions projected
by Wilkie’s ESG, a time-additive EDLU-CRRA maximizing agent with zero bequest motive
more highly values conventional annuity products (i.e. fixed, escalating nominal, and
inflation-indexed annuities) when inflation is introduced.
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We further considered four types of Epstein-Zin agents under three preference specifica-
tions, S1, S2 and S3, discussed in Chapter 2. The preference models differ in the treatment
of mortality risk. We found that the optimality of full annuitization remains unchanged.
However, agents with higher RRA (ρ = 5) would hold precautionary savings, the level of
which differs dramatically for the three preference specifications.
Overall, the annuitization decision is more strongly affected by RRA than the EIS, such
that higher RRA leads to lower annuitization in the VPA. The effect of EIS is difficult
to interpret under S1 and S2, since EIS no longer governs preferences over consumption
smoothing over time. Under S3, a lower EIS reduces annuitization in the VPA when RRA is
high. Overall, the effect of EIS is stronger when the indexing factor k is larger. Incorporating
stochastic systematic longevity development in the VPA mortality assumptions is found to
lower the attractiveness of the VPA, as the systematic longevity risk is nondiversifiable and
the retiree’s risk exposure increases subsequently.
We projected retirees’ real consumption paths under the optimal strategy. Comparing
the consumption behaviour under S1, S2, and S3, we conclude the following:
i. under S1 and S3, altering the EIS had a minor impact on the optimal consumptions.
In particular,
under S1, a lower EIS leads to higher consumption volatility;
under S3, a lower EIS leads to lower consumption volatility;
ii. under S2, altering the EIS had a more significant impact. However, certain agents
would save in order to have significantly higher consumption later in life. This is due to
the impact of EIS on impatience, causing time discounting to be greater than 1 when
mortality is high. This is an undesirable property of the preference model, especially
when used in the context of retirement planning.
Overall, we note relatively high levels of downside risk in the long run, despite the extension
to the Epstein-Zin specification which allowed for a more flexible preference specification for
long-term intertemporal problems. This is partially attributed to the implicit assumption
of myopia by allowing the pure rate of time discounting to be smaller than one. Drawing
on the literature on choice over time, we argue that in a normative setting, the pure rate of
time discounting should be set to unity to reflect the equal treatment of gratification across
one’s lifetime. We repeat the optimization with zero time discounting and find a significant
reduction in consumption downside risk in the long run, highlighting the impact of this
assumption on the risk of old-age poverty. In the next chapter, we present the empirical
finding that individuals are significantly less myopic than most prescriptive models assume,
further highlighting the paradoxical nature of the parameter β in either prescriptive or
descriptive modeling of retirement planning.
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Retirement Consumption, Risk
Perception, and Planning Objectives
4.1 Introduction and Motivation
This chapter focuses on retirement objective formulation, which requires a comprehensive
understanding of actual retirement experience, as it relates to longevity, consumption, wealth,
risk perception, and variability of income, etc. To this end, a survey study is suitable.
In this chapter, we report the findings of a large-scale web-based survey study of 1,000
Canadian (pre-)retirees on retirement planning objectives. This investigation is conducted
in a country-specific context, since social insurance programs, including public pensions
and health care, vary dramatically across countries and potentially play an important role
in retirement planning concerns. In addition to normative objective formulation, we are
interested in the descriptive validity of the expected lifetime discounted utility maximization
framework in predicting optimal planning behaviours. This is grounded on the work of
Beshears et al. (2014), which designed a set of comprehensible quantitative survey questions
on retirement income preferences and is used as a basis for our study.
The key contribution of this chapter is to shed light on actual retirement decision-making,
and compare and contrast our findings with theoretical retirement objective formulation.
This has both normative and descriptive implications. Motivated by the concern over
the current state of research on retirement planning, which has tended to be driven by
mathematical elegance rather than practicability or efficacy, we bring forward empirical
evidence of retirement planning, as it relates to consumption needs, risks, and preferences
over annuities and pension incomes. This contributes to the literature by 1) identifying
actual challenges in individual retirement planning, and their causes, and 2) driving future
research and public policy changes that address these challenges. Through this study, we
seek to stimulate new discussions on retirement decision-making and inspire innovation. It
may appear to the reader that this work raises more questions than it answers.
This work was partially funded by the Canadian Institute of Actuaries, for which a
technical report was prepared, peer-reviewed, and published. This chapter attaches this
report with minimal changes.
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4.2 Executive Summary
4.2.1 Overview
The Ontario Retirement Survey (ORS), conducted by Saisai Zhang, Mary Hardy, and David
Saunders at the Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of Waterloo,
explores retirement consumption, risk perception and alternative objective functions and
decision-making models in the retirement planning phase of Canadians’ lives. The study
carried out an online survey of 1,000 randomly selected Ontario pre-retirees and retirees
aged 50 to 80, with the purpose of determining key elements of the retirement planning
and experience of Canadians, including retirement age, subjective survival beliefs, private
pension wealth and income, preferences among different consumption patterns, key risks
concerning retirees and pre-retirees, and subjective time discounting factors.
This study is motivated by concerns regarding the adequacy of traditional applications of
mathematical optimization to retirement planning problems. These applications typically
focus on either the mean-variance tradeoff, or the maximization of expected discounted
lifetime utility derived from consumption and wealth. While the resulting optimization
models have nice mathematical properties, it is not clear that the optimal portfolio strategies
genuinely reflect the retirement planning concerns of individual Canadians. The ORS aims
to explore the adequacy of the utility maximizing framework under risk-averse agents,
by gaining a more complete picture of retirement planning concerns and behaviours of
Canadians, and by comparing and contrasting observed preferences with preferences implied
under such a theoretical framework.
The study explores three key areas. The first is the difference between expectations and
experience among Canadian retirees, in particular, as it relates to longevity (life expectancy
and survival rates), consumption (annuity prices and expected savings required to maintain
a given level of income), and risk and variability of income (expectations of future income
requirements and their variability). The second area relates to the current level of wealth
in retirement, or savings pre-retirement (in particular in contrast to expectations). The
third area addresses preferences and objectives. In this area, following in the vein of some
of the literature on the elicitation of utility functions, survey participants are presented
with a sequence of choices aimed at determining their risk and time preferences, and in
particular in assessing whether the emergent preferences are well-represented by commonly
employed utility functions and objectives
The survey was launched on September 20, 2016 and closed on October 13, 2016. The
survey had a response rate of 7.7% and an average survey length of 27 minutes. The sample
is reasonably well-representative of the population in terms of key demographic factors such
as age, gender, marital status, household income, and retirement assets.
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4.2.2 Main Findings
The main findings of this study are highlighted below.
Expected retirement age: on average, pre-retirees expect to retire at a later age than
retirees have experienced: the median and mean retirement age for retirees is 60 and
58.6, respectively; pre-retirees’ expectation for the age of retirement has a median of 65
and a mean of 67.1.
The prevalence of low retirement wealth: the study finds that a majority (61%)
of the respondents have/expect relatively “low1” liquid retirement assets, with the
phenomenon more pronounced for female respondents. Alarmingly, 10% have/expect less
than $25,000 of liquid retirement assets and do not own their home or other properties,
implying low living standards in retirement. Overall, 21% expect/have liquid retirement
assets under $25,000, 40% under $100,000.
Severe underestimation of survival probability to an extreme old age: while
respondents have reasonable beliefs for their own life expectancies, there is strong evidence
that they highly underestimate the probability of survival to at least age 95 or more.
92% of respondents report a subjective survival rate below the objective rate implied by
the most recent life table, 27% believe that they have zero chance of surviving to age 95.
Retirement income expectations: overall, when compared to retirees’ experience,
pre-retirees have reasonable expectations regarding income in retirement from a variety
of sources. Fewer pre-retirees (than retirees) have defined benefit (DB) workplace
pensions, mirroring a shift away from DB arrangements. Pre-retirees expectations for
social insurance pensions are quite strongly related to the highest level of education
attained (which is positively correlated with financial literacy). Certain pre-retirees
may underestimate public pension benefits due to a lack of knowledge of the Canadian
retirement income system.
Retirement planning and spending concerns: the four most important concerns
when making planning and spending decisions are: liquidity, consumption/income smooth-
ing, inflation and longevity. Bequest and investment risk-taking are considered the least
important. Concerns vary according to retirement wealth levels: high wealth respondents
are more concerned with meeting home care or nursing home expenses than longevity
risk; extremely low wealth respondents are more concerned with consumption/income
smoothing. Female respondents, in general, are found to be more concerned than male.
Bequest motives: bequest is generally viewed as fairly unimportant. Nonetheless,
respondents with more dependents tend to have higher bequest motives. The strength of
bequest motives is also found to be affected by when death occurs: respondents have
mildly higher bequest motives if death were to occur earlier in life.
1Below $200,000 for single respondents; below $300,000 for married/common-law respondents.
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Seeking professional financial advice in retirement planning: the overall attitude
towards seeking professional financial advice is positive. Behaviour, however, is found to
be strongly related to liquid retirement assets: respondents with low liquid assets show
little interest in seeking advice, mainly due to affordability. In general, respondents show
high concerns over potential issues such as accessing quality service, conflicts of interest,
and frauds.
Attitudes towards life annuities: the study found that respondents profoundly
undervalue life annuities. 84% of respondents reported a subjective price that is below
half of the average market price in 2015. Respondents additionally showed extremely low
interest in purchasing annuities at any price, with top concerns being credit risk (i.e. the
fear of provider default), a loss of flexibility and control, and a loss of financial security.
Risk preferences elicitation: qualitatively, the average level of risk aversion among
respondents is “moderate”. The average elicited constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
parameter is between 1.74 and 2.48 for pre-retirees, and between 2.48 and 3.74 for retirees,
implying that retirees are more risk averse. The elicited CRRA parameter is found to
also depend on age, gender, education and wealth level, such that those who are female,
with fewer years of formal education, or poorer tend to be more risk averse.
Time preferences elicitation: the median subjective time discount factor elicited is
0.997, and the mean is 0.965. 85% of the elicited factors are greater than 0.96, 71% are
greater than 0.98. The two discount factors, 0.96 and 0.98, are commonly used in the
retirement planning literature, and imply much stronger myopia in long-term problems
than empirically observed in this study.
Decision-making under risky scenarios: this quantitative section studies the de-
scriptive validity of the traditional life-cycle investment approach to retirement planning,
which is to maximize welfare measured by the expected discounted lifetime utility derived
from real consumption. The study finds dramatic differences between the actual and
implied choices under the welfare maximization framework.
I Inflation-indexed pension versus steady pension: the study of decision-making under
risky inflation scenarios found that respondents, in general, lack the understanding of
the long-term cumulative impact of inflation on the cost of living. This is manifested
in the dramatic change in preferences when cumulative inflation impact is depicted.
Respondents more concerned over the impact of inflation on the costs of living, and
those with more optimistic longevity beliefs, are willing to “pay” more in exchange
for inflation protection.
I Equity-linked pension versus steady pension: the study of decision-making under risky
equity returns scenarios reveals that when choosing between an equity-linked pension
and a steady pension, the potential for upside gain (in the equity scenarios) drives
decision-making. It is also found that having a higher minimum income protection,
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which in most cases, is provided by a social insurance pension income, induces more
risk-taking behaviour.
4.3 Introduction
The Ontario Retirement Survey explores retirement consumption, risk perception and
alternative objective functions and decision-making models in the retirement planning
phase of Canadians. We carry out a survey of 1,000 randomly selected Ontario pre-retirees
and retirees. The objective of the survey is to obtain a more complete picture of the
retirement objectives of Canadians, and to compare and contrast them with the objectives
that are commonly assumed in models of lifetime portfolio selection. We are interested
in three key areas. The first is the difference between expectations and experience among
Canadian retirees. In particular, as it relates to longevity (life expectancy and survival
rates), consumption (annuity prices and expected savings required to maintain a given level
of income), and risk and variability of income (expectations of future income requirements
and their variability). The second area relates to the current level of wealth in retirement, or
savings pre-retirement (in particular in contrast to expectations). The third area addresses
preferences and objectives. In this area, following in the vein of some of the literature on
the elicitation of utility functions, survey participants will be presented with a sequence
of choices aimed at determining their risk and time preferences, and in particular at
assessing whether the emergent preferences are well-represented by commonly employed
utility functions and objectives.
The purpose of this study is to determine key elements of the retirement planning and
experience of Canadians, including preferences among different consumption patterns, key
risks concerning retirees and pre-retirees, and subjective discount factors and mortality
expectations. We further elicit quantitative risk preferences that will enable us to develop
more realistic models for retirees’ preferences and needs.
The report is organized as follows. Section 4.4 describes survey methodology. Section 4.5
discusses the design of the survey, which includes descriptions of each major section of the
survey, and the assumptions and calculations made for the quantitative survey questions.
Section 4.6 describes the data and assumptions used in the analysis. Section 4.7 assesses the
representativeness of the sample, in terms of key demographic information, by comparing
with the most recent census and national survey data. Section 4.8 provides an analysis of
the survey data and detailed discussions of their implications. Section 4.9 concludes the
chapter. The survey questions are included in Appendix D.1. Appendix D.2 reports the
economic and pension scenarios used in the survey.
The survey is conducted in conjunction with the University of Waterloo’s Survey Research
Centre. The survey has received ethics clearing from the Office of Research Ethics at the
University of Waterloo. We acknowledge the support of the Canadian Institute of Actuaries,
the University of Waterloo, and the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of
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Canada (NSERC).
4.4 Methodology
The Ontario Retirement Survey (the survey, or ORS) was administered by the Survey
Research Centre, officially launched on September 20, 2016 and closed on October 13,
2016. Respondents were recruited using the online panel firm, Leger. A total of 1,001
completed and 10 partially-completed survey responses were collected. The average length
of a completed survey was 27 minutes.
The target group of participants was 1,000 Ontario residents aged 50 to 80, with 500
self-identified as retired and 500 as pre-retired. Other demographic data such as gender,
marital status, age group and urban or rural residence were monitored. An email was
first sent by the panel firm to collect information regarding age, region of residence, and
retirement status. A second email was sent, inviting the member to participate, if they
satisfied the condition for completing the survey (i.e. belonged to the target group). During
the launching period, invited members would receive up to two email reminders if they had
not yet completed the survey. In total, 13,275 unique invitations and 6,100 reminders were
sent. The detailed invitation timeline is included in Table 4.1.
Date Number of invites New/Reminder
9/20/2016 200 New (Soft Launch)
9/22/2016 2000 New
9/23/2016 2250 New
9/26/2016 3000 New
9/27/2016 500 New
9/28/2016 400 New
9/28/2016 900 Reminders
10/3/2016 100 New
10/3/2016 1400 Reminders
10/4/2016 1000 Reminders
10/6/2016 1500 New
10/7/2016 1250 New
10/11/2016 1075 New
10/11/2016 2800 Reminders
10/12/2016 1000 New
Table 4.1 Survey contact timeline (source: Survey Research Centre, University of Waterloo)
Respondents2 who accepted the invitation to participate (i.e. who clicked on the link
to the web survey) were categorized as two group, Completed or Drop-outs. Completed
respondents were those who reached the very end of the survey and exited from the “Thank
2Used interchangeably with participants and subjects.
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you for participating...” page (henceforth the “Thank you” page). Note that a Completed
respondent needed not complete the survey by answering every question, since questions
were allowed to be skipped. Drop-out respondents were those who last exited the survey
before reaching the “Thank you” page. Note that respondents were permitted to exit and
return to the survey by re-clicking on the invitation link. A Completed respondent was
marked as a Speeder, if their total survey time was less than 1/3 of the median survey
time of the up to date sample. Speeders’ responses were considered unreliable and were
removed from the sample of Completed respondents. A Drop-out respondent was marked
as Partially-completed, if a significant proportion of the survey was completed. Partially-
completed respondents’ responses were considered to contain sufficient information and
were collected in addition to the Completed responses.
The survey had a total number of 306 Drop-outs, 16 Speeders, and 10 Partial-completes.
Out of the 306 Drop-outs, 125 occurred on the instruction page which is a typical observation
for web surveys. The survey has a response rate of 7.7%, which is lower than the typical
response rates seen for web studies (10% to 15%). This is likely due to the length of the
survey and the complexity of the questions being asked. A summary of survey completion
breakdown is given in Table 4.2.
Category Number
Completed 1,001
Partially-Completed 10
Drop-outs 306
Speeders (removed) 16
Table 4.2 Survey completion breakdown (source: Survey Research Centre, University of
Waterloo)
4.5 Survey Design
The objective of the study is to develop a better understanding of the concerns and risk
preferences of individuals who are either close to retirement, or who are already retired.
It is designed to include four major sections3: Preliminary, Expectations and Experience,
Preferences, and Retirement Planning Objectives. A short list of demographic information is
collected at the end of the survey. The survey is designed such that the questions presented
to participants are adaptive of answers provided in the earlier section of the survey, in
particular, on gender (female, male), marital status (married, single), retirement status
(pre-retired, retired) and wealth status (low, medium, high). As a result, respondents are
gradually divided into 24 categories. This process allows the survey to target the questions
to the respondents. For example, when asked about annuity purchases, a female-identifying
3Section information is not shown to the respondents.
119
Chapter 4 Retirement Consumption, Risk Perception, and Planning Objectives
respondent would be presented with an annuity price that is computed based on female
mortality assumptions.
4.5.1 Preliminary & Expectations and Experience
The section ‘Preliminary’ is designed to identify relevant information such that the remaining
part of the survey can be properly presented. The section ‘Expectations and Experience’
collects information on expected and actual retirement age; subjective life expectancy;
expected and actual asset level at retirement (liquid and real estate); expected and actual
retirement consumptions with income sources including private and public pension, annuities,
investment and employment; subjective annuity prices; and attitude towards seeking
professional financial advice.
4.5.2 Preferences
The section ‘Preferences’ elicits preferences towards risk and time. Risk preferences are
elicited both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative elicitation questions, for example,
include describing risk taking behaviour in managing investable assets before and after
retirement. Quantitative elicitation questions are more involved and require participants
to make hypothetical “lottery” choices based on smaller and larger stakes. There exists a
variety of experimental methods on eliciting risk preferences. For a review of commonly
used methods, see Charness et al. (2013). In this study, we use the Eckel and Grossman
method developed by Eckel and Grossman (2002). Specifically, participants are presented
with two lists of payoff options. Each list consists of 10 options that have a 50-50 chance of
giving a higher or a lower payoff. Participants are asked to choose ONE option they prefer
the most. The list of payoffs based on smaller stakes is presented in Table 4.34, along with
the expected returns, standard deviations and the corresponding implied range of CRRA
parameters. This implied CRRA range assumes zero background consumption, and that
the payoffs are immediately consumed upon being received.
In particular, let pil and pih denote the low and high payoff of option i. Then, a participant
with CRRA preference prefers option i to j if
u(ω + pil) + u(ω + pih)
2 >
u(ω + pjl) + u(ω + pjh)
2 (4.1)
where u(ω + c) = (ω + c)
1−ρ
1− ρ , ω represents background consumption and ρ 6= 1 is the
parameter that governs the degree of risk aversion. The implied CRRA range can be
obtained by solving for ρ such that chosen option yields the highest expected utility among
all ten options.
4The last three columns of Table 4.3 are not shown to the respondents.
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Option Low Payoff High Payoff Expected Return Standard Deviation Implied CRRA range
1 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $0.00 9.73 < ρ <∞
2 $9.50 $11.00 $10.25 $0.75 5.87 < ρ < 9.73
3 $9.20 $12.00 $10.60 $1.40 3.74 < ρ < 5.87
4 $8.90 $13.00 $10.95 $2.05 2.48 < ρ < 3.74
5 $8.30 $15.00 $11.65 $3.35 1.74 < ρ < 2.48
6 $7.70 $17.00 $12.35 $4.65 1.36 < ρ < 1.74
7 $7.10 $19.00 $13.05 $5.95 0.88 < ρ < 1.36
8 $6.00 $22.00 $14.00 $8.00 0.26 < ρ < 0.88
9 $4.00 $25.00 $14.50 $10.50 0 < ρ < 0.26
10 $2.00 $27.00 $14.50 $12.50 −∞ < ρ < 0
Table 4.3 An example of a quantitative risk preference elicitation question with low stake
options.
Time preferences are elicited quantitatively using the multiple-horizon treatment based
on the experimental method introduced by Coller and Williams (1999) and extended by
Harrison et al. (2002). Specifically, participants are asked to consider seven hypothetical
binary payoffs that are made with certainty (i.e. no risk associated with the payoffs). The
options are presented such that a lower payoff is made 1 month from today, and a higher
payoff is made 13 months from today. Both options are designed to be future payoff options
to avoid the potential problem of subjects facing extra risk or transaction costs with the
future income option, as compared to the “instant” income option (for a more detailed
discussion of the experimental design, see Andersen et al. (2008)). A total of 7 choices are
made. The question is presented in Table 4.4.
Scenario Payoff Option A (pays
1 month from today)
Payoff Option B (pays
13 months from to-
day)
I prefer: Option A I prefer: Option B
1 $1,000 $1,020  
2 $1,000 $1,040  
3 $1,000 $1,080  
4 $1,000 $1,140  
5 $1,000 $1,240  
6 $1,000 $1,340  
7 $1,000 $1,440  
Table 4.4 Time preference elicitation.
A rational respondent should fall into one of the three cases: 1) always prefers option
A, 2) always prefers option B, or 3) starts with option A then switches to option B (i.e. a
unique switching point). The first case implies high impatience; the second low impatience;
the third in-between. Responses that involve multiple switching points, or from B to A
are difficult to interpret from a rational standpoint, and hence should be ignored in the
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analysis. Let pkA and pkB denote the payoff from Option A and B of scenario k. Assuming
the switching point is scenario i, the range of discount rates is obtained by solving the
following two inequalities,
u(ω + p(i−1)A) + βu(ω) > u(ω) + βu(ω + p(i−1)B) (4.2)
u(ω + piA) + βu(ω) < u(ω) + βu(ω + piB) (4.3)
which yields,
(ω + piA)1−ρ − ω1−ρ
(ω + piB)1−ρ − ω1−ρ
< β <
(
ω + p(i−1)A
)1−ρ − ω1−ρ(
ω + p(i−1)B
)1−ρ − ω1−ρ (4.4)
When there is no switching (i.e. consistent choice of either Option A or B), then,
0 < β < (ω + p7A)
1−ρ − ω1−ρ
(ω + p7B)1−ρ − ω1−ρ
, if Option A (4.5)
(ω + p1A)1−ρ − ω1−ρ
(ω + p1B)1−ρ − ω1−ρ
< β < 1, if Option B (4.6)
4.5.3 Retirement Planning Objectives
The section Retirement Planning Objectives presents participants with hypothetical re-
tirement scenarios on annuitization and retirement income decisions under inflation and
investment risk exposures. This section is an extension of the study conducted by Beshears
et al. (2014), where participants are asked to make hypothetical annuitization choices. One
main focus of Beshears et al. (2014) is the effect of framing in annuitization decision-making
(for more details, see the cited paper). Our study focuses on annuitization and retirement
income decision-making under risky scenarios (with minimal framing to avoid framing bi-
ases). The remaining section describes the survey questions and the way they are presented
to the respondents.
Match-Inflation Pension
This section examines decision-making under risky inflation and comprises of two parts. In
the first part, participants are given no extra information on future inflation outlook (see
Q22). In the second part, participants are provided with 10 possible scenarios of future
costs of living (see Q23). The purpose is to study the impact of subjective inflation beliefs.
i. Subjective Inflation Beliefs – Q22
Participants are first asked to consider the following hypothetical scenario:
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Suppose that you are 65 years old and you are JUST about to retire. Your
employer will pay you monthly pension income payments for the rest of your
life. The pension will stop when you die. Your employer presents you with the
following pension options:
1. Match-Inflation Pension Option: This option pays a monthly pension
that increases at a rate that exactly matches inflation (i.e. the increase in
the cost of living).
2. Steady Pension Option: This option pays a constant monthly pension
that does not change.
Participants are then presented with six scenarios, with varying first monthly income
payment under the Match-Inflation pension, as shown in Table 4.5. The dollar values are
determined by the individual wealth level and gender, collected in the Preliminary section.
Participants are prompted to choose either the Match-Inflation or Steady pension, under
each of the six scenarios, meaning that six choices are made. At this stage, the choices are
entirely based on each participant’s subjective belief on future macroeconomic conditions.
First Monthly Income Payment I would choose...
Match-Inflation Option
This option provides income payments that
increase at the rate of inflation
Steady Option
This option provides income
payments that do not change
Match-
Inflation
Option
Steady
Op-
tion
$1, 551 $2, 358  
$1, 650 $2, 358  
$1, 752 $2, 358  
$1, 857 $2, 358  
$1, 965 $2, 358  
$2, 358 $2, 358  
Table 4.5 An example of Match-Inflation pension option versus steady pension option
under subjective inflation beliefs (high wealth & female).
ii. Objective Inflation Information – Q23
The next question repeats the previous hypothetical scenario but provides participants
with additional information on inflation outlook. Participants are informed that inflation is
targeted, but the actual rates can deviate from the target from year to year.
Consider the same hypothetical situation where you are 65 years old and JUST
about to retire. This time, you will be provided with more information on what
inflation will look like in the future.
Suppose the Canadian government targets inflation to be 2% per year, but the
actual inflation in each year can be anywhere between 1% to 3%. You can
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expect inflation to be 2% per year on average for the rest of your life, but you
do not know for certain what the actual future inflation rates will be.
To help you make a decision, the chart below presents 10 possible paths of how
much things that cost $1 today could cost you in the next 35 years. Keep in
mind there is an equal chance for any one of these paths to happen.
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Age
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
$C
A
D
Future Cost of Something Worth $1 Today
Now, consider again the two pension options your employer presents you...
Respondents are asked to make the same choices as described in Table 4.5, with each
choice supported with a chart of possible future pension payments. When prompted to
make a choice, the respondent is reminded that future inflation is random, and that the
Match-inflation pension has an equal chance of following any one of the ten coloured paths
shown in the chart. An example of case 1 is given below:
Consider Case 1.
If you choose the Match-Inflation Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $1,551 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the
10 coloured pension paths shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
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I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life,
as shown by the black line in the chart below.
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST
about to retire?
 Match-Inflation Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
Respondents are shown the next case if they choose the steady option, with each succeeding
case offering a higher starting value for the Match-inflation pension (as described in
Table 4.5). The last case (i.e. case 6) is shown in Figure 4.1, under which the Match-
Inflation pension gives strictly higher payments than the steady option. To minimize
survey fatigue, at any point the respondent switches to the Match-Inflation option, the
question terminates, skipping the remaining cases. The underlying assumption5 is that the
respondent would prefer the Match-Inflation option for the remaining cases since they give
strictly higher payments.
5We acknowledge that, in reality, certain respondents may make inconsistent choices.
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Figure 4.1 An example of the chart shown to respondents: Match-Inflation pension option
versus steady pension option with objective inflation information given (high wealth &
female, case 6).
We are interested in the point at which the respondent switches to the Match-Inflation
option. Certainly, this is related to the subject’s beliefs about longevity, inflation (single
period and long term), and to a large degree, financial literacy. A follow-up question asks
participants to rate the importance of four concerns/statements in making the choices
regarding match-inflation pensions (see Q23A). Following this, an additional question is
asked to assess participants’ understanding (see Q23B). The first pension payments are
summarized in Table D.3 in the Appendix.
Equity-Linked Pension
The third section alters the pension scenario and introduces an Equity-Linked pension
option. Participants are asked to consider the following hypothetical pension scenario:
Suppose that you are 65 years old and you are JUST about to retire. Your
employer will pay you monthly pension income payments for the rest of your
life. The pension will stop when you die. Your employer presents you with the
following pension options:
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1. Equity-Linked Pension Option
This option pays a monthly pension with payments linked to stock market
performance. Every year your pension will be re-evaluated based on the
performance of the stock market. This means that your pension income
payments are uncertain and will experience some ups and downs.
2. Steady Pension Option
This option pays a constant monthly pension that does not change.
To help you make a decision, for each case, we will present you 10 possible future
paths of what your future monthly pension will look like under the Equity-Linked
Pension Option.
Keep in mind there is an equal chance for any one of the paths to happen.
Participants are then presented with six cases (i.e. 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B, 2C). The cases
differ in the annuity interest rate assumptions (AIRs) and risk exposures (i.e. equity
allocation). For details, see Section 4.5.4. In essence, the equity-linked pension becomes
increasingly risky from cases A to C (i.e. 1A to 1C, 2A to 2C). Compared to the steady
pension, the upside gains and downside losses of the equity-linked option become more
pronounced. The difference between the two sets of scenarios is in the average trend of
the pension income. For 1A to 1C, the trend is flat, and for 2A to 2C, the trend tends
downwards. We are interested in the degree to which the trend impacts decision-making.
An example of case 1C is described below:
Consider Case 1C.
If you choose the Equity-Linked Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,808 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the
10 coloured pension paths as shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life,
as shown by the black line in the chart below.
*Note the difference in the first monthly income payments.
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about to retire?
 Equity-Linked Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
After making the six choices, a follow-up question asks participants to rate the importance
of seven concerns/statements in making the choices regarding equity-linked pensions (see
Q24A). Following this, an additional question is presented to assess participants’ under-
standing (see Q24B). The first pension payments are summarized in Table D.4 in the
Appendix.
4.5.4 Scenario Calculations, Economic and Mortality
Assumptions
Pension Scenario Calculations
In this section, we describe the calculations of the hypothetical pension scenarios in the
second last section of the survey. We start by assigning a hypothetical wealth levelW , which
can be thought of as the accumulated individual pension account balance at retirement. W
is dependent on the participant’s wealth status (i.e. low, medium and high) and is assumed
to take the following values:
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Low wealth Medium wealth High wealth
W 150,000 300,000 500,000
Table 4.6 Hypothetical pension account balance at retirement (not disclosed to partici-
pants).
Let t = 0, 1, 2, 3... denote time in years. Let Pt =
(
PSt , P
M
t , P
E
t
)T
be the yearly pension
income for the Steady, Match-inflation and Equity-linked pension options, respectively.
Then the monthly pension income, pt =
(
pSt , p
M
t , p
E
t
)T
, is computed as,
pSt =
PSt
12 , p
M
t =
PMt
12 , p
E
t =
PEt
12 . (4.7)
Let i =
(
iS , iM , iE
)T
denote the AIRs. The pension income in the first year is,
PS0 =
W
a¨
(12)
65:iS
, PM0 =
W
a¨
(12)
65:iM
, PE0 =
W
a¨
(12)
65:iE
. (4.8)
The annuity factor is computed using the approximation a¨(12)x = a¨x − 1124 , and is calculated
based on gender-specific mortality assumptions described in Section 4.5.4.
Recall that each risky pension choice involves 10 economic scenarios (i.e. ten paths). The
remaining section describes the calculation for each economic scenario.
i. Steady Pension
The Steady pension option pays a constant income stream, therefore for all t > 0,
PSt = PS0 . (4.9)
ii. Match-Inflation Pension
Let δt denote the annual inflation in year t, then,
PMt = PMt−1 (1 + δt) , ∀t > 0. (4.10)
iii. Equity-Linked Pension
Let rt denote the annual total return on equity in year t, rf denote the risk-free interest
rate, and α be the percentage of equity allocation in the underlying fund invested, then,
PEt = PEt−1
1 + rf + α(rt − rf )
1 + iE , ∀t > 0. (4.11)
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Economic Assumptions
The used inflation scenarios are shown in Table D.2 in the appendix. The scenarios are
randomly generated from U(0.01, 0.03) , which reflects the most recent inflation-control
target adopted by the Bank and the Government of Canada in 2016 that aims to keep
inflation at 2% (and within a target range of 1% to 3%). The total log returns scenarios (i.e.
log(1 + rt)) used are described in Table D.1 in the appendix. The scenarios are randomly
generated from N(0.04078, 0.187032), which is a common assumption used in the life-cycle
retirement planning literature (see, e.g., Maurer et al., 2013; Blake et al., 2008; Horneff
et al., 2010). The risk-free interest rate rf is assumed to be 2%, which is set based on the
Canadian long-term government bond yields in 2016.
The equity scenarios are handpicked to represent a reasonably wide-spread range of
scenarios. One may argue that the scenarios are “too good to be true”, or “not reasonably
representative of reality”, since the changes for the upside largely outweigh the downside.
This is by design, as we are interested in whether the unlikely worst case scenario would
have a significant impact on decision-making. We acknowledge that in reality, the downside
frequency may be low but the severity may be highly significant, especially in the event of
unfavourable systematic mortality shifts and stock market crashes.
The annuity interest rates (AIRs) used to compute the incomes in Q14, Q22, Q23 and Q24
are based on the average of the three most competitive hypothetical quotes at December
31, 2015, obtained in Committee on Pension Plan Financial Reporting (2016). The AIRs
used for Q14 and the Steady pension option in Q22, Q23 and Q24 are 2.85%, based on
the non-indexed annuity proxy. The AIRs used in Q22 and Q23 for the Match-Inflation
pension options are:
Scenario 1 2∗ 3 4 5 6
AIR (iM ) −0.51% −0.06% 0.39% 0.84% 1.74% 2.85%
Table 4.7 Annuity Interest Rates used in the Match-Inflation Pension Options.
Among these, the asterisked scenario AIR = −0.06% is based on the CPI-Indexed annuity
proxy, representing a realistic market quote in early 2016 (when the survey was designed).
For Q24, the AIRs used in computing the Equity-Linked pension incomes are:
Case 1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C
AIR (iE) 3.45% 4.04% 4.53% 4.83% 5.66% 6.34%
Equity allocation (α) 40% 60% 80% 40% 60% 80%
Table 4.8 Annuity Interest Rates and equity allocation assumptions used in the Equity-
Linked Pension Options.
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Mortality Assumptions
The mortality assumptions used are Canadian Pensioners’ Mortality Table 2014 (CPM2014)
combined with mortality improvement scale CPM Improvement Scale B (CPM-B) with
no adjustments for sub- or super-standard mortality (CPM2014proj), for both female and
male6. Details on CPM2014 can be found in Pension Experience Subcommittee (2014).
Four questions in this survey require mortality assumptions: Q14, Q22, Q23 and Q24.
In Q14, mortality rates are used to compute the default (i.e. when participants skip the
previous question) maximum price for the monthly income of $100. In Q22, Q23 and Q24,
mortality rates are used to compute the monthly pension incomes for the Match-Inflation,
Steady and Equity-Linked pension options.
4.6 Data and Assumptions
Historical inflation rates are computed based on monthly Consumer Price Index (all items)
in Ontario from January 1979 to October 2016, obtained from Statistics Canada (table
326-0020). At times, future inflation assumptions need to be made to convert expected
future monetary values to the present. In these cases, inflation is assumed to be 2% per
annum.
Some responses regarding wealth and income are collected over dollar intervals. In our
analysis, responses are assumed to be the midpoints of the intervals. For example, if one
selects $10,000 to $20,000, we assume a response of $15,000. This may bias the results,
especially in cases where responses are concentrated in the lower end. This can be improved
by always giving options for choosing $0. Nonetheless, obtaining an accurate estimate of
actual values is difficult without compromising the participation/completion rate, since
respondents are far more likely to choose an interval than to provide a point estimate.
4.7 Assessing Sample Representativeness
To ensure that the collected data is representative of residents in Ontario, a comparison
to the most recent census and national survey data is conducted. Key aspects of interest
are age, marital status, household income, retirement liquid assets and real estate/home
ownership. The following data provided by Statistics Canada are used,
2011 National household survey (sample size 4.5 million),
2012 Survey of Financial Security (sample size 20,000),
CANSIM Database (updated daily).
6Recall that a participant’s gender is identified in this study. In the event that the question on gender
identification is skipped, male mortality assumptions are used.
131
Chapter 4 Retirement Consumption, Risk Perception, and Planning Objectives
4.7.1 Age
ORS 2016 NHS 2011
Age Group Percentage Percentage
50 – 54 17% 25%
55 – 59 20% 21%
60 – 64 22% 19%
65 – 69 21% 14%
70 – 74 14% 11%
75 – 79 6% 9%
Sum 100% 100%
Table 4.9 Age Distribution of ORS 2016 and NHS 2011.
Comparison to the National Household Survey 2011 shows that the sample has a higher
concentration in age group 60 – 69 and a lower concentration in age group 50 – 54.
Considering that the Canadian population is on average aging, we conclude that the sample
represents the population reasonably well.
4.7.2 Marital Status
ORS 2016 CANSIM 2016
Age Group Married Single Married Single
50 – 80 71.2% 28.8% 70.3% 29.7%
Table 4.10 Marital Status of ORS 2016 and CANSIM 2016.
Comparison to CANSIM data in 2016 shows that the sample well-represents the population
in terms of marital status. Here, the married status described in CANSIM 2016 includes
those in common-law relationships and excludes separated, widowed or divorced married
couples not living common law.
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4.7.3 Household Income
ORS 2016 NHS 2011
Frequency Percentage Cumulative Percentage Cumulative
Below $25,000 101 10% 10% 16% 16%
$25,000 to $49,999 185 19% 29% 22% 37%
$50,000 to $74,999 186 19% 48% 19% 56%
$75,000 to $99,999 164 17% 65% 15% 71%
$100,000 to $124,999 110 11% 76% 10% 81%
$125,000 to $149,999 82 8% 84% 7% 87%
$150,000 to $174,999 50 5% 89% | |
$175,000 to $199,999 37 4% 93% | |
$200,000 to $224,999 39 4% 97% 13% 100%
$225,000 to $250,000 7 1% 98% | |
Above $250,000 21 2% 100.0% | |
Skipped 19
Sum 1001 100% 100%
Median $75,000 to $99,999 $66,358
Average $75,000 to $99,999 $85,772
Table 4.11 Income Distribution of ORS 2016 (adjusted to 2011 dollars) and NHS 2011
(Total Household Income, Ontario).
To ensure that our results are comparable to NHS 2011, inflation adjustments to monetary
values need to be made. The survey collects information on total household income for the
year 2015 (for pre-retirees) and the year prior to retirement (for retirees). As information
on retirement age is also collected (in Q5), combining with information on birth year, we
can deduce the year of retirement and convert the income to 2011 dollars using historical
inflation rates. For pre-retirees, no extra information is required since incomes are all
expressed in the monetary value in 2015. Inflation adjustment is done by adjusting the
midpoint of selection by historical inflation and then reassigning the selection.
The total household income reported in NHS 2011 refers to income from all sources,
including employment income, income from government programs, pension income, in-
vestment income and any other money income. This is a reasonable benchmark because
retirement status is self-identified, hence there is no restriction on the income source pre
or post retirement (e.g. a self-identified pre-retiree may be receiving government pension
income in 2015).
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4.7.4 Retirement Liquid Assets
ORS 2016 SFS 2012
Retirement Liquid Assets Private Pension Assets TFSA Deposits
Age Group Below $25,000 Median None Median None Median None Median
(Excl. Below $25,000) (Excl. None) (Excl. None) (Excl. None)
55 – 64 21.4% $200,000 to $299,999 23.70% $285,000 60.5% $11,000 6.7% 5,000
65 + 18.7% $200,000 to $299,999 25.80% $266,000 55.1% $18,000 2.6% 10,000
Table 4.12 Liquid Asset Distribution of ORS 2016 and SFS 2012 by age group.
The amount of liquid assets (actual and expected) at the time of retirement is compared
with the 2012 Survey of Financial Security. In particular, comparisons are made to the
level of private pension assets, tax-free savings account (TFSA) and any deposits held in
financial institutions, for all family units in Ontario. The age group reflects the age of the
major income earner of the family unit. SFS 2012 reports other liquid assets sources, such
as bonds and stocks, but the percentage owned and median values are very small hence
excluded. The ORS finds that roughly 20% had/expected liquid assets to be below $25,000
(including none). This mirrors the findings of SFS that nearly a quarter of the population
had no private pension assets. It appears that our sample may be slightly wealthier than
the population on average. This is reasonable since we asked the respondents to either
indicate their expected assets or actual assets at retirement, at which asset level is typically
high (i.e. the end of the retirement asset accumulation stage), whereas the SFS looks at
actual asset level at the time. Other factors including pre-retirees’ salary inflation, interest
rate expectations, as well as past inflation also may impact the value of the assets. Overall,
we conclude that our sample represents the population to a reasonable degree.
4.7.5 Real Estate/Home Ownership
ORS 2016 SFS 2012
Real Estate (net Mortgage) Principal Residence Other Real Estate Mortgages
Age Group Do not own Median None Median None Median None Median
(Excl. Do not own) (Excl. None) (Excl. None) (Excl. None)
55 – 64 20.3% $200,000 to $399,999 27.9% $300,000 79.9% $230,000 65.7% $135,000
65 + 16.7% $200,000 to $399,999 25.3% $300,000 20.5% $200,000 86.9% $60,000
Table 4.13 Real estate distribution of ORS 2016 and SFS 2012 by age group.
Comparison to SFS 2012 suggests that the sample contains a slightly higher proportion of
households that own real estate (including principal residence and other properties). Among
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those households that own real estate, the median of value net mortgage is reasonably close
to the value reported in SFS. In terms of home ownership (principal residence), the sample
has 20.5% (age 55 – 64) and 19.1% (65 – 80) who do not own a home.
4.7.6 Overall
Overall, the sample is reasonably representative of the population in terms of age, marital
status, household income, retirement liquid assets and real estate. There is some evidence
that the sample is slightly biased towards wealthier households. This is a reasonable
observation given that selection bias is present in web based surveys. For example, those
who have less access to the internet may be under-represented (see, e.g., Fowler Jr, 2013;
Couper, 2000).
4.8 Data Analysis
4.8.1 Introduction
This section provides an analysis of the survey data and detailed discussions of their
implications. Specifically, the relationships between any two variables are shown graphically
using ‘frequency plots’, and are quantified by Kendall’s rank correlations (i.e. Kendall’s
tau).
A frequency plot resembles a heat-map, which shows the proportions of respondents
that fall under each pair of choices. It can also be viewed as a graphically represented
2-dimensional matrix, with the colour of each square representing the relative size of each
element. The first frequency plot can be found in Section 4.8.2 and is described with more
details.
Kendall’s rank correlation, or Kendall’s tau, measures the concordance, or pairwise
dependence, for two random variables (X,Y ), and is formally defined as
τk(X,Y ) = E
(
sign((X − X˜)(Y − Y˜ ))
)
(4.12)
where (X˜, Y˜ ) is an independent copy of (X,Y ). Kendall’s tau takes values in [−1, 1], where
1 implies comonotonicity, and -1 implies countermonotonicity. The intuition is that if larger
values of X (relative to its range) are associated with larger relative values of Y , and smaller
values of X with smaller values of Y , then X and Y are concordant. On the other hand, if
larger relative values of X are associated with smaller relative values of Y (and vice versa),
then X and Y are discordant. The estimator is computed by,
τ̂k =
2
n(n− 1)
n−1∑
i=1
n∑
j=i+1
sign((Xi −Xj)(Yi − Yj)) (4.13)
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where n is the total number of pairs observed. We further conduct the Tau test to establish
whether the pair of variables can be considered as statistically dependent. Under the null
hypothesis of independence, the test statistic τ̂k is approximately Normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance 2(2n+5)9n(n−1) . We use
∗ to denote a p-value ≤ 0.05, and ∗∗ for a
p-value ≤ 0.01.
4.8.2 Retirement wealth
We find that the majority of the respondents fall under “low” under expected and actual
liquid assets at retirement, with the phenomenon more pronounced for female respondents.
The breakdown for all respondents is shown in Figure 4.2.
All Participants
Low: 61%
Medium: 21%
High: 18%
Female
Low: 66%
Medium: 20%
High: 14%
Male
Low: 56%
Medium: 23%
High: 21%
Figure 4.2 All participants: liquid assets at retirement.
Single Married
Low Below $200,000 Below $300,000
Medium $200,000 to $399,999 $300,000 to $699,999
High Above $400,000 Above $700,000
Table 4.14 Definition of liquid wealth levels.
It is important to note that the wealth categories are defined differently for single and
married participants, as shown in Table 4.14. We highlight that the result does not necessarily
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suggest that those having “low” retirement liquid assets have inadequate retirement savings,
since the amount of liquid assets required to provide for an adequate retirement living is
highly subjective. Contributing factors may include lifestyle, life expectancy, household
size, health, pension income (e.g. workplace pension or public pension), other income (e.g.
employment and investment) and fixed assets.
Comparing liquid and fixed assets reveals respondents’ overall asset level at retirement.
Fixed assets include home (i.e. principal residence) and other property investment, and
are highly relevant to the cost of retirement and income in retirement. Specifically, home
ownership directly impacts the cost of living in retirement (i.e. renting costs); it is also a
source of liquidity through downsizing or a reverse mortgage. Investment properties bring
in rental income, which is a regular income that hedges price inflation, and produces capital
gains if sold.
Figure 4.3 is a frequency plot, which we use extensively to illustrate the relationship
between two variables. In this case, the figure shows the proportion of respondents who
fall under each pair of liquid and fixed asset levels. For example, the dark square in the
bottom left indicates that 10% of respondents do not own real estate and expect/have had
less than $25,000 of liquid assets at retirement. This proportion is alarming, along with
the evident positive relationship between liquid and fixed assets (Kendall’s tau: 0.4323∗∗;
correlation: 0.4791∗∗ ), suggesting that those with low retirement savings tend to have low
fixed assets, which implies higher costs of living, lower liquidity, and lower income from
property investment.
Overall, 21% expect/have had liquid assets under $25,000, 40% under $100,000; 19% do
not own property. This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 4.8.4.
Respondents with extremely low assets
One may be interested in investigating those with extremely low private pension assets, in
particular relating to income at retirement. For this part, we examine the 101 respondents
who do not own property and expect/have had less than $25,000 at retirement (i.e. the
bottom left square). We find the following:
71 do not have defined benefit pensions, those who do receive, on average, $14,667
85 do not have life annuities, those who do receive, on average, $12,333
97 expect/have made very little withdrawal from liquid assets
respondents expect/have public pension income of $10,860 on average
respondents on average expect/have income from other sources that averages around
$9,167
Overall, the 101 respondents expect/had an income of $34,083 in the first year of retirement,
of which 32% comes from public pension benefits, and 27% from other income sources.
When asked to specify these income sources, 44 respondents provided written responses,
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Frequency Plot: All Participants
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Figure 4.3 All participants: liquid assets and real estate at retirement.
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among which 15 indicated there are simply no other income sources, 14 indicated some form
of work or employment, 7 mentioned income associated with disabilities, others mentioned
spouse’s salary, inheritance etc. These findings highlight that retirees with extremely low
assets are highly dependent on public pensions, and potentially expect to re-enter the
workforce to supplement their retirement income.
4.8.3 Longevity and survival beliefs
The survey collects three responses that measure respondents’ subjective beliefs on survival
rates and life expectancy (see Q6, Q7 and Q8). We are interested in respondents’ beliefs
about their 1) life expectancies, 2) survival probabilities for at least 10 more years, and 3)
survival probabilities to an extreme old age of 95. We explore the degree to which these
subjective beliefs differ from actual mortality experience, and their corresponding influence
on retirement decision-making.
The mortality data7 for Ontario male and female residents are obtained from Statistics
Canada. As of August 2017 (the time of writing), the most up-to-date mortality information
from Statistics Canada is for 2011-2013. The mortality experience from 2014 to 2016 is not
reflected, thus comparisons should be interpreted with caution. Results are illustrated in
Figures 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6. We highlight the following findings:
i. Severe underestimation of survival probabilities to an extreme old age: we
find strong evidence that respondents highly underestimate their probability of survival
to at least age 95 or more. As shown in Figures 4.5 and 4.6, 92% report a survival
rate below the objective rate, and 27% believe that they have zero chance of surviving
to age 95. This evidence points to a severe underestimation of longevity risk. This
raises questions as to whether such underestimation plays a key role in retirement
decision-making.
ii. Mild underestimation of life expectancy: the objective expected age at death
for Ontario individuals aged 50 to 80 is 85.6 to 90.6 for females and 82.1 to 88.9
for males. The left plot of Figure 4.4 shows the distribution of responses, which
ranges from 60 to 200, centred around 85. On the right hand side, we take each of
the subjective responses and divide them with the expected age at death computed
based on population mortality experience (i.e. objective mortality rates) and plot the
distribution of this ratio. We find that 54% report an expected age at death lower
than the objective estimate, and that the median ratio is 0.98. This suggests that on
average, respondents mildly underestimate their life expectancies. While 54% and 0.98
are not strong evidence, the degree of underestimation may be more pronounced if
mortality improvement8 from year 2014 to 2016 is taken into account.
7Data source: Statistics Canada. 2017. Life tables, Canada, provinces and territories, catalogue no.
84-537-X.
8The expected age at death for Ontario females aged 50 to 80 is 85.4 to 90.5 in 2010-2012, and 85.2 to 90.4
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iii. Close estimation of survival probabilities for 10 or more years: on average,
the subjective estimates for survival probabilities for 10 or more years are relatively
close to the objective estimates. 47% reported a probability estimate below the
objective rate. The median ratio (i.e. subjective divided by objective rates) is 1.02.
We conclude that these are close estimates, taking into account mortality improvement
in the past 3 years.
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Figure 4.4 Expected age at death: subjective estimates (reported) and subjective/objective
estimates.
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Figure 4.5 Survival probabilities: subjective and objective estimates.
4.8.4 Retirement expectation and experience
In this section, we separate responses from pre-retirees and retirees regarding retirement
expectation and experience. For responses involving dollar values, such as assets and income,
in 2009-2011.
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Figure 4.6 Survival probabilities: subjective/objective estimates.
we report findings without adjusting for inflation. This is because adjusting for inflation
requires ad hoc assumptions to be made about future inflation rates. Inflation adjustment
also does not make a large impact when responses are given within a range. For example, a
response within the range of $10,000 to $20,000 will most likely be within the same range
after adjusting for inflation for 5 to 10 years.
We highlight that this is not an expected versus observed comparison, as many objective
factors may contribute to the differences. In other words, if pre-retirees’ expectation is
significantly different from retirees’ experience, it is not necessarily the wrong expectation.
Nonetheless, the direction and magnitude of such differences, combined with other evidence
collected in the survey, may reveal important insights on the retirement planning behaviours
of Canadian individuals.
We find that on average, pre-retirees’ expectation of asset values at retirement quite
reasonably matches retirees’ experience, taking a number of factors into account. The
following section discusses retirement age, assets, income and planning concerns in detail.
Retirement age
Compared to retirees’ experience, pre-retirees on average expect a higher retirement age.
Figure 4.7 plots the distribution of expected and experienced retirement age. Table 4.15
summarizes the average retirement age. A myriad of factors may contribute to the difference
in expectation and experience, including life expectancy, age eligibility of public pension
schemes, involuntary retirement, retirement readiness (e.g. asset and retirement income)
and survey bias. We provide an explanation for each.
i. Life expectancy: on average, pre-retirees estimate a lower expected age at death
than retirees (84.99 and 86.05). It therefore cannot be concluded that pre-retirees
expect to retire later because they expect to live longer.
ii. Age eligibility: the normal retirement age for receiving CPP and OAS benefits has
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stayed at 65 since 1970 (CPP benefits can be taken at a reduced rate as early as age
60 since 1987). This means that pre-retirees are not compelled to retire later to be
eligible to receive public benefits. Nonetheless, it is still possible for pre-retirees to
anticipate a future increase in the eligibility age, since such increases are taking place
in other aging countries such as Australia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
iii. Involuntary retirement: pre-retirees may overestimate their remaining working life,
by underestimating the probability of declining health, direct or indirect involuntary
termination, or other relevant personal circumstances. The survey does not collect
information on the reasons behind retirement for retirees; doing so may reveal more
insight.
iv. Retirement readiness: it is plausible that pre-retirees expect to retire later due
to lower retirement readiness. Particularly for those in the private sector, the shift
from having generous defined benefit pension arrangements to defined contribution
or no arrangements means that pre-retirees need to accumulate more assets to meet
retirement needs, which translates to a longer working life and shorter retirement
length (see section 4.8.4 on defined benefit pension income).
v. Survey bias: the survey targets an audience between ages 50 to 80, which means
pre-retirees cannot report a retirement age less than 50, whereas retirees can. This
may create a biased sample and contribute to a larger average expected retirement
age, which we observe.
Mean Median
Expectation of pre-retirees 67.11 65.00
Experience of retirees 58.59 60.00
Table 4.15 Average age at retirement.
Assets at retirement
We compare pre-retirees’ expectation of asset values at retirement with retirees’ experience,
and find that, on average the expectations are very close to retirees’ experience. Table 4.16
summarizes the mean and median of reported asset values at the year of retirement.
Figure 4.8 shows the proportion of each response for pre-retirees and retirees.
We see that for pre-retirees, the means are higher for both liquid and fixed assets while the
medians are the same. This shows that the larger means are driven by higher expectations
in the right tails (see Figure 4.8), meaning that a small proportion of pre-retirees expect
much higher assets at retirement, while the majority expect similar asset levels with retirees’
experience. For liquid assets, the largest difference in expectation and experience comes
from the response “> 1,000,000”. This may be a manifestation of a tendency to overweigh
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Figure 4.7 Distribution of retirement age.
small probability events, as behavioural economic theory suggests (see Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979), or overconfidence in one’s investment skills. For fixed assets, pre-retirees
with medium to high property holdings consistently expect higher property values at
retirement. This is reasonable, since historical property inflation has been high in recent
years. Pre-retirees may also have high confidence in the Ontario housing market based on
these favourable observations. Additionally, historical inflation and pre-retirees’ beliefs of
future price inflation contribute to the difference.
Further, pre-retirees on average expect to retire later than retirees have, which provides
additional explanation for much higher fixed asset values at retirement (the accumulation
of property inflation over a longer period). For liquid assets, the difference is small, which
provides further evidence that lower retirement readiness, in terms of liquid retirement
assets and income on average contributes to the large difference in expected retirement age
for pre-retirees. A shorter retirement life, combined with a similar level of assets, sheds light
on pre-retirees’ lower retirement income expectations. We investigate retirement income in
the next section.
Liquid assets Fixed assets
Mean Median Mean Median
Expectation of pre-retirees $320,230 $150,000 $462,960 300,000
Experience of retirees $306,210 $150,000 $357,640 300,000
Table 4.16 Liquid and fixed assets at retirement.
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Figure 4.8 Liquid and fixed assets at retirement.
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Figure 4.9 Liquid and fixed assets at retirement.
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Retirement income
We compare pre-retirees expectations of retirement income from five sources with retirees’
experience. Table 4.17 summarizes the average income expected and experienced in the first
year of retirement. Figures 4.10 to 4.14 show the distribution of expected and experienced
income from various sources in the first year of retirement, separated by marital status9.
We highlight the following main findings:
i. Reasonable expectations by pre-retirees: taking inflation into account, the mean
of the expected total income is close to the experience (i.e. 2,101 higher), but the
median is considerably lower (i.e. 8,000 lower).
ii. Defined benefit pension: the most notable difference lies in income from defined
benefit pension plans, where pre-retirees’ expectation is significantly lower (i.e. 4,707
lower in the mean, 10,000 lower in the median). Overall, 48% of pre-retirees and 36%
of retirees do not have a defined benefit pension. The shift away from the defined
benefit arrangement is evident.
iii. Social insurance pension: the pension income from social insurance programs10
(i.e. public pensions), from which pre-retirees expect significantly higher amounts (i.e.
3,887 higher in the mean, 6,000 higher in the median). We examine public pensions
more closely in the next paragraph.
iv. Withdrawals: comparing the two means, pre-retirees expect to make moderately
higher withdrawals from liquid assets (i.e. 3,295 higher), which is consistent with their
moderately higher expectation of liquid assets at retirement.
v. Life annuities: few respondents have or expect to purchase private life annuities (i.e.
21% of pre-retirees and 12% of retirees).
vi. Other income sources: expectation of income from other sources, such as investment
income or employment, is moderately lower than retirees’ experience. This may reflect
a lower expectation for the need for employment in retirement.
As mentioned above, the seemingly high expectation of public pension benefits among
pre-retirees compared to retirees’ experience needs to be more closely examined. At first
glance, this may seem to indicate overconfidence in the Canadian public pensions program
among pre-retirees. However, this does not account for the age eligibility requirement to
receive these pension benefits. The normal retirement age for the OAS, GIS and CPP is 65
(though CPP benefits can be taken at a reduced rate starting from age 60), meaning that
those who retire prior to age 65 (or 60, in the case of CPP only) are not eligible, in the first
year of retirement, for receiving public pension benefits.
Table 4.18 summarizes the percentages of respondents with expected or actual retirement
9Survey options presented differ for married and single respondents.
10Public pension programs in Canada include the Canada Pension Plan, Old-age Security and Guaranteed
Income Supplement.
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Expectation of pre-retirees Experience of retirees
Mean Median Mean Median
Defined benefit $23,478 $5,000 $28,185 $15,000
Life annuities $6,298 $0 $2,833 $0
Withdrawals $21,793 $10,000 $18,498 $10,000
Public pension $15,505 $15,000 $11,618 $9,000
Other income $17,782 $10,000 $21,759 $10,000
Total income $85,194 $61,000 $83,093 $ 69,000
Table 4.17 Average income in the first year of retirement.
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Figure 4.10 Defined benefit pension in the first year of retirement.
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Figure 4.11 Public pension in the first year of retirement.
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Figure 4.12 Life annuities in the first year of retirement.
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Figure 4.13 Withdrawals from liquid assets in the first year of retirement.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
<20,000
20,000939,999
40,000959,999
60,000979,999
80,000999,999
100,0009119,999
120,0009139,999
140,0009159,999
160,0009179,999
180,0009200,000
>200,000
Other income sources (married)
Expectation of pre-retirees
Experience of retirees
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
<10,000
10,000919,999
20,000929,999
30,000939,999
40,000949,999
50,000959,999
60,000969,999
70,000979,999
80,000989,999
90,000999,999
>100,000
Other income sources (single)
Expectation of pre-retirees
Experience of retirees
Figure 4.14 Income from other sources in the first year of retirement.
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60 and above 65 and above
All Married Single All Married Single
All 72% 70% 75% 49% 45% 59%
Pre-retirees 93% 92% 96% 76% 72% 84%
Retirees 50% 50% 52% 22% 18% 31%
Table 4.18 Percentages of respondents with retirement age at least 60 or 65.
age at least 60 and 65. It can be observed that half of the retirees were not eligible for
OAS and GIS benefits in the first year of retirement, which explains the high proportions of
“Below $6,000” and “Below $3,000” responses from retirees. It would be sensible to repeat
the analysis excluding those who expect to, or have retired before the age 60 or 65, which
is summarized by Table 4.19, and Figures 4.15 and 4.16.
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Figure 4.15 Public pension in the first year of retirement (retirement age 60 and over).
Expectation of pre-retirees Experience of retirees
Mean Median Mean Median
60 and above $15,762 $15,000 $15,440 $15,000
65 and above $16,111 $15,000 $18,179 $15,000
Table 4.19 Average public pension income in the first year of retirement (excluding
ineligible respondents).
We observe that when ineligible respondents are excluded, the difference between expec-
tation and experience diminishes. We attribute this to the rise in the average of retirees’
public pension income, since ineligible respondents are excluded. For the 65 and above
group, pre-retirees’ lower11 expectation is largely driven by choices at the lower end, which
11The Mann-Whitney U -test is performed with p = 0.0817. The null hypothesis of equal distributions is not
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Figure 4.16 Public pension in the first year of retirement (retirement age 65 and over).
we discuss below. It should be noted that inflation and inflation expectations play a role,
as benefits are indexed12 to price inflation.
i. Complexity/Lack of knowledge: The Canadian pubic pension system is complex,
and includes two pillars. The first pillar includes OAS and GIS which are means-tested.
The second pillar, the CPP,13 has earnings-related contributions and benefits. As
such, estimating future public pension benefits is difficult, especially for those with low
financial literacy who have not sought retirement planning advice. This is particularly
the case for the CPP, where the calculation of the benefit is tied to past contributions.
The CPP benefits, as well as income from other sources, also interact with the first
pillar through “clawbacks”, that is, higher CPP benefits and other income may reduce
benefits from the OAS and GIS.
ii. Age of application: We solicit responses based on the first year of retirement, which
means even if the retirement age is above 60 or 65, respondents may choose to postpone
taking benefits to a later age, either irrationally (e.g. lack of knowledge, inaction, etc.),
or rationally (e.g. CPP benefits can be taken as early as 60, at a reduced rate, or
postponed to as late as age 70, with an incentive of increased benefits).
iii. Changed incentives on age of application: from 2012, the CPP introduced
changes to further incentivize late retirement and disincentivize early retirement.
Gradually by 2016, the benefit reduction rate for each year of early retirement increased
from 6% to 7.2%; the adjustment rate for each year of late retirement increased from 6%
to 8.4%. Consequently, pre-retirees in this study have a higher incentive to postpone
rejected at the 5% level.
12The OAS and GIS benefits are indexed to quarterly changes in the Consumer Price Index, whereas the
CPP benefits are adjusted annually.
13Or the Quebec pension plan (QPP) for residents in Quebec, which we do not consider since respondents
are residents of Ontario. Some (very few) respondents report income from QPP in the “other income
sources” category.
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CPP benefits than retirees, meaning that they may report lower expected public
pension income in the first year of retirement.
iv. Increase in future benefits: Pre-retirees may expect public pension benefits to
change due to future changes in the public retirement income system. This is a
reasonable expectation since historically the Canadian public pension system has
evolved significantly. Specifically, GIS benefits for single retirees increased in 2016; the
CPP was also set to increase its benefits starting in 2019. Pre-retirees may or may
not be aware of these introduced changes, and may or may not accurately translate
legislative changes to monetary changes in their retirement income expectations. The
effect on expectations due to future changes in public pensions is inconclusive since
the survey does not specifically solicit directly relevant responses.
v. Increase in future eligibility age: In 2012, the Canada government announced
plans to increase the age of eligibility for OAS and GIS from 65 to 67, taking effect
between 2023 and 2029. The proposed change was reversed in March 2016, prior to
the time this survey took place. Assuming that the survey respondents were informed
of both events, it is reasonable that certain pre-retirees may hold the belief that the
age of eligibility may increase in the future (since it has been proposed in the past).
If these respondents expect to retire before the age of eligibility (say 67), then their
expected social insurance pension should be low in the first year of retirement.
vi. Immigration: one factor that may contribute to the high concentration of low
expected public pension income among pre-retirees is immigration. Since the early
1990s, the inflow of immigrants to Canada has been on average roughly 235,000 per
year, which is nearly 50% higher than the average number from the 60s to 80s (source:
Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 11-630-X). Pre-retirees who migrated to Canada at
older ages would receive lower CPP benefits, since benefits are linked to historical
contributions throughout one’s working life. We do not collect immigration information
in the survey, however, 21% of Canada’s total population are foreign-born (source:
NHS 2011) it is likely that we have a similar composition among the survey respondents.
Nonetheless, it remains inconclusive as to what extent immigration contributes to the
difference in expectation and experience.
Looking at those who retire at age 65 and above, the difference between expectation and
experience is most significant for the first choice “below 6,000” and “below 3,000”. It may be
interesting to single out these respondents, and compare certain demographic information.
For this we make the following comments.
We find that these pre-retirees on average have fewer years of formal education, hence
are less likely to be financially literate (see, for example, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007a)):
62% report the highest level of education completed being “trades or college certificate or
diploma” or below, whereas only 40% of the retirees in the same choice category report a
similar education level. This is reasonable, since income is typically positively correlated
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with education received14, and higher income earners receive less from means-tested public
pension schemes. Further, 59% of the pre-retirees have not sought professional financial
planning advice in the past, which, combined with likely lower financial literacy, raises
questions as to whether they can accurately estimate future benefits. This percentage is
higher than the 51% among the remaining pre-retirees. The above evidence suggests that
it is quite likely that these pre-retirees underestimate public pension benefits due to lack
of knowledge, which results in the mean being lower than retirees’ experience even when
future benefits are to increase due to recent legislative changes.
Expectation of pre-retirees Experience of retirees
Mean Median Mean Median
Defined benefit $18,562 $0 $16,822 $0
Life annuities $5,538 $0 $3,148 $0
Withdrawals $20,082 $10,000 $23,619 $10,000
Public pension $16,111 $15,000 $18,179 $15,000
Other income $18,003 $10,000 $19,688 $10,000
Total income $78,296 $35,000 $81,456 $ 35,000
Table 4.20 Average income in the first year of retirement (retirement age 65 and above).
For pre-retirees who expect to retire at 65 or above (i.e. eligible for public pension
benefits), we observe a positive relationship between public pension income and liquid assets
expectations (the estimated Kendall’s tau is 0.08∗). In Table 4.20, we observe that public
pension income is a primary source of income for an average (median) individual. This
implies that those who expect more public pensions also tend to have higher liquid assets
at retirement. This appears counterintuitive since one would imagine that with such low
expectations, these individuals would save more. This may be due to the fact that the
major source of public pension income, the CPP, is an earnings-related program.
4.8.5 Retirement planning and spending
Concerns
The results, summarized in Figure 4.17, show that for all respondents, the top four
important concerns when making retirement planning and spending decisions are:
Liquidity (setting money aside to access quickly when unforeseen expenses arise)
Consumption/Income smoothing (avoiding ups and downs in my income / having
a smooth income stream during retirement)
14Our results show a positive estimated Kendall’s tau of 0.2503∗∗ and a correlation coefficient of 0.3280∗∗ for
income and the highest education received among all respondents. This is consistent with other research
findings such as Lusardi and Mitchell (2007b).
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Inflation (the impact of inflation on my standard of living)
Longevity (the possibility of living longer than expected)
The least important concerns are:
Bequest (leaving a bequest)
Investment risk (taking some investment risk with my savings during retirement)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Bequest
Investment risk
Longevity
In.ation
Consumption smoothing
Liquidity
Very important Fairly important Neutral Fairly unimportant Very unimportant
Figure 4.17 All participants: retirement planning and spending concerns (top to bottom:
most important to least important).
Concerns change when separately considering the wealthy (i.e. “high” wealth level) and the
extremely poor (i.e. liquid assets below $25,000) (see Figure 4.18). High wealth respondents
are more concerned with home care or nursing home expenses than with longevity. Extremely
low assets respondents are most concerned with consumption/income smoothing. These
observations are reasonable, since wealthy respondents can potentially afford home care or
nursing home services (while others cannot, hence are not too concerned); and respondents
with extremely low liquid assets cannot tolerate income or consumption volatility due to
having extremely limited capacity to make up for the differences.
We further quantify the relationship between the strength of the concerns and basic
demographic information of the respondents. Table 4.21 summarizes the estimated Kendall’s
taus of each concern and demographic item. The strength of the concerns is measured on a
scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being very unimportant and 5 being very important. Retirement,
gender and marital status are indicator variables, with 1 being pre-retiree, female, or
married, and 2 being retiree, male or single (as shown in the tables). The concerns are
listed in the order of high to low average importance among all respondents. We find the
152
4.8 Data Analysis
Home/Nursing home care
5%
8%
32%
32%
23%
Very unimportant
Fairly unimportant
Neutral
Fairly important
Very important
Consumption/Income 
 smoothing
4%5%
22%
32%
37%
Figure 4.18 Retirement planning and spending concerns. Left: participants with “high”
wealth. Right: participants with liquid assets below $25,000.
following evidence:
i. Gender: gender has a significant impact on the level of concern respondents express.
For the top 8 concerns, the estimated Kendall’s tau with gender are all negative and
statistically significant, indicating that female respondents tend to rate the concerns as
more important than male respondents. The relationship is stronger for top concerns.
Male respondents, on the other hand, tend to rate taking some investment risk with
their retirement savings as more important than females do.
ii. Assets: as discussed previously, those with high liquid assets tend to be more con-
cerned over nursing care/home care expenses, and less concerned over longevity risk.
Also, respondents with higher assets (liquid and fixed) tend to consider taking some
investment risk as more important, suggesting that risk preferences may be dependent
on wealth. More discussion on risk preferences and decision-making under risk can be
found in sections 4.8.6 and 4.8.7.
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Age Retirement Gender Marital Liquid Assets Fixed Assets
(1: unimp 5: imp) (1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1. mar 2: sin)
Unforeseen exps −0.02 −0.01 −0.20∗∗ 0.00 0.06∗∗ 0.02
Smooth income 0.02 −0.02 −0.17∗∗ 0.03 −0.05∗ −0.11∗∗
Inflation −0.07∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.15∗∗ 0.06∗ −0.02 −0.06∗
Living longer −0.02 −0.04 −0.15∗∗ 0.02 0.01 0.00
Less spending −0.09∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.07∗ −0.04 −0.03
Nursing Care 0.01 −0.04 −0.10∗∗ −0.02 0.08∗∗ 0.05
More spending 0.00 −0.03 −0.09∗∗ 0.07∗ −0.05∗ −0.06∗∗
Dying early −0.08∗∗ −0.02 −0.07∗∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.03
Taking inv risk 0.00 0.01 0.07∗∗ −0.04 0.17∗∗ 0.10∗∗
Bequest 0.00 −0.02 −0.05 −0.05 0.03 0.03
Table 4.21 Kendall’s taus: relationship between concerns and demographic information.
In addition to the specific planning and spending concerns, respondents are asked to
rate how concerned they are, currently, regarding the impact of aging on their and/or their
spouses’ ability to manage their own finances. The average response shows a lack of concern
(see Figure 4.19, the average is “fairly unconcerned”), especially among retired respondents
(see Table 4.22). Mild relationship between the respondent’s current health status, such
that those with poorer health tend to be more concerned, is found. Single respondents show
higher relative concern over the issue than married ones.
21%
40%
29%
10%Very unconcerned
Fairly unconcerned
Fairly concerned
Very concerned
Figure 4.19 All participants: current concerns over the ability to manage own finances as
one ages.
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Age Retirement Gender Marital Health Liquid Education
(1: unc 4: con) (1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1. mar 2: sin) (1: Exc 5: Poor)
Aging −0.06∗ −0.22∗∗ −0.06 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.06∗ −0.04
Table 4.22 Kendall’s taus: relationship between current concerns over the impact of aging
on the capability of managing finances and demographic information.
Attitude towards professional advice
Figure 4.20 summarizes responses on seeking professional financial advice (henceforth
advice). Overall, attitude towards seeking advice is positive: 60% indicate that it plays a
role in future planning, a majority of which have sought advice, implying a comparably
positive experience. A majority of those who will not be seeking advice have not had the
experience of doing so in the past (i.e. “No/No”).
Attitude is found to be strongly related the level of actual/expected liquid assets at
retirement. Those with very low liquid assets (i.e. below $25,000, a total of 210 respondents)
have dramatically different attitudes from the rest: 80% of these respondents report no
interest in seeking advice in the future (34% for the rest). This finding is reasonable, as
these respondents have little assets to manage. This also mirrors the findings of Iannicola
and Parker (2010), which discusses barriers to financial advice for non-aﬄuent individuals
in the US. The following discussion excludes the 210 respondents with liquid retirement
assets below $25,000.
Figure 4.21 summarizes the results: concerns are shown from top left to bottom right in
the order of high to low average importance. Table 4.24 outlines the relationship between
concerns and demographic information. We highlight the following findings:
i. The general concern is high: respondents on average show high concerns over all
issues raised, with the top two being ‘having access to quality service’ and ‘conflicts of
interest’.
ii. Age: a mild relationship is found between age and concerns over quality assessment
and conflict of interest, such that younger subjects are more concerned. Pre-retirees
(who are on average younger) are more concerned about conflicts of interest.
iii. Written comments: A total of 84 respondents provided written comments on
additional concerns (on top of those shown in Figure 4.21) over seeking advice or
financial advisors in general, among which only 52 are relevant to the question. Top
comments/concerns are recorded in Table 4.23. Interestingly, the most prevalent
response is expressing trust in the current advisors (due to long-term relationships).
Other concerns center around the fiduciary duties of financial advisors (i.e. conflicts of
interest, fees transparency, and government oversight).
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Top comments/concerns Frequency Percentage
“I trust my advisor” 11 21%
Conflict of Interest 7 13%
Affordability/cost 7 13%
Negative past experience 5 10%
Government oversight 5 10%
Fees transparency 4 7%
Table 4.23 Top comments/concerns towards seeking professional financial advice (collected
from written responses).
47%
13%
9%
31%
Past/Future: Yes/Yes
Past/Future: No/Yes
Past/Future: Yes/No
Past/Future: No/No
Liquid assets at retirement below $25,000 
10%
11%
18% 62%
Liquid assets at retirement above $25,000
58%
8%
12%
22%
Figure 4.20 All participants: attitude towards seeking professional financial advice.
Age Retirement Gender Marital Liquid Fixed
(1: uncon 5: con) (1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1. mar 2: sin)
Access quality service 0.04 0.03 −0.06 −0.02 0.04 0.03
Victim of fraud −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.04 0.00
Unable to assess quality −0.06∗ −0.06 −0.05 −0.03 −0.04 −0.01
Incapable advisors −0.02 −0.02 −0.03 0.01 −0.01 −0.02
Self-serving advisors −0.06∗ −0.08∗ −0.04 0.00 −0.04 0.00
Table 4.24 Kendall’s taus: seeking professional financial advice (excluding participants
with liquid assets below $25,000).
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0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Not being able to
assess service quality
Being a victim of
a fraud or scam
The capability of
advisors
Advisors acting in
own best interest
Accessing high
quality service
Very important Fairly important Neutral Fairly unimportant Very unimportant
Figure 4.21 Concerns regarding professional financial advisors (excluding participants
with liquid assets below $25,000). From top to bottom: high to low average importance.
Bequest motives
In the beginning of section 4.8.7, bequest motives are found to play the least important
role in dictating retirement planning and spending decisions. However, bequest motives are
common assumptions in traditional life-cycle models, and are often quantified by a utility
function multiplied by a strength parameter, which governs the willingness to bequest.
For example, an agent who more strongly values bequest would have a higher strength
parameter. Consequently, the utility derived from bequest is more amplified, resulting in
bequest playing a significant role in retirement decision-making in the academic literature.
To date, the strength parameters used in these models are constant throughout an agent’s
remaining lifetime. We postulate that bequest motives vary, at the very least with age
which broadly measures personal circumstances. For example, younger individuals are more
likely to have dependents, hence should have stronger bequest motives if they were to die
within the next couple of years than older individuals with grown children (i.e. fewer or
no dependents). Younger individuals may also have younger dependents, who need more
sizeable financial support, hence influencing the size of the bequest.
The survey collects responses on how important bequest is if respondents were to die
within the next 10 years, 10 to 20 years and over 20 years from now. We are interested in
exploring whether the strength of bequest changes with age, or other personal circumstances.
Results are summarized in Figure 4.22 and Table 4.25. We report the following findings:
i. Overall: the average importance of bequest is between “fairly unimportant” and
“neutral”. This is consistent with our previous findings. The average level of importance
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drops when death is more distant: some of this difference may be due to myopia.
Additionally, little evidence suggests that the strength of bequest motives is related to
current health, or the amount of liquid assets.
ii. Dependents15: the number of dependents is found to have the strongest relationship
with bequest motives, in that those with more dependents tend to value bequests more
strongly. This finding implies that bequest motives are strongly driven by financial
needs.
iii. Marital status: married respondents tend to have stronger bequest motives than
single respondents, regardless of when death might occur.
iv. Gender: women tend to have stronger bequest motives than men, regardless of when
death might occur. This is consistent with the previous findings that women tend to
be more concerned over retirement planning and spending issues than men.
v. Fixed assets: respondents with higher fixed assets (i.e. properties) tend to consider
bequest as more important. Interestingly no such relationship is observed for liquid
assets. This implies that, potentially, respondents view properties as their major source
of bequest.
vi. Retirement and age: since retirement and age are both negatively related16 to the
number of dependents (i.e. younger or pre-retirees tend to have more dependents), we
find a mild relationship between each of the two factors and bequest.
Age Retirement Gender Marital Dependents Liquid Fixed
(1: unimp 5: imp) (1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1. mar 2: sin) (1: 1 5: ≥ 5 )
< 10 −0.05∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.13∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.02 0.07∗∗
10− 20 −0.05∗ −0.06∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.12∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.02 0.07∗∗
> 20 −0.06∗ −0.06 −0.09∗∗ −0.11∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.02 0.06∗
Table 4.25 Kendall’s taus: relationship between bequest motives and demographic infor-
mation.
15Q10 collects responses on the number of people the household income supports in 2015 (for pre-retirees)
and in the first year of retirement (for retirees). The average is 2.19 for pre-retirees and 1.98 for retirees
(the Mann-Whitney U -test is performed with p = 0.0116. The null hypothesis of equal distribution is
rejected at the 5% level.). Since no data is collected on the number of dependents retirees currently have,
we make the assumption that the number of current dependents is equal to that at retirement.
16The estimated Kendall’s tau for age and retirement, against the number of dependents are −0.14∗∗ and
−0.07∗.
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Over 20 years from now
10 to 20 years from now
Within the next 10 years
Very important Fairly important Neutral Fairly unimportant Very unimportant
Figure 4.22 All participants: the importance of bequest if respondents were to die within
different time periods.
4.8.6 Risk and time preferences
Risk preferences
We elicit risk preferences both qualitatively and quantitatively. Qualitative results are
summarized in Figures 4.23 and 4.24, quantitative results in Figures 4.25 and 4.26, and
Table 4.26.
i. Average risk aversion is “moderate”: For pre-retirees, the median description for
current risk attitude with respect to managing assets is that “I am willing to accept
moderate risk”. The same median is observed for retirees when asked to state their
risk attitude when first retired. The distributions of risk attitude for pre-retirees and
retirees show strong similarities (see Figure 4.23).
ii. Risk aversion over time: When asked to compare risk attitude across time (see
Figure 4.24), almost all respondents expect/express that their risk tolerance level will
be/is no greater than when they were younger. In other words, there is strong evidence
that risk aversion is perceived to either stay the same or increase with age. This
perception is consistent with empirical research findings such as Eckel and Grossman
(2008) and Halek and Eisenhauer (2001). An interesting observation is that pre-retirees
have a very reasonable expectation as to how their risk attitude would change entering
retirement.
iii. CRRA parameter: The median implied CRRA range for pre-retirees is 1.74 < ρ <
2.48 under lower stakes and 2.48 < ρ < 3.74 under higher stakes. For retirees, the range
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is 2.48 < ρ < 3.74 under both cases. Close to 90% of respondents have an implied
CRRA parameter greater than zero (i.e. risk averse). There is strong dependency
between the implied CRRA range under the lower and higher stake options (see
Figure 4.26). We highlight the following implications and findings:
For pre-retirees, the CRRA parameter is dependent on the level of consumption,
such that the higher the stakes, the higher the aversion to risk. This is consistent
with findings by Harrison et al. (2007), which offered evidence of lower estimates
of relative risk aversion when the stakes are reduced significantly. These empirical
observations question the validity of the restrictive representation of the CRRA
utility function, and potentially point to a decreasing relative risk aversion utility
form. Nonetheless, we find no such evidence for retirees. It could be that the
difference exists but is too small to be detected. We postulate that this difference
may reduce with age.
Relative risk aversion is related to age, retirement status, gender, education, and
wealth (see Table 4.26), such that the retired/female/those with fewer years of formal
education/poorer are more risk averse. Risk aversion has the strongest relationship
with wealth and retirement.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
avoid at all cost
low risk
moderate risk
moderate to high risk
high risk
no investments
Risk attitude with respect to managing assets
Pre-retirees (current attitude)
Retirees (attitude at retirement)
Figure 4.23 All participants: risk attitude (the amount of risks willing to accept).
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Pre-retirees: expected risk attitude 
 at retirement (compared to now)
1%
49% 50%
more willing to accept risk when retired
the same when retired
less willing to accept risk when retired
Retirees: current risk attitude 
 (compared to at retirement)
5%
57%
37%
more willing to accept risk now
the same now
less willing to accept risk now
Figure 4.24 All participants: risk attitude (compared to current (pre-retirees) and at
retirement (retirees)).
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0:26 < ; < 0:88
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!1 < ; < 0
All participants: implied CRRA range
Lower stakes
Higher stakes
Figure 4.25 All participants: implied CRRA range for choices under lower and higher
stakes.
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Frequency Plot: All Participants
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Figure 4.26 All participants: the relationship between the implied CRRA range under
lower and higher stakes. Kendall’s tau: 0.69∗∗.
Age Retirement Gender Marital Education Liquid Fixed
(1: low 10: high) (1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1. mar 2: sin) (1: low 6: high )
Lower stakes 0.06∗ 0.09∗∗ −0.06∗ 0.05 −0.06∗ −0.08∗∗−0.10∗∗
Higher stakes 0.05∗ 0.10∗∗ −0.05 0.06∗ −0.06∗ −0.07∗∗−0.07∗∗
Table 4.26 Kendall’s taus: relationship between risk aversion and demographic information.
Time preferences
Similar to risk, time preferences are elicited through hypothetical monetary choices. Partici-
pants are asked to make 7 choices with binary payoff options, with a lower more immediate
payoff and a higher payoff made in the distant future. The goal is to elicit the annual time
discount factor β.
As described in section 4.5.2, β can only be obtained from consistent choices. Consistent
choices include three cases: 1) consistently choose Option A, 2) consistently choose Option
B, and 3) switch from A to B, once only. Among all participants, 715 made consistent
choices. We obtain 711 time discount factors due their entanglement with the parameter
of risk aversion ρ (see Equation (4.4) and (4.5)). Here, we use the ρ obtained from the
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higher stake options, and assume a background consumption17 of $172 which is the average
daily consumption of Ontario residents in 2015. A histogram of elicited18 discount factors
is shown in Figure 4.27.
0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75 0.8 0.85 0.9 0.95 1
Elicited time discount factor -
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Figure 4.27 All participants: elicited annual time discount factor β.
Age Retirement Gender Marital Education Liquid Fixed Risk Aversion
(1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1. mar 2: sin) (1: low 6: high )
β 0.02 0.09∗∗ −0.04 0.03 −0.01 −0.05 −0.04 0.86∗∗
Table 4.27 Kendall’s taus: relationship between elicited time discount factor and demo-
graphic information.
We find the following:
i. Average discount factor above 0.96: the median elicited β is 0.997, and the mean
is 0.965. 85% of the elicited β are greater than 0.96, 71% are greater than 0.98. The
17The assumption of background consumption ω impacts the elicited time discounting parameter β. A
lower ω gives rise to a higher β. However, this impact is small within reasonable bounds. We repeated
the calculations assuming average daily background consumptions of $55 and $300 (i.e. an average
yearly consumption of $20,075 and $109,500 ) and found negligible differences. The average household
consumption for Ontario residents is $62,719 in 2015 (Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 203-0021
and Catalogue no. 62F0026M).
18We obtain the discount factors by taking the midpoint of the elicited range. For those who provide
boundary responses (i.e. consistent choice of A or B), the elicited factor is taken as the upper or lower
bound. This avoids having discount factors that imply extreme myopia.
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two discount factors, 0.96 and 0.98, are commonly used in the retirement planning
literature, and imply much stronger myopia in long-term problems than our empirical
findings.
ii. Retirement: the elicited discount factor is related to the retirement status (see
Table 4.16) in that retirees tend to have higher discount factors than pre-retirees. This
implies that retirees may be more forward thinking in terms of financial planning and
spending, due to lower income compared to pre-retirees.
iii. Other demographic factors: there is no evidence that the discount factor is de-
pendent on age, gender, marital status, education, health, or asset levels. There is a
strong positive relationship between β and ρ since the boundaries of β are increasing
functions of ρ (see Equations (4.4) and (4.5)).
The elicited discount rates are based on short-term choices (i.e. 1 year) and are later
applied to longer term problems (i.e. 30+ years) in Section 4.8.7. The assumption is
that intertemporal choice is time-consistent, meaning that preferences do not change over
time. This type of time discounting is called time-consistent discounting, or exponential
discounting. Though widely used in the economic and retirement planning literature, there
exists evidence that exponential time discounting does not reflect the observed behaviour
of individuals. Loewenstein and Elster (1992), among others, provides an interesting
and comprehensive discussion on intertemporal preferences. An alternative assumption is
hyperbolic discounting, under which the discounting effect declines for longer periods and
choice becomes time-inconsistent. Our study restricts the investigation to time-consistent
models, which have been commonly adopted in the actuarial science literature to date.
Investigations of alternative decision-making models are reserved for future studies.
4.8.7 Retirement planning under risky scenarios
The annuity puzzle
In the retirement planning literature, life annuities are shown to significantly improve the
welfare of an individual in retirement (see Yaari, 1965; Davidoff et al., 2005; Peijnenburg
et al., 2016). Despite these theoretical findings, there is ample evidence that, in practice,
annuity sales are extremely low (with the exception of a few countries, such as the United
Kingdom which until recently mandated partial annuitization of pension funds). This
contrast is referred to as the Annuity Puzzle. To explore this puzzle, we construct a
hypothetical annuity19 product of $100 per month and ask respondents to 1) value its
worth, 2) make purchasing decisions, and 3) explain the reasons behind these decisions. We
first ask respondents to specify the maximum amount that they are willing to pay for this
19The annuity product is presented under the name “guaranteed income for life” to avoid any pre-existent
negative sentiment towards the word annuity.
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product, followed by a question that offers the annuity at the selected price20 and solicits
responses on the number of units they are willing to purchase. Respondents are then asked
to rate how important certain considerations are in their choices. Results are summarized in
Figures 4.28, 4.29, and 4.30, and Tables 4.28 and 4.29. We highlight the following findings:
i. Extreme undervaluation of annuities: Overall, 66% of respondents report that
the maximum price is below 3,000, 79% report below 6,000 and 84% report below 9,000
which is approximately half of the average market price in 2015. The 2015 average
market quote for a life annuity of $100 per month for a life aged 65 is $19,776 for
male and $21,202 for female. This suggests that annuity products have extremely
low value to respondents. Figure 4.28 plots the relationship between liquid assets
and the reported maximum prices. We observe that the majority of the choices are
concentrated on “Below 3,000”, regardless of the level of liquid funds. This is an
interesting observation, since for a price of $3,000 the break-even point for purchasing
the annuity is roughly 3 years. A financially literate respondent should be willing to
purchase at this price if they believe that survival for another 3 years is highly likely.
ii. Extremely low interest in purchasing annuities at any price: Since respon-
dents reported extremely low prices, the annuities are correspondingly offered at
extremely low prices (e.g. a price of $1,500 is offered for those who chose “Below 3,000”
in the valuation question). Surprisingly, 53% still choose not to purchase. The average
offering price for these respondents is extremely low at $3,530, which is less than one
fifth of the market price.
iii. Liquid assets, gender and education: We find that the maximum price is more
strongly impacted by the amount of liquid assets, gender and the highest level of
education, all of which have been shown to be strongly related to financial literacy (see,
e.g., Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007a). Male, more educated
and those with higher liquid assets tend to value annuities more highly. The impact of
gender is particularly interesting since females are more exposed to longevity risk than
males, and should theoretically value annuities more highly.
iv. Retirement status: We find that pre-retirees tend to purchase more units than
retirees. This mirrors the fact that pre-retirees have on average lower retirement
income than retirees due to decreasing defined benefit workplace pensions.
20If the previous question is skipped, the 2015 market price is shown.
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Frequency Plot: All Participants
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Figure 4.28 All participants: liquid assets and the maximum prices willing to pay for a
monthly (annuity) income of $100.
Further evidence (summarized in Figure 4.30) suggests that the top three concerns
over annuity purchases are:
Credit risk (default of the annuity provider)
Loss of flexibility and control of personal finances
Loss of financial security
The above findings shed important light on the annuity puzzle. In the current literature,
full annuitization is considered optimal when retirement planning (or welfare maximization)
is based solely on maximizing the CRRA utility derived from consumption and bequest. We
are not aware of any quantitative model that considers utility derived from holding wealth,
which appears to have high psychological importance to individuals (i.e. a sense of control,
liquidity and security). The fear of provider default, which can be argued to be rational
or irrational, is also rarely considered in modelling descriptive decision-making. In fact,
Canadian annuitants face very limited credit default risk due to the protection provided
by Assuris – a Canadian consumer protection agency that insures full or partial annuity
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payments in the event of provider default. The strong concern demonstrated by respondents
regarding provider default points to a lack of understanding of this protection. It should be
highlighted that there is some framing effect at play, since the option of provider default is
presented as a possible concern.
In making the annuity purchase decision, respondents show low concerns over longevity
risk, possibly due to existing access to public/workplace pension income which provides
some longevity protection. Respondents are least concerned over the possibility of family
facing hardship if they were to die early, which gives rise to three possible explanations: 1)
they do not consider dying early as a plausible scenario; 2) there are no significant financial
consequences; 3) there might be significant financial consequences, but the respondent fails
to foresee, or chooses to ignore them in the present (i.e. myopia). This, combined with the
findings of low bequest motives in the section 4.8.5, suggests that the financial consequences
in the event of death play an unimportant role in respondents’ retirement planning and
spending decisions.
53%
34%
7%
7%will not purchase
1 to 5 units
6 to 15 units
over 15 units
Figure 4.29 All participants: units of purchase when annuities are offered at agreeable
prices.
Maximum price Units of purchase
Credit risk 0.01 0.04
Loss of flexibility and control 0.05 0.01
Loss of financial security −0.07∗∗ −0.10∗∗
Longevity risk 0.07∗∗ 0.07∗∗
Family hardship 0.00 0.03
Table 4.28 Kendall’s taus: the relationship between maximum price/units of purchase and
concerns.
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Figure 4.30 Concerns about purchasing annuities. From top to bottom: high to low
average importance.
Retirement Gender Marital Health Education Liquid
(1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1. mar 2: sin) (1: exc 5: poor ) (1: low 6: high )
Price 0.05 0.17∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.07∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.23∗∗
Units −0.12∗∗ 0.05 −0.01 −0.03 0.08∗∗ 0.09∗∗
Credit risk −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.04 0.03 −0.03 −0.01
Loss of flexibility −0.09∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.01 0.05 −0.02 0.02
Loss of security −0.09∗∗ −0.16∗∗ −0.03 0.07∗∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.09∗∗
Longevity −0.17∗∗ −0.17∗∗ 0.00 0.06∗ −0.06∗∗ −0.08∗∗
Family hardship −0.08∗∗ −0.02 −0.18∗∗ 0.08∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.08∗∗
Table 4.29 Kendall’s taus: relationship between annuity purchases, concerns and demo-
graphic information.
Decision-making under risky pension scenarios
The purpose of this section is to assess the descriptive validity of the traditional life-cycle
investment approach to retirement planning, which is to maximize welfare measured by the
expected discounted lifetime utility (EDLU) derived from real consumption. In this section,
we compare the pension choices implied under the EDLU approach, and the actual choices
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made by survey subjects. The maximized EDLU is expressed mathematically as
max
p∈P
E
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct(p))
}
(4.14)
where P = {“pension option 1”, “pension option 2”}, and {ct(p)}∞t=0, real consumption, is a
function of p. The implied decision under EDLU is that the subject should choose “pension
option i” if
E
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct(i))
}
> E
{ ∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct(j))
}
, i 6= j. (4.15)
Under the CRRA assumption, the utility function is u(c) = (ω + c)
1−ρ
1− ρ . In our analysis, we
compute the pension choices implied under the EDLU maximization method using elicited
time and risk preference parameters β̂ and ρ̂. We additionally assume zero background
consumption and that the monthly pension income is fully consumed. In reality, individuals
may choose to save, invest or borrow, but data on such specific behaviour is not collected
(and would be extremely difficult to do so, especially in a cross-sectional survey). The
assumption simplifies the problem and the results should be interpreted accordingly.
The elicited time discount rates are based on short-term choices (i.e. 1 year) and are being
applied to longer term problems (i.e. 30+ years). The assumption is that intertemporal
choice is time-consistent, meaning that preferences do not change over time. This is referred
to as time-consistent discounting, or exponential discounting. Though widely used in the
economic and retirement planning literature, there exists evidence that exponential time
discounting does not reflect the observed behaviour of individuals (Loewenstein and Prelec,
1992). A prominent alternative to exponential discounting is hyperbolic discounting, under
which the discounting effect declines for longer periods (i.e. β in more distant periods
becomes closer to 1) and choice becomes time-inconsistent (see Laibson, 1997). Our current
study restricts the investigation to the time-consistent model described in Equation (4.14),
which is commonly adopted in the retirement planning literature to date. Investigations of
alternative decision-making models are reserved for future studies.
One may be interested in the implication of hyperbolic discounting on long-term decision-
making investigated in this study. For this we provide the following comments. If the
observed preferences are well-described by hyperbolic discounting, then future gratifications
would be discounted less heavily (compared to exponential discounting), which would
potentially impact decision-making at the present. This effect would be more prominent
for those who exhibit stronger hyperbolic preferences, potentially agents with a lower
short-term discount factor β. Overall, most of the elicited β’s are very close to unity,
meaning that very little short-term discounting is observed. This implies that for most
surveyed individuals, even under the assumption of exponential discounting (where the
future is more heavily discounted than in the hyperbolic discounting), time discounting
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does not have a dominant impact on decision-making. The implication is that if preferences
follow hyperbolic discounting, most of the differences in model-implied choice would be
quite small.
i. Inflation-indexed pension (with subjective beliefs)
Respondents are first asked to choose between Match-inflation pension (MIP,“pension option
1”) and Steady pension (SP, “pension option 2”) without any given information on future
inflation outlook. The breakdown of choices for all six cases is summarized in Figure 4.31.
The relationships between pension choices and certain decision-making factors are presented
in Table 4.30. We highlight the following findings:
i. Consistency: respondents on average make consistent choices. The proportion of
MIP choices increases for succeeding choices, which is reasonable since the next MIP
choice gives strictly higher income. This is also observed in the next section when
objective inflation information is provided.
ii. Low expectation of cumulative inflation impact in the long term: when
provided with no information on inflation outlook, respondents place lower value on
the MIP. Comparing Figure 4.31 to Figures 4.32 and 4.33, the percentage of those
who prefer the MIP increases dramatically, implying that the subjects either 1) believe
that inflation has a lower impact on the cost of living than described (i.e. on average
2% per annum with some variations), or 2) lack the understanding of the impact of
cumulative inflation on the cost of living. A combination of both factors is also likely.
iii. Financial literacy: certain choices are quite strongly clouded by low financial literacy.
Certain respondents with low financial literacy may not grasp the concept of inflation
or be able to quantify its cumulative impact in the long term. This is clearly observed
in Figure 4.31, where 31% choose SP over MIP when MIP gives strictly higher income
in all scenarios. This is strongly related to subjects’ understanding of the MIP
option: Table 4.30 shows an increasing estimated Kendall’s tau for “MIP is difficult to
understand”, suggesting that those who find the MIP difficult to understand are far
more likely to choose the steady option regardless of the case.
iv. Other relationships: respondents concerned with inflation impact on living standard
tend to identify, correctly, that the MIP provides inflation protection, and are willing
to “trade” such protection with lower income in the earlier years. Those not concerned
with inflation risk are more likely to choose the SP in all cases. However, both
relationships are rather mild. An interesting observation is that “maintaining a stable
living standard” is not associated with either pension choice, as one would expect. The
implication is that respondents may fail to recognize that the MIP is the option that
provides “steady” purchasing power.
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Case 1
29%
71%
Case 2
27%
73%
Case 3
33%
67%
Case 4
44%
56%
Case 5
54%
46%
Case 6
69%
31%
Match-In.ation
Steady
Figure 4.31 All participants: choices under match-inflation pension (subjective beliefs on
future inflation).
(1: unimp 5: imp) \ (1: MI 2: S) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Stable living standard 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.02
Inflation impact −0.11∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.08∗ −0.03 −0.05
Inflation risk is low 0.04 0.02 0.07∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.08∗∗
MIP difficult to understand 0.03 0.05 0.10∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.20∗∗
Table 4.30 Kendall’s taus: relationship between match-inflation pension choices and
retirement planning concerns (subjective beliefs on future inflation).
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ii. Inflation-indexed pension (with objective information)
In the second part of this section, participants are asked to remake the six choices between
Match-inflation pension (MIP,“pension option 1”) and Steady pension (SP, “pension option
2”), but this time with objective information on inflation provided. Participants are told
that inflation is on average 2% per year, but can vary between 1% and 3% from year to
year (i.e. is risky). A graph on the cost of living for the next 35 years is provided, along
with a chart that depicts the income paths for options 1 and 2. For a detailed description
of the survey questions, see Section 4.5.3.
Figures 4.32 and 4.33 compare the actual choices made by subjects and the implied (or
“predicted”) choices under the EDLU maximization approach. The relationships between
pension choices and selected demographic factors, retirement income and planning concerns
are summarized in Tables 4.31, 4.33, and 4.34, respectively. The importance of concerns are
summarized in Figure 4.34. We additionally analyze the point at which subjects switch from
SP to MIP, as it reveals important insight on the perceived “cost” of inflation protection.
The switching point is defined as the pension scenario where the respondent selects the MIP
for the first time. Those who select SP for all six cases are ignored (83 individuals). The
relationships between the switching points and subjective survival beliefs are summarized
in Table 4.32.
Case 1
40%
60%
Case 2
45%
55%
Case 3
55%
45%
Match-In.ation
Steady
0%
100%
25%
75%
38%
62%
Actual
Predicted
Figure 4.32 All participants: choices under match-inflation pension scenarios 1 to 3
(inflation information provided).
We highlight the following findings:
i. Dramatic differences between actual and implied choices when the MIP
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Case 4
68%
32%
Case 5
79%
21%
Case 6
91%
9%
Match-In.ation
Steady
79%
21%
88%
12%
100%
0%
Actual
Predicted
Figure 4.33 All participants: choices under match-inflation pension scenarios 4 to 6
(inflation information provided).
is costly: when the MIP is more “costly” (cases 1, 2, and 3), we observe stronger
preferences towards the MIP than those implied under the EDLU maximization
approach. This suggests that inflation protection in retirement income is valued much
more strongly than the model predicts. Note that in case 1, where the MIP is offered
at a higher price than the average 2016 market price for inflation-indexed annuities,
40% still prefer the MIP to the SP. The differences are smaller for higher MIP benefits
(cases 4, 5, and 6), as the appeal of MIP become more apparent to the participants.
Nonetheless, 9% of participants prefer the SP when the MIP gives less risky and
strictly higher real payments. This may be a result of extreme risk-seeking behaviour,
irrationality, mindless decision-making or confusion/misinterpretation.
ii. Average switching points: the mean and median switching point to the MIP are
2.84 and 3, respectively. Both suggest a higher starting value than the average 2016
market starting value for inflation-indexed annuities, implying that the average price
is moderately higher than what an average individual would accept (in the presence of
a fixed annuity).
iii. The cost of inflation protection related to subjective longevity beliefs: the
switching point is found to be related to age, subjective expected age at death, and
subjective beliefs of survival rate to an extreme old age of 95. The impact of age in
decision-making is evident, since older participants have lower uncertainties regarding
future longevity (since age 65, as the hypothetical scenario describes). Those who
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believe that they will live longer (measured by subjective expected age at death and
survival rate to 95), are more likely to choose the MIP due to the stronger long term
impact of inflation. The switching point is also found to be unrelated to retirement
status, gender, marital status, education, assets or risk aversion.
iv. The impact of retirement savings: subjects with lower retirement liquid assets
tend to prefer the MIP when the MIP is more expensive. This is a reasonable
observation since lower liquid assets are less likely to provide a long-lasting income
stream that protects against declining purchasing power. As the MIP becomes less
costly, the relationship with savings changes. This is due to the fact that the group
of subjects who consistently choose the SP (even when the MIP is quite attractive)
are increasingly dominated by subjects with lower financial literacy. These individuals
tend to have lower assets and fewer years of formal education (see column “Education”
in Table 4.31).
v. Retirement income has little impact: we observe little significant relationship
between pension choices and retirement income. It is unclear whether respondents,
while making the hypothetical pension choices, take existing retirement income into
consideration.
Age Retirement Gender Marital Education Liquid Fixed Risk aversion
(1: MI 2: S) (1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1: mar 2: sin) (1: low 6: high )
Case 1 −0.04 −0.02 0.03 0.04 −0.01 0.07∗∗ 0.05 −0.02
Case 2 −0.06∗ −0.03 0.06∗ 0.02 −0.01 0.09∗∗ 0.05 −0.01
Case 3 −0.08∗∗ −0.05 0.07∗ 0.01 −0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Case 4 −0.11∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.01 0.01 −0.08∗∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.06∗ 0.03
Case 5 −0.09∗∗ −0.04 −0.04 0.00 −0.12∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.09∗∗ 0.07∗
Case 6 −0.06∗ 0.00 −0.01 −0.03 −0.07∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.07∗ 0.06∗
Table 4.31 Kendall’s taus: relationship between match-inflation pension choices and
demographic information (inflation information provided).
Age Expected age at death Subjective survival rate to age 95 Time discounting
Switch −0.06∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.06
Table 4.32 Kendall’s taus: relationship between match-inflation pension choices and age,
subjective survival and time discounting (inflation information provided).
iii. Equity-linked pension
In this section of the survey, participants consider a slightly different hypothetical pension
scenario. The format is similar to the previous section on inflation-indexed pension with
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(1: MI 2: S) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Defined Benefit −0.05 −0.04 −0.05 −0.06∗ −0.01 0.01
Public pension −0.07∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.04 0.00 0.01 −0.02
Life annuities −0.07∗ −0.07∗ −0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04
Withdrawals 0.02 0.03 0.01 −0.02 −0.05 0.00
Other income −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.02 −0.01
Table 4.33 Kendall’s taus: relationship between match-inflation pension choices and
retirement income (inflation information provided).
(1: unimp 5: imp) \ (1: MI 2: S) Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Stable living standard −0.03 −0.04 −0.05 −0.01 0.00 −0.04
Inflation impact −0.20∗∗ −0.21∗∗ −0.20∗∗ −0.15∗∗ −0.11∗∗ −0.05
Inflation risk is low −0.01 −0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗
MIP difficult to understand −0.06∗ −0.07∗ −0.03 0.05 0.10∗∗ 0.16∗∗
Table 4.34 Kendall’s taus: relationship between match-inflation pension choices and
retirement planning concerns (inflation information provided).
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
MIP di/cult
to understand
In.ation does not
pose high risk
Worried about
in.ation impact
Stable living
standard
Very important Fairly important Neutral Fairly unimportant Very unimportant
Figure 4.34 Importance of concerns when making choices between MIP and SP (top to
bottom: high to low average importance).
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inflation information provided. Here, participants are provided with six cases. In each,
participants are asked to choose between an Equity-Linked pension (ELP, “pension option
1”) and the Steady pension (SP, “pension option 2”). The six scenarios vary in the starting
pension incomes and the level of risk exposed in the ELP. For a detailed description of
the survey question, see Section 4.5.3. The goal is to study the perception of the risk and
return tradeoff in retirement income. In Section 4.8.5, we observe that subjects report
low interest in taking investment risk in retirement, and a high preference for a smooth
consumption/income stream. We are interested in the consistency of these responses.
Participants’ choices, along with implied (predicted) choices under the EDLU maximization
approach are summarized in Figures 4.35 and 4.36. The relationships between the pension
choices and demographic information, retirement income, and concerns are included in
Tables 4.35, 4.36 and 4.37.
We highlight the following key findings:
i. Dramatic differences between actual and predicted choices: similar to MIP,
we observe dramatic differences between the actual choices made by subjects and the
predicted choices implied by the EDLU maximization approach. In particular, we note
the following:
The upside gain drives decision-making: as the ELP becomes riskier, the
percentage of ELP choices increases. This has an important implication, that the
main driving force behind decision-making in risky scenarios is the upside gain
(in the context of our framing). The predicted choices imply the opposite, that
fewer subjects should prefer the ELP as risk grows higher. Note that the worst
case scenario (i.e. the purple path) becomes increasingly worsened. Regardless, on
average, this does not seem to discourage participants from choosing the ELP.
Downside protection induces more risk-taking behaviour: a close examina-
tion of the relationship with existing pension income shows that those with higher
social insurance pensions exhibit higher risk-taking behaviour. A social insurance
pension acts as a minimum income guarantee: the higher the guarantee, the lower
the impact of downside scenarios on living standard, hence, the lower the downside
consequences for choosing the riskier workplace pension (with the upside gain unaf-
fected). This observation has important implications on the design of retirement
income products, especially those with some form of guarantee structures, such as
variable payout annuities, hybrid pension plans and segregated funds products.
Stronger implied preferences towards the ELP by EDLU maximization:
the EDLU maximization approach suggests stronger preferences for the ELP than
observed (see Figures 4.35 and 4.36), except for the case 2C where the risk is at
its highest. We postulate that EDLU over-predicts risk-taking behaviour when the
risk/return is lower, and under-predicts when risk/return is higher. This may imply
some form of S-shaped preference model, such as those described in Cumulative
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Prospect Theory (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
ii. Consistency with risk aversion: choices are consistent with the elicited relative
risk aversion, such that those with higher CRRA parameters tend to prefer the SP.
Particularly, female or lower wealth subjects tend to be less risk-taking and show
stronger preferences towards the SP (see Table 4.35).
iii. Perception of risk and return: Respondents report that the two most important
deciding factors are:
Old-age financial security21
Persistently poor stock performance22.
The two least important concerns are:
Incomprehensible pension choices23
Risk-taking for long term gains24
Additionally, Table 4.37 shows that the top two important concerns are associated with
a preference for the SP, along with the fear of stock market crashes and a preference
for choices that are comprehensible (i.e. the implication is that the SP is easier to
understand than the ELP, hence more preferable). In particular for the most important
concern, the association shows farsightedness, as respondents tend to recognize the
long term risk in the extremely low income paths. This is consistent with the high
average elicited time discount factor.
Although risk-taking for long term gains is rated as the least important on average,
those who believe in its importance show a very strong preference for the ELP. A
contradiction is observed for “changing risk attitude”25, as those who consider this an
important reason tend to choose the ELP. Recall that in Section 4.8.6, almost half of
subjects report that aversion to risk will increase as they age. This implies that these
respondents should, theoretically, prefer the SP as the ELP has higher volatility and
downside consequences as they age. This brings about important questions about how
respondents perceive risk and return. We postulate that respondents may perceive the
SP as “risky” as it would provide “insufficient” income when compared to the highly
attractive upside of the ELP, hence putting their financial security at risk.
21I want to make sure I have enough income later in life.
22I am worried about persistent poor stock market performance and deteriorating income stream.
23The concept of the Equity-Linked pension option is difficult to understand.
24I expected to take some risk to gain exposure of possible higher income in the long term.
25I expect my risk attitude to change as I grow older.
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1A
40%
60%
1B
49% 51%
1C
54%
46%
71%
29%
62%
38%
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Steady
Actual
Predicted
Figure 4.35 All participants: choices under risk pension scenarios 1A to 1C.
2A
41%
59%
2B
49% 51%
2C
55%
45%
62%
38%
62%
38%
45%
55%
Equity-linked
Steady
Actual
Predicted
Figure 4.36 All participants: choices under risk pension scenarios 2A to 2C.
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Age Retirement Gender Marital Education Liquid Fixed Risk aversion
(1: EL 2: S) (1: pre 2: ret) (1: F 2: M) (1: mar 2: sin) (1: low 6: high )
1A −0.06∗ −0.03 −0.18∗∗ 0.03 −0.08∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.08∗∗ 0.14∗∗
1B −0.05 0.01 −0.14∗∗ 0.03 −0.07∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.07∗ 0.18∗∗
1C −0.03 0.03 −0.14∗∗ 0.04 −0.07∗ −0.07∗∗ −0.07∗ 0.16∗∗
2A −0.01 0.03 −0.11∗∗ 0.03 −0.03 −0.09∗∗ −0.06∗ 0.12∗∗
2B −0.05 −0.02 −0.10∗∗ 0.02 −0.06∗ −0.08∗∗ −0.06∗ 0.16∗∗
2C −0.05 −0.01 −0.14∗∗ 0.03 −0.05 −0.08∗∗ −0.06∗ 0.19∗∗
Table 4.35 Kendall’s taus: relationship between equity-linked pension choices and demo-
graphic information.
(1: EL 2: S) 1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C
Defined Benefit 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00
Public pension −0.06∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.06∗ −0.06∗ −0.06∗ −0.04
Life annuities −0.02 −0.05 −0.05 −0.03 −0.05 −0.05
Withdrawals −0.06∗ −0.06∗ −0.04 −0.07∗ 0.04 −0.03
Other income −0.04 −0.06 −0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01
Table 4.36 Kendall’s taus: relationship between equity-linked pension choices and retire-
ment income.
(1: unimp 5: imp) \ (1: EL 2: S) 1A 1B 1C 2A 2B 2C
Take risk for return in long term −0.33∗∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.36∗∗ −0.31∗∗ −0.37∗∗ −0.39∗∗
Stock market crashes 0.30∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.25∗∗
Persistently poor stock performance 0.29∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.24∗∗
Prefer understandable options 0.23∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.18∗∗ 0.18∗∗
ELP difficult to understand 0.13∗∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.10∗∗
Changing risk attitude −0.10∗∗ −0.10∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.13∗∗ −0.12∗∗
Enough income later in life 0.10∗∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.09∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.09∗∗
Table 4.37 Kendall’s taus: relationship between equity-linked pension choices and retire-
ment planning concerns.
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Figure 4.37 Importance of concerns when making choices between ELP and SP (top to
bottom: high to low average importance).
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Figure 4.38 Reported clarity of the questions involving the Match-Inflation and Equity-
Linked pension options.
4.9 Conclusion and Implications
This report presents the findings of the Ontario Retirement Survey, which studies retirement
consumption, wealth, income, risk perception, decision-making, and planning objectives of
Canadian pre-retirees and retirees. Specifically, following the footsteps of Beshears et al.
(2014), we study the decision-making process of participants facing longevity, inflation and
investment risks. It should be noted that these choices are hypothetical in nature, and the
results should be interpreted with caution.
Several findings of this study have important implications on the design of retirement
income and pension solutions, and the quantitative literature on retirement planning,
especially those with a focus on the decumulation phase.
The study finds that while (pre-)retirees have reasonable beliefs for their own life ex-
pectancies, the meaning of life expectancies may be wrongly interpreted. It is possible
that individuals believe that expected age at death is the maximum age achievable. For
example, the official Canadian Retirement Income Calculator on Canada.ca (see Canadian
Retirement Income Calculator) uses an individual’s expected age at death as the default age
at death for calculating retirement income, meaning that the status quo (Kahneman et al.,
1991) would lead to a withdrawal plan that ceases at the default age at death, exposing the
individual to the risk of longevity or a sharp drop in living standard at an advanced age.
We further find that respondents severely underestimate their survival probabilities to an
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extreme old age of 95, where almost a third believe that the chance is zero. Such beliefs
have potentially large impact on retirement planning behaviours and may result in severe
financial consequences at extreme old ages.
There has been a strong emphasis on bequest motives in the literature of utility maximiza-
tion (see thesis introduction). Modelling bequests means that some utility can be derived
from the death state, creating a tradeoff between consumption and savings, thus leading to
more flexible optimal consumption profiles. Our study shows that leaving a bequest is, in
general, unimportant. This questions the necessity of modelling utilities in the death state,
especially when it adds to the computational complexity of dynamic programming. More
important concerns revealed by our study, such as liquidity, consumption smoothing, home
care or nursing home care expenses, were given less attention in quantitative works. More
effort should be made to integrate these concerns into new or existing modelling frameworks
in future work.
The study again confirms the widespread aversion for life annuities, which results in a
profound subjective undervaluation of their monetary worth, and extreme reluctance in
purchasing annuities at any price. Such aversion is mainly grounded on a general fear
for provider default (irrational in the Ontario context), which is also found by Beshears
et al. (2014). Although theoretically, a life annuity provide longevity protection, it tends
to be perceived as a ‘risky gamble’ of whether a retiree can ‘win’ by outliving the pool of
annuitants. As shown, respondents profoundly undervalue the risk of living longer than
expected, which further implies an over-estimation of the risk of ‘losing’ such a gamble. The
lump sum purchase, on the other hand, results in the perception of losing financial flexibility,
control and security; none of which, to our knowledge, is currently incorporated in descriptive
retirement decision-making models that give rise to the annuity puzzle. In essence, we
highlight that the annuity puzzle is no longer a puzzle, when one chooses to recognize
the psychological deterrents associated with annuity purchases (see MacDonald et al.,
2013). Existing effort made on the reconciliation of theoretical explanations and empirical
observations of life annuities largely ignores these important psychological dimensions.
We find that a moderate level of risk aversion is measured by a constant relative risk
aversion parameter (ρ) between 1.74 to 3.74. This finding sets a benchmark for future
parameter choice in similar contexts. We point out that this is significantly lower than
what is commonly assumed in the literature (i.e. ρ = 5), raising doubt over the practical
relevance of the results arise from these studies. We also find that (pre-)retirees are less
myopic than typically assumed. This is manifested in the high time discount factors elicited,
which are very close to 1, suggesting close to zero discounting for future gratifications. This
further underscores the paradoxical nature of subjective time discounting in descriptive
and prescriptive modelling of retiree behaviour, especially given its negative cumulative
impact on old-age financial security. Existing works that assume stronger subjective time
discounting should be revisited.
Our study on decision-making under risk pension scenarios invalidates the CRRA utility
maximization approach as a descriptive model in the context of long-term retirement
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planning. We find dramatic differences between the actual and implied choices under
this approach. Our investigation reveals that in the context of our framing, when facing
investment risks, the potential for the upside gain drives decision-making, and that having
a higher minimum income protection (often provided by public pension income) induces
more risk-taking behaviour. Our work further reveals that when facing risky inflation,
participants in general lack the understanding of its long-term cumulative impact on the
cost of living. These findings highlight the complexity of the interplay among various
retirement income sources and decision-making. They also have important implications
on the design of retirement income products involving risk taking and sharing, especially
those with embedded choices, and guarantee structures, such as hybrid pension plans and
segregated funds products.
As with most survey studies, the ORS has some limitations. But the study was conducted
following best practices in statistical sampling. General limitations and errors present in
survey studies are well-described in Fowler Jr (2013). Specific limitations in the survey
design and the analysis of results are discussed as they emerge in the main text. The
conclusions should be interpreted with these limitations in mind.
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Chapter 5
Future Work
This thesis explores three important topics in retirement decision-making, namely long-term
economic scenario modelling and generation, optimal life-cycle investment, and preferences
and objective formulation. This chapter discusses future work in each of these topics.
General directions that require more attention are also highlighted.
Chapter 1 investigates Wilkie’s ESG and translates the model for uses in the US context.
Future work may consider the development of a long-term ESG more appropriate for US or
Canadian use, taking into considerations the limitations of Wilkie’s ESG discussed in this
chapter. Similarly, model risk can be explored by comparing the model with open-access
ESGs. Importantly, there still lacks a rigorous definition of what constitutes an appropriate
ESG, for practitioners or independent researchers, in general or for specific applications.
The literature would benefit from such a discussion. Additional practical aspects of ESGs
should be regarded in the development and critique of these models, these include user
friendliness, flexibility, calibration, scalability, and the communication of model assumptions
and outputs.
Chapters 2 and 3 consider the extension to Epstein-Zin preferences in modelling intertem-
poral portfolio choice. This extension retains a major flaw of EDLU maximization such that
the certainty equivalent of future utility is computed as an expected value. This measure of
certainty equivalent effectively trades off extremely high and low consumption scenarios.
Extensions to non-expected certainty equivalent, such as the Chew-Dekel class (see Epstein
and Zin, 1989) should be considered for future work. Along with this, more efficient
numerical procedures should be explored (see Brandt et al., 2005), given the sensitivity
of speed to the complexity of the preference model. To date, the most common approach
remains to be value function iteration, using either a serial or parallel method.
Studies of life-cycle investment continue to dominate the retirement planning literature,
with the majority putting forward normative solutions. It should be highlighted that these
solutions are based on greatly simplified objective functions. Consequently, the resulting
optimal strategies are most often not adequate to be given as plausible financial planning
advice. As shown in Chapter 4, individuals face a significantly more intricate and evolving
world, ranging from economic, financial and health risks, to pensions, evolving preferences
and spending concerns, etc. The prescription of retirement planning strategies should not
be made in absence of a thorough understanding of actual decision-making in retirement
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(rationality aside). Future investigations should be driven by practical usefulness, rather
than mathematical complexity or descriptive validity of the preference models. At the very
least, researchers in the prescriptive line of work ought to ask the question whether the
resulting optimal solutions appear “reasonable”, or can be adopted as practicable retirement
planning strategies in real life. Additionally, on top of individual optimality, researchers
should consider the broader impact of the proposed normative solutions. After all, the
prescription of microeconomic decision-making should not be made independently of a
nation’s macroeconomic security and sustainability.
Those who wish to extend the survey study in Chapter 4 can consider the following
improvements to the survey design. First, participants indicate that they would like to have
the option of selecting $0, or “do not have” when asked about wealth and income. Note
that the option of $0 is included in the option “Below $X”, but respondents may interpret
“Below $X” as a strictly positive response. These respondents believe that they are not given
a selectable option, hence, may randomly select or skip the question altogether. Second,
the hypothetical annuity purchase question can be improved. In the follow-up question
on annuity purchases, instead of offering the annuity at the midpoint of the selection, it
may be more realistic to offer them at the lower bound of the selection. This way, the
offer prices will be strictly below or at the maximum specified price. Third, a question on
the immigration status of the respondents may be included. Immigrants who arrived in
Canada after adulthood face challenges when it comes to retirement planning and savings
in three ways: 1) disruptive careers and differences in the nature and characteristics of
employment, hence reduced capacity and incentives to save privately for retirement, 2)
OAS eligibility, 3) CPP contributions. Fourth, future work may include survey questions
that explore Canadians’ attitude towards purchasing reverse mortgage, term and whole life
insurance products. Finally, this survey study can be replicated for similar investigations in
countries other than Canada, with a few questions on social insurance programs altered to
reflect the country-specific programs.
In Chapter 4, we find significant heterogeneity in retirement savings, income, consumption,
and planning concerns. This questions the existence of a truly “representative” agent, since
retirement concerns the entire working-age population. Significant effort should be made to
incorporate this heterogeneity in the mathematical formulations of objectives, and this should
be done well beyond simply specifying varying levels of risk aversion and time preferences.
Future work may explore techniques from predictive analytics. Moreover, this heterogeneity
creates challenges for researchers and policymakers to assess the normative adequacy of
theoretical and prescriptive results. Future work should consider the construction of a set
of qualitative and quantitative criteria, taking into account micro-level characteristics of the
retirees. Some effort along this line was made in this thesis, but significant improvement
and extensions should be explored. Future work may consider the framework of the Living
Standards Replacement Rate described in MacDonald et al. (2016).
Lastly, considerably more effort should be made on the interpretation, and consequently
translation, of theoretical results to practice.
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A.1 Updating Wilkie’s ESG to 2014
Wilkie’s ESG (US) updated to 2014 remains an integrated stochastic economic model. The
relationship between total stock return and long-term bond yield sustains through the
inflationary effect. Parameters appropriate for long-term economic scenario generation are
reported in Table A.1. The updated model structure is shown in Figure A.1.
Price Inflation
Dividend YieldDividend Index Long-Term Bond Yield
Total Stock Return
Figure A.1 Wilkie’s ESG: model structure (fitted to 1991–2014).
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Estimates (SE) Simulation
µq 0.0338 (0.0085) 0.0338
aq 0.7575 (0.0793) 0.7575
σq 0.0171 (0.0015) 0.0171
wy 0.0504 (0.9249) 0
µy 0.0331 (0.0108) 0.0331
ay 0.9582 (0.0341) 0.9582
σy 0.1310 (0.0116) 0.1310
wd 1 – 1
dd 0.3800 – 0.3800
µd 0.0202 (0.0098) 0.0202
yd 0.2138 (0.1055) 0.2138
bd −0.3468 (0.1563) −0.3468
σd 0.1146 (0.0103) 0.1146
wc 1 – 1
dc 0.0580 – 0.0580
µc 0.0213 (0.0103) 0.0213
ac 0.9109 (0.0576) 0.9109
yc −0.1958 (0.2337) 0
σc 0.3157 (0.0280) 0.3157
cmin 0.0050 – 0.0050
Estimates (SE) Simulation
µq 0.0244 (0.0021) 0.0244
aq -0.1011 (0.2043) 0
σq 0.0111 (0.0016) 0.0111
wy −4.5762 (1.5249) −4.5762
µy 0.0252 (0.0055) 0.0252
ay 0.9112 (0.0759) 0.9112
σy 0.1159 (0.0167) 0.1159
wd 1 – 1
dd 0.3800 – 0.3800
µd 0.0306 (0.0266) 0
yd 0.1567 (0.2187) 0
bd 0.1215 (0.2013) 0
σd 0.1097 (0.0165) 0.1097
wc 1 – 1
dc 0.0580 – 0.0580
µc 0.0338 (0.0081) 0.0338
ac 0.8020 (0.1322) 0.8020
yc −0.2785 (0.4551) 0
σc 0.2538 (0.0372) 0.2538
cmin 0.0050 – 0.0050
Table A.1 Wilkie’s ESG: fitted parameters. Left: 1951–2014. Right: 1991–2014.
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A.2 Backtesting Parameters
Estimates (SE) Simulation
µq 0.0396 (0.0153) 0.0396
aq 0.8067 (0.0935) 0.8067
σq 0.0189 (0.0024) 0.0189
wy 1.9414 (1.0897) 1.9414
µy 0.0412 (0.0066) 0.0412
ay 0.8787 (0.0853) 0.8787
σy 0.1186 (0.0142) 0.1186
wd 1 – 1
dd 0.3800 – 0.3800
µd 0.0152 (0.0119) 0
yd 0.2080 (0.2130) 0
bd −0.4954 (0.1967) −0.4954
σd 0.1157 (0.0147) 0.1157
wc 1 – 1
dc 0.0580 – 0.0580
µc 0.0309 (0.0302) 0.0309
ac 0.9633 (0.0414) 0.9633
yc 0.0139 (0.2477) 0
σc 0.2307 (0.0279) 0.2307
cmin 0.0050 – 0.0050
Estimates (SE) Simulation
µq 0.0034 (0.0003) 0.0034
κq 0.4451 (0.0404) 0.4451
σq 0.0031 (0.0000) 0.0031
κr 1.1643 (0.0570) 1.1643
σr 0.0035 (0.0000) 0.0035
µl 0.0019 (0.0003) 0.0019
κl 0.5619 (0.0436) 0.5619
σl 0.0030 (0.0000) 0.0030
µ1 0.0079 (0.0025) 0.0079
σ1 0.0339 (0.0027) 0.0339
µ2 −0.0078 (0.0105) −0.0078
σ2 0.0541 (0.0076) 0.0541
p12 0.0283 (0.0215) 0.0283
p21 0.1027 (0.0852) 0.1027
ρqr −0.8638 (0.0085) −0.8638
ρrl 0.8284 (0.0188) 0.8284
ρql −0.9121 (0.0062) -0.9121
Table A.2 Backtesting parameters (fitted to 1951–1984). Left: Wilkie’s ESG. Right:
Generic ESG (monthly).
A.3 Long Term Bonds Annual Reinvestment
Calculations
Assuming a portfolio value of $1 at time 0, below we set out how the portfolio value
evolves over time, assuming an annual reinvestment of proceeds in long term bonds (n-year,
n >> 1).
Let Ac(t) denote the accumulation factor, or, the unit portfolio value at time t. Ac(0) = 1.
Let BPt denote the price of an n-year zero-coupon bond at time t with a face value of $1,
maturing in 10 years. Let BP+t denote the re-sale price of the bond, purchased at time t,
evaluated 1 year later.
BPt = (1 + c(t))−n, BP+t = (1 + c(t+ 1))−(n−1)
Let Nt denote the number of bond contracts being held at time t, after reinvestment of
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proceeds. It is immediate that
Nt =
Ac(t)
BPt
.
Consider the simple case when t = 0.
N0 =
1
BP0
= (1 + c(0))n
At t = 1, the portfolio is worth Ac(1) = BP
+
0
BP0
= (1+c(0))
n
(1+c(1))n−1 . The n-year bond is currently
worth BP1 = (1 + c(1))−n. Current holdings are converted to cash in the secondary market
and reinvested in n-year bonds. The number of bonds being held at t = 1, after reinvestment
is
N1 = A(1)/BP1 = (1 + c(0))n(1 + c(1)).
At t = 2, the portfolio grows to Ac(2) = N(1)×BP+1 = (1 + c(0))n(1 + c(1))(1 + c(2))−(n−1).
After reinvestment, the number of bonds being held is:
N2 = Ac(2)/BP2 = (1 + c(0))n(1 + c(1))(1 + c(2))
Thus, it can be iteratively shown that the following equations hold, ∀t > 0,
Nt = (1 + c(0))n
t∏
i=1
(1 + c(i)), Ac(t) =
(1 + c(0))n
(1 + c(t))n
t∏
i=1
(1 + c(i))
Consequently, the effective annual return on reinvesting an n-year long term bond, Rc(t), is,
Rc(t) =
Ac(t)
Ac(t− 1) − 1 =
(1 + c(t− 1))n
(1 + c(t))n−1
− 1
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B.1 Elasticity of Intertemporal Substitution
At any time t, the EIS is given by
EIS = −
d log
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
d log(MRSt,t+1)
where MRSt,t+1 is the marginal rate of substitution between Ct and Ct+1, alternatively
referred to as the marginal rate of intertemporal substitution. In economics, the marginal
rate of substitution refers to the rate at which an agent is ready to give up one good in
exchange for another good while maintaining the same level of utility. Consequently, the
marginal rate of (intertemporal) substitution is the rate at which an individual is willing
to delay current consumption in exchange for future consumption, while keeping the same
level of utility Vt. Hence, it is given by
MRSt,t+1 =
∂Vt/∂Ct+1
∂Vt/∂Ct
= A2(Ct, µt(Vt+1))A1(Ct+1, µt+1(Vt+2))
A1(Ct, µt(Vt+1))
where A1 and A2 denote the corresponding partial derivatives with respect to the first and
second argument. From this point on we suppress the argument for µt. It can be readily
obtained that
∂Vt
∂µt
= 1
1− 1α
V
1
α
t β(1−
1
α
)µ−1/αt = β
(
Vt
µt
)1/α
,
∂Vt
∂Ct
= 1
1− 1α
V
1
α
t (1−
1
α
)C−1/αt =
(
Vt
Ct
)1/α
.
Consequently, we have
MRSt,t+1 = β
(
Ct
Ct+1
)1/α (Vt+1
µt
)1/α
,
and that the EIS is given by
EIS = −
d log
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
d log(MRSt,t+1)
= −
Ct
Ct+1
d(Ct+1Ct )
− 1α CtCt+1d
(
Ct+1
Ct
) = α.
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C.1 The CBD Mortality Model
Under the CBD model described in Cairns et al. (2006), the logit of the conditional mortality
rate qx,t = 1− 1px,t is
logit qx,t = log
qx,t
1− qx,t = A0,t +A1,tx,
and the two dimensional process At = (A0,t, A1,t)T is given by
At+1 = τ +At + V Zt+1,
where V TV = Σ is the covariance matrix and Zt+1 is a standard normal random vector.
Assuming a terminal age of 110, we use the following parameters obtained from Maurer
et al. (2013):
A0 =
[
−10.1502416
0.0904819
]
, Σ =
[
0.0019766 −0.0000291
−0.0000291 0.0000006
]
τ =
[
−0.0337497
0.0003242
]
, V =
[
0.0444590 −0.0006545
0 0.0004142
]
In Chapter 3, the best estimates of future mortality rates, based on information up to
time u, are used for computing the annuity factors. Here, we clarify how the best estimates
are computed. Consider the mortality rate for a life aged x at time t (i.e. qx,t). The best
estimate of this rate computed at time u, where u ≤ t, is:
qˆx,t|F(u) =
exp
{
Aˆ0,t|F(u) + xAˆ1,t|F(u)
}
1 + exp
{
Aˆ0,t|F(u) + xAˆ1,t|F(u)
}
= exp {A0,u + (t− u)τ11 + x(A1,u + (t− u)τ21)}1 + exp {A0,u + (t− u)τ11 + x(A1,u + (t− u)τ21)} .
C.2 Adjustment Factors Calculation
Here, we demonstrate the calculation of the adjustment factors for an open-fund VPA where
annuity factors are computed annually based on the current best estimate to reflect the
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most up-to-date mortality experience. Using notation consistent with Boyle et al. (2015),
at any time t− 1, prior to benefit payment, the total fund balance F (t− 1) is calculated by
aggregating the expected present values of the benefits for all surviving members of the
fund, namely
F (t− 1) =
∑
k∈At−1
Bk(t− 1)a¨xk+t−1,t−1.
Then, the balance after benefit payment, F (t− 1)+, is
F (t− 1)+ = F (t− 1)−
∑
k∈At−1
Bk(t− 1)
=
∑
k∈At−1
Bk(t− 1)axk+t−1,t−1.
The fund balance before benefit payment at time t is therefore
F (t) = F (t− 1)+(1 +RVt )
= (1 +Rt)
∑
k∈At−1
Bk(t− 1)axk+t−1,t−1,
where RVt is the one-year return on the VPA fund. Since F (t) can be alternatively expressed
as
F (t) =
∑
k∈At
Bk(t)a¨xk+t,t
=
∑
k∈At
Bk(t− 1)(1 + jt)a¨xk+t,t.
We have ∑
k∈At
Bk(t− 1)(1 + jt)a¨xk+t,t = (1 +RVt )
∑
k∈At−1
Bk(t− 1)axk+t−1,t−1
1 + jt =
(1 +RVt )
∑
k∈At−1 Bk(t− 1)axk+t−1,t−1∑
k∈At Bk(t− 1)a¨xk+t,t
.
Since,
axk+t−1,t−1 = pxk+t−1,t−1(1 + AIR)−1a¨xk+t,t−1.
Then,
1 + jt =
(
1 +RVt
1 + AIR
) ∑
k∈At−1 Bk(t− 1)pxk+t−1,t−1a¨xk+t,t−1∑
k∈At Bk(t− 1)a¨xk+t,t
It is important to note that at time t− 1, the randomness of jt stems from the following:
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i. the random investment return on the VPA fund Rt, and
ii. Zt, which drives the random vector At, and hence the random variable a¨xk+t,t since it
is defined as the best estimate given the information up to time t.
Since no idiosyncratic risk is allowed, the number of surviving members to time t is known
at t− 1. As such, pxk+t−1,t−1 and a¨xk+t,t−1 are also known at t− 1.
C.3 Backward Induction
The optimal decision at time T is known, since death is certain at T + 1 and therefore it is
optimal to consume all remaining wealth. The optimization procedure follows below,
i. Initialize four vectors storing the discretized state variables.
ii. Construct a five-dimensional array that stores the value function evaluated at discretized
state variables and time.
iii. Initialize two five-dimensional arrays that store the corresponding optimal normalized
consumption and investment decisions ωt.
iv. Start with T . The value function and optimal consumption depend only on one state
variable wT , Compute these values based on wT and fill the grid.
v. Moving back to T −1, first evaluate the conditional expectation. Note that randomness
stems from the risky asset returns (i.i.d.) and the adjustment factor which depends
only on the state variable AT−1. Simulate N scenarios conditional on each state of
A0,T−1 and A1,T−1.
vi. Solve for the optimal controls for each combination of the state variables, record them
and record the corresponding value functions.
vii. Repeat steps 6 and 7 for T − 2, ..., 0. At time 0, obtain the optimal controls c, ω for a
range of initial states (w0, b0).
viii. Solve the final optimization problem with control variables ωV and ωI .
Note that the adjustment factor is evaluated differently depending on if systematic
mortality development is considered. If so, then,
1 + jt =
∑k∈S+t−1 kBVt−1pxk+t−1,t−1 a¨xk+t,t−1∑
k∈St kB
V
t−1a¨xk+t,t
( 1 +RVt
1 + AIR
)
.
It not, the adjustment factor depends only on the VPA fund returns. The optimization
problem can be solved using a two-dimensional grid as At is no longer relevant.
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C.4 Multilinear Interpolation and Extrapolation
Here, we describe the multilinear interpolation and extrapolation method used to approxi-
mate the value function. The method searches for an estimate of a function f(x1, x2, x3, ..., xz)
from a z-dimensional grid of tabulated values f and z one-dimensional vectors giving the
computed values of each of the independent variables x1, ..., xz.
Consider when n = 4. Suppose the value of f is known on (x1,1, ..., x1,m)T , (x2,1, ..., x2,n)T ,
(x3,1, ..., x3,p)T , and (x4,1, ..., x4,q)T . We seek to approximate f(x∗1, x∗2, x∗3, x∗4). First, we
locate the 4-dimensional grid space in which the point (x∗1, x∗2, x∗3, x∗4) falls, that is, to find
the eight tabulated points that surround the desired interior point. Suppose,
x1,al ≤ x∗1 ≤ x1,au, x2,bl ≤ x∗2 ≤ x2,bu, x3,cl ≤ x∗3 ≤ x3,cu, x4,dl ≤ x∗4 ≤ x4,du.
Then, let
u = x
∗
1 − x1,al
x1,au − x1,al , v =
x∗2 − x2,bl
x2,bu − x2,bl , k =
x∗3 − x3,cl
x3,cu − x3,cl , l =
x∗4 − x4,dl
x4,du − x4,dl .
We obtain that
f(x∗1, x∗2, x∗3, x∗4) ≈(1− u)(1− v)(1− k)(1− l)f(x1,al, x2,bl, x3,cl, x4,dl)
+ u(1− v)(1− k)(1− l)f(x1,au, x2,bl, x3,cl, x4,dl)
+ uv(1− k)(1− l)f(x1,au, x2,bu, x3,cl, x4,dl)
+ (1− u)v(1− k)(1− l)f(x1,al, x2,bu, x3,cl, x4,dl)
+ · · ·
+ uvklf(x1,au, x2,bu, x3,cu, x4,du).
Note that it is also possible for the point to lie outside of the grid range. In such cases
extrapolation is used. Extrapolation follows the same concept by creating a tangent line
outside the range, except that the point of interest does not fall in any grid space. More
precisely, for each dimension, we need to locate the two closest points such that,
x1,al ≤ x1,au ≤ x∗1, x2,bl ≤ x2,bu ≤ x∗2,
x3,cl ≤ x3,cu ≤ x∗3, x4,dl ≤ x4,du ≤ x∗4.
The function approximation then follows similarly as above.
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D.1 Survey
This section presents the survey used to conduct the Ontario Retirement Survey study
referenced in Chapter 4. This is a web-based survey, where questions are dynamic, such
that certain text, numbers and graphics are presented based on the previous responses
provided by the participant. Details are given in the Section “Notes”, and are included as
[blue text] in the survey.
Introduction
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Mary Hardy, David Saunders
and Saisai Zhang at the Department of Statistics and Actuarial Science, University of
Waterloo.
The objective of this study is to develop a better understanding of the concerns and risk
preferences of individuals who are either close to retirement, or who are already retired.
This will allow us to assess whether the retirement income plans offered by insurance
companies, or provided through occupational pension plans, are adequately meeting the
needs of retirees.
The on-line survey should take about 20 to 30 minutes to complete. We are not asking
for money or selling anything. The survey includes questions about your assets, income,
and some demographic information, as these are important considerations in assessing
appropriate retirement income plans.
The on-line survey data is being collected by the Survey Research Centre at the University
of Waterloo, on behalf of the Investigators. All survey data will be anonymous to the
Investigators as they are not provided with any names or identifying information of respon-
dents. No individual information, including participation status, will be shared with the
researchers or with any other institution. When analyzed, all of the data will be summarized
and no individual could be identified from these summarized results. Furthermore, the
web site is programmed to collect responses alone and will not collect any information that
could potentially identify you (such as machine identifiers). An analysis of the results will
be published in Saisai Zhang’s PhD thesis; the Investigators also intend to summarize the
results in a report that will be made available to participants on request, and may include
some analysis in scientific journal articles.
Participation in this study is voluntary. You can decline to respond to any question by
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leaving it blank, with the exception of the first two questions that determine whether you
qualify to complete the survey. The first two questions are about your age and retirement
status, as the Investigators are interested in the changing attitude to financial security as
people transition from work to retirement. You may withdraw from participating in the
survey by simply closing the browser without submitting your responses. However, once you
have submitted your responses it is not possible to withdraw your consent to participate,
as we have no way of knowing which responses are yours. By indicating your consent you
are not waiving your legal rights or releasing the investigators or involved institutions from
their legal and professional responsibilities.
The Survey Research Centre has complete control over data security and participant
anonymity. The data collected from this study, with no personal identifiers, will be
maintained on a password-protected computer database in a restricted access area of the
university. The data will be electronically archived after completion of the study and
retained for a minimum of 7 years.
There are no known or anticipated risks from participating in this study.
The survey has been partially funded by a research grant from the Canadian Institute of
Actuaries. The Canadian Institute of Actuaries is the national organization of the actuarial
profession, with a mission to serve the public through actuarial education and research, and
is independent of the commercial interest of any financial institutions. The funders of this
study have no influence over the analysis of the survey responses or the dissemination of
the survey results.
We would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics
clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. However, the final
decision about participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from
your participation in this study, please contact the Chief Ethics Officer, Office of Research
Ethics, at 519-888-4567, Ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.
Should you have any questions about the study, please contact Mary Hardy at
mrhardy@uwaterloo.ca. If you would like to receive a copy of the results of this study,
please contact Saisai Zhang at s288zhan@uwaterloo.ca. If you are experiencing technical
issues when completing the survey, please contact srccinb@uwaterloo.ca.
Thank you for considering participating in this study.
[Button] I CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
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Notes
Texts in square brackets [marked in blue] are notes for the programmer and are not shown
to the respondents. Further, section/subsection titles are not shown to the respondents.
Respondents are gradually divided into 24 categories based on,
i. Gender (Female, Male), determined in Q3.
ii. Marital status (Married, Single), determined in Q4.
iii. Retirement status (Pre-Retiree, Retiree), determined in Q2.
iv. Wealth status (Low, Medium, High), determined in Q11.
Questions are presented to respondents based on their specified category. For example, a
question labeled [Retiree, Single] is shown to a respondent identified as single and retired,
regardless of gender and wealth status.
In particular in Section D.1.4, respondents will see charts and monetary values based
on their Gender and Wealth category (e.g. Female and High Wealth Status). These
adaptive figures are highlighted in magenta.
Adaptive income figures for the last section are included in Table D.3 and Table D.4.
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D.1.1 Preliminary
Q1 In what year were you born?
[Determine Age = 2016−Entry]
[IF Age < 50 OR IF Age > 80, THEN SHOW “Thank you but to qualify to complete
this survey, we require a different age group. Thank you for your time.”]
[IF SKIPPED, THEN SHOW “In order to present you with the remaining questions,
please provide an answer to this question. Please click the PREVIOUS button to go
back to provide an answer to continue, or the NEXT button to exit the survey.”]
Q2 Which one of the statements best describes your current work/retirement status?
 I work full-time and I do NOT consider myself retired [→ Pre-retiree]
 I work full-time and I consider myself retired [→ Retiree]
 I work part-time and I do NOT consider myself retired [→ Pre-retiree]
 I work part-time and I consider myself retired [→ Retiree]
 I do NOT work (outside the home) and I do NOT yet consider myself retired [→
Pre-retiree]
 I do NOT work (outside the home) and I consider myself retired [→ Retiree]
[Determine Retirement Status]
[IF SKIPPED, THEN SHOW “In order to present you with the remaining questions,
please provide an answer to this question. Please click the PREVIOUS button to go
back to provide an answer to continue, or the NEXT button to exit the survey.”]
Q3 How do you identify your gender?
 Female [→ Female]
 Male [→ Male]
 Other [→ Male]
 Prefer not to say [→ Male]
[Determine Gender]
[IF SKIPPED, THEN → Male]
Q4 Do you currently have a spouse or common-law partner?
 Yes [→ Married, SHOW Q4a]
 No [→ Single, SKIP Q4a]
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[Determine Marital Status]
[IF SKIPPED, THEN → Single]
Q4a Is your spouse/partner...
 Working full-time
 Working part-time
 Not Working (outside the home)
D.1.2 Expectations and Experience
Retirement Age
Q5 [Pre-Retirees] At what age do you expect to retire?
[RESTRICTION: ENTRY ≥ Age− 1 ]
[Retirees] At what age did you retire?
[RESTRICTION: ENTRY ≤ Age ]
Life Expectancy
Q6 Approximately what age do you expect to live to?
[RESTRICTION: ENTRY ≥ Age ]
Q7 On a scale of 0% to 100%, where 0% means absolutely no chance and 100% means
absolutely certain, what do you think is the chance that you will live to be
[SHOW:Age + 10] or more?
% [RESTRICTION: 0 ≤ ENTRY ≤ 100 ]
Q8 On a scale of 0% to 100%, where 0% means absolutely no chance and 100% means
absolutely certain, what do you think is the chance that you will live to be 95
or more?
% [RESTRICTION: 0 ≤ ENTRY ≤ 100 ]
Wealth
Q9 [Pre-Retirees, Married] What was your and your spouse/partner’s total income in 2015?
(Please note that in this survey, all monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
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[Pre-Retirees, Single] What was your income in 2015? (Please note that in this survey, all
monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
[Retirees, Married] What was your and your spouse/partner’s total income, in the
year prior to your retirement? (Please note that in this survey, all monetary values are
expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
[Retirees, Single] What was your income, in the year prior to your retirement?
(Please note that in this survey, all monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
 Below $25,000
 $25,000 to $49,999
 $50,000 to $74,999
 $75,000 to $99,999
 $100,000 to $124,999
 $125,000 to $149,999
 $150,000 to $174,999
 $175,000 to $199,999
 $200,000 to $224,999
 $225,000 to $250,000
 Above $250,000
Q10 [Pre-Retirees] How many people did this income support?
[Retirees] How many people was this income supporting at the time?
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5 or more
Q11 [Pre-Retirees, Married] When you retire, approximately how much money do you
and your spouse/partner expect to have in the following savings and investment cate-
gories: (Please note that in this survey, all monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
[Pre-Retirees, Single] When you retire, approximately how much money do you
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expect to have in the following savings and investment categories: (Please note that in
this survey, all monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
[Retirees, Married] Part a: When you first retired, approximately how much
money did you and your spouse/partner have in the following savings and investment
categories: (Please note that in this survey, all monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
[Retirees, Single] Part a: When you first retired, approximately how much money
did you have in the following savings and investment categories:(Please note that in this
survey, all monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
a. Liquid assets, including Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), Registered
Retirement Income Fund (RRIF), Defined Contribution Pension Fund, Tax-Free Sav-
ings Account (TFSA), Guaranteed Income Certificates (GICs), chequing and savings
accounts, and any other savings in which you can decide how the money is invested
(please do not include the value of your home or other investment properties).
 Below $25,000 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ Low; IF Single, Wealth Status→ Low]
 $25,000 to $99,999 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ Low; IF Single, Wealth Status→ Low]
 $100,000 to $199,999 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ Low; IF Single, Wealth Status→ Low]
 $200,000 to $299,999 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ Low; IF Single, Wealth Status→ Medium]
 $300,000 to $399,999 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ Medium; IF Single, Wealth Status→ Medium]
 $400,000 to $499,999 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ Medium; IF Single, Wealth Status→ High]
 $500,000 to $599,999 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ Medium; IF Single, Wealth Status→ High]
 $600,000 to $699,999 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ Medium; IF Single, Wealth Status→ High]
 $700,000 to $799,999 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ High; IF Single, Wealth Status→ High]
 800,000 to 899,000 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ High; IF Single, Wealth Status→ High]
 900,000 to 1,000,000 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ High; IF Single, Wealth Status→ High]
 Above 1,000,000 [IF Married, Wealth Status→ High; IF Single, Wealth Status→ High]
[Determine Wealth Status]
[IF SKIPPED, THEN → Medium]
b. Real Estate, including the value of your primary home and other investment
properties, minus any outstanding mortgage amounts.
 Do not [IF Retiree, Did not] own any property
 Below $25,000
 $25,000 to $99,999
 $100,000 to $199,999
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 $200,000 to $399,999
 $400,000 to $599,999
 $600,000 to $799,999
 $800,000 to $999,999
 $1,000,000 to $1,299,999
 $1,300,000 to $1,599,999
 $1,600,000 to $1,999,999
 $2,000,000 to $3,000,000
 Above $3,000,000
[IF GO BACK, THEN SHOW “Sorry, your answers up to this point have been saved.
They are being used to determine the remaining survey questions and therefore, cannot
be changed. Please click“Next” to continue the survey.”]
[Retirees, Married] Part b: CURRENTLY,approximately how much money do you
and your spouse/partner have in the following savings and investment categories: (Please
note that in this survey, all monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
[Retirees, Single] Part b: CURRENTLY, approximately how much money do you
have in the following savings and investment categories: (Please note that in this survey, all
monetary values are expressed in Canadian Dollars $)
a. Liquid Assets, including Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP), Registered
Retirement Income Fund (RRIF), Defined Contribution Pension Fund, Tax-Free Sav-
ings Account (TFSA), Guaranteed Income Certificates (GICs), chequing and savings
accounts, and any other savings in which you can decide how the money is invested
(please do not include the value of your home or other investment properties).
 Below $25,000
 $25,000 to $99,999
 $100,000 to $199,999
 $200,000 to $299,999
 $300,000 to $399,999
 $400,000 to $499,999
 $500,000 to $599,999
 $600,000 to $699,999
 $700,000 to $799,999
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 $800,000 to $899,000
 $900,000 to $1,000,000
 Above $1,000,000
b. Real Estate, including the value of your primary home and other investment
properties, minus any outstanding mortgage amounts.
 Do not own any property
 Below $25,000
 $25,000 to $99,999
 $100,000 to $199,999
 $200,000 to $399,999
 $400,000 to $599,999
 $600,000 to $799,999
 $800,000 to $999,999
 $1,000,000 to $1,299,999
 $1,300,000 to $1,599,999
 $1,600,000 to $1,999,999
 $2,000,000 to $3,000,000
 Above $3,000,000
Income and Consumption
Q12 [Pre-Retirees, Married] Please indicate the approximate amount you and your spouse/-
partner expect to receive, in the first year of your retirement, from the following
sources:
[Pre-Retirees, Single] Please indicate the approximate amount you expect to receive,
in the first year of your retirement, from the following sources:
[Retirees, Married] Part a: Please indicate the approximate amount you and your
spouse/partner received from the following sources in the first year of your retire-
ment:
[Retirees, Single] Part a: Please indicate the approximate amount you received from
the following sources in the first year of your retirement:
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a. Defined Benefit Pension Plan
(A defined benefit pension plan provides members with a defined pension income when they retire. The
formula used to determine a member’s benefit usually involves factors such as years of membership in
the pension plan and the member’s salary, and is not dependent on the investment returns of the plan
fund. )
 Do not have Defined Benefit Pension Plans
 Below $10,000 [IF Married, Below $20,000]
 $10,000 to $19,999 [IF Married, $20,000 to $39,999]
 $20,000 to $29,999 [IF Married, $40,000 to $59,999]
 $30,000 to $39,999 [IF Married, $60,000 to $79,999]
 $40,000 to $49,999 [IF Married, $80,000 to $99,999]
 $50,000 to $59,999 [IF Married, $100,000 to $119,999]
 $60,000 to $69,999 [IF Married, $120,000 to $139,999]
 $70,000 to $79,999 [IF Married, $140,000 to $159,999]
 $80,000 to $89,999 [IF Married, $160,000 to $179,999]
 $90,000 to $100,000 [IF Married, $180,000 to $200,000]
 Above $100,000 [IF Married, Above $200,000]
b. Government Pension Provisions, including Old Age Security (OAS) Pension,
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), and Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
 Below $3,000 [IF Married, Below $6,000]
 $3,000 to $5,999 [IF Married, $6,000 to $11,999]
 $6,000 to $8,999 [IF Married, $12,000 to $17,999]
 $9,000 to $11,999 [IF Married, $18,000 to $23,999]
 $12,000 to $14,999 [IF Married, $24,000 to $29,999]
 $15,000 to $17,999 [IF Married, $30,000 to $35,999]
 $18,000 to $20,999 [IF Married, $36,000 to $41,999]
 $21,000 to $23,999 [IF Married, $42,000 to $47,999]
 $24,000 to $26,999 [IF Married, $48,000 to $53,999]
 $27,000 to $30,000 [IF Married, $54,000 to $60,000]
 Above $30,000 [IF Married, Above $60,000]
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c. Life Annuities, privately purchased from an annuity provider (e.g. a life insurance
company)
(Life annuities guarantee you a predetermined income for as long as you live, in exchange for a lump-sum
payment upfront. )
 [Pre-Retirees: Do not plan to not purchase life annuities when I retire. Retirees: Do
not have life annuities.]
 Below $10,000 [IF Married, Below $20,000]
 $10,000 to $19,999 [IF Married, $20,000 to $39,999]
 $20,000 to $29,999 [IF Married, $40,000 to $59,999]
 $30,000 to $39,999 [IF Married, $60,000 to $79,999]
 $40,000 to $49,999 [IF Married, $80,000 to $99,999]
 $50,000 to $59,999 [IF Married, $100,000 to $119,999]
 $60,000 to $69,999 [IF Married, $120,000 to $139,999]
 $70,000 to $80,000 [IF Married, $140,000 to $160,000]
 Above $80,000 [IF Married, Above $160,000]
d. Withdrawals from Liquid Assets, including for example, Registered Retirement
Savings Plan (RRSP), Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF), Defined Contribu-
tion Pension Plan, Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA), or other savings and chequing
accounts.
 Below $10,000 [IF Married, Below $20,000]
 $10,000 to $19,999 [IF Married, $20,000 to $39,999]
 $20,000 to $29,999 [IF Married, $40,000 to $59,999]
 $30,000 to $39,999 [IF Married, $60,000 to $79,999]
 $40,000 to $49,999 [IF Married, $80,000 to $99,999]
 $50,000 to $59,999 [IF Married, $100,000 to $119,999]
 $60,000 to $69,999 [IF Married, $120,000 to $139,999]
 $70,000 to $79,999 [IF Married, $140,000 to $159,999]
 $80,000 to $89,999 [IF Married, $160,000 to $179,999]
 $90,000 to $100,000 [IF Married, $180,000 to $200,000]
 Above $100,000 [IF Married, Above $200,000]
e. Other Income Sources, including for example, full-time or part-time employment
[IF Married, of you and your spouse/partner], property investment, etc.
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 Below $10,000 [IF Married, Below $20,000]
 $10,000 to $19,999 [IF Married, $20,000 to $39,999]
 $20,000 to $29,999 [IF Married, $40,000 to $59,999]
 $30,000 to $39,999 [IF Married, $60,000 to $79,999]
 $40,000 to $49,999 [IF Married, $80,000 to $99,999]
 $50,000 to $59,999 [IF Married, $100,000 to $119,999]
 $60,000 to $69,999 [IF Married, $120,000 to $139,999]
 $70,000 to $79,999 [IF Married, $140,000 to $159,999]
 $80,000 to $89,999 [IF Married, $160,000 to $179,999]
 $90,000 to $100,000 [IF Married, $180,000 to $200,000]
 Above $100,000 [IF Married, Above $200,000]
Please specify these income sources
[Retirees, Married] Part b: Please indicate the approximate amount you and your
spouse/partner received from the following sources in the year 2015:
[Retirees, Single] Part b: Please indicate the approximate amount you received from
the following sources in the year 2015:
a. Defined Benefit Pension Plan
(A defined benefit pension plan provides members with a defined pension income when they retire. The
formula used to determine a member’s benefit usually involves factors such as years of membership in
the pension plan and the member’s salary, and is not dependent on the investment returns of the plan
fund. )
 Do not have Defined Benefit Pension Plans
 Below $10,000 [IF Married, Below $20,000]
 $10,000 to $19,999 [IF Married, $20,000 to $39,999]
 $20,000 to $29,999 [IF Married, $40,000 to $59,999]
 $30,000 to $39,999 [IF Married, $60,000 to $79,999]
 $40,000 to $49,999 [IF Married, $80,000 to $99,999]
 $50,000 to $59,999 [IF Married, $100,000 to $119,999]
 $60,000 to $69,999 [IF Married, $120,000 to $139,999]
 $70,000 to $79,999 [IF Married, $140,000 to $159,999]
 $80,000 to $89,999 [IF Married, $160,000 to $179,999]
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 $90,000 to $100,000 [IF Married, $180,000 to $200,000]
 Above $100,000 [IF Married, Above $200,000]
b. Government Pension Provisions, including Old Age Security (OAS) Pension,
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS), and Canada Pension Plan (CPP)
 Below $3,000 [IF Married, Below $6,000]
 $3,000 to $5,999 [IF Married, $6,000 to $11,999]
 $6,000 to $8,999 [IF Married, $12,000 to $17,999]
 $9,000 to $11,999 [IF Married, $18,000 to $23,999]
 $12,000 to $14,999 [IF Married, $24,000 to $29,999]
 $15,000 to $17,999 [IF Married, $30,000 to $35,999]
 $18,000 to $20,999 [IF Married, $36,000 to $41,999]
 $21,000 to $23,999 [IF Married, $42,000 to $47,999]
 $24,000 to $26,999 [IF Married, $48,000 to $53,999]
 $27,000 to $30,000 [IF Married, $54,000 to $60,000]
 Above $30,000 [IF Married, Above $60,000]
c. Life Annuities, privately purchased from an annuity provider (e.g. a life insurance
company)
(Life annuities guarantees you a predetermined income for as long as you live, in exchange for a
lump-sum payment upfront. )
 Do not have life annuities.
 Below $10,000 [IF Married, Below $20,000]
 $10,000 to $19,999 [IF Married, $20,000 to $39,999]
 $20,000 to $29,999 [IF Married, $40,000 to $59,999]
 $30,000 to $39,999 [IF Married, $60,000 to $79,999]
 $40,000 to $49,999 [IF Married, $80,000 to $99,999]
 $50,000 to $59,999 [IF Married, $100,000 to $119,999]
 $60,000 to $69,999 [IF Married, $120,000 to $139,999]
 $70,000 to $80,000 [IF Married, $140,000 to $160,000]
 Above $80,000 [IF Married, Above $160,000]
d. Withdrawals from Liquid Assets, including for example, Registered Retirement
Savings Plan (RRSP), Registered Retirement Income Fund (RRIF), Defined Contribu-
tion Pension Plan, Tax-Free Savings Account (TFSA), or other savings and chequing
accounts.
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 Below $10,000 [IF Married, Below $20,000]
 $10,000 to $19,999 [IF Married, $20,000 to $39,999]
 $20,000 to $29,999 [IF Married, $40,000 to $59,999]
 $30,000 to $39,999 [IF Married, $60,000 to $79,999]
 $40,000 to $49,999 [IF Married, $80,000 to $99,999]
 $50,000 to $59,999 [IF Married, $100,000 to $119,999]
 $60,000 to $69,999 [IF Married, $120,000 to $139,999]
 $70,000 to $79,999 [IF Married, $140,000 to $159,999]
 $80,000 to $89,999 [IF Married, $160,000 to $179,999]
 $90,000 to $100,000 [IF Married, $180,000 to $200,000]
 Above $100,000 [IF Married, Above $200,000]
e. Other Income Sources, including for example, full-time or part-time employment
[IF Married, of you and your spouse/partner], property investment, etc.
 Below $10,000 [IF Married, Below $20,000]
 $10,000 to $19,999 [IF Married, $20,000 to $39,999]
 $20,000 to $29,999 [IF Married, $40,000 to $59,999]
 $30,000 to $39,999 [IF Married, $60,000 to $79,999]
 $40,000 to $49,999 [IF Married, $80,000 to $99,999]
 $50,000 to $59,999 [IF Married, $100,000 to $119,999]
 $60,000 to $69,999 [IF Married, $120,000 to $139,999]
 $70,000 to $79,999 [IF Married, $140,000 to $159,999]
 $80,000 to $89,999 [IF Married, $160,000 to $179,999]
 $90,000 to $100,000 [IF Married, $180,000 to $200,000]
 Above $100,000 [IF Married, Above $200,000]
Please specify these income sources
Q13 Please indicate how important the following considerations are in making retirement
savings and spending decisions. Please select one importance rating that best represents
your opinion.
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Very
Unim-
portant
Fairly
Unim-
portant
Neu-
tral
Fairly
Impor-
tant
Very
Impor-
tant
Setting money aside for nursing home or home
care expenses     
Leaving a bequest     
Setting money aside to access quickly when
unforeseen expenses arise     
The impact of inflation on my standard of
living     
The possibility of living longer than expected
    
The possibility of dying early
    
Taking some investment risk with my savings
during retirement     
Avoiding ups and downs in my income; having
a smooth income stream during retirement     
Expecting my spending needs in the future to
be less than at retirement     
Expecting my spending needs in the future to
be more than at retirement     
Please specify any other important
considerations in your retirement savings and
spending decisions
Q14 [Pre-Retirees] Consider the following hypothetical situation. At the time of your
retirement, you are given an option by your financial service provider (e.g. bank,
financial advisor, or insurance company) to purchase a product that guarantees you a
monthly income of $100 for the rest of your life. This income will stop when you die.
Please indicate the maximum amount of money you are willing to pay for this
product (Note that this is a one-time purchase).
 Below $3,000 [P → $1, 500]
 $3,000 to $5,999 [P → $4, 500]
 $6,000 to $8,999 [P → $7, 500]
 $9,000 to $11,999 [P → $10, 500]
 $12,000 to $14,999 [P → $13, 500]
 $15,000 to $17,999 [P → $16, 500]
 $18,000 to $20,999 [P → $19, 500]
 $21,000 to $23,999 [P → $22, 500]
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 $24,000 to $26,999 [P → $25, 500]
 $27,000 to $30,000 [P → $28, 500]
 Above $30,000 [P → $31, 500]
[Determine: P = Midpoint value of selection]
[IF SKIPPED AND MALE, THEN P = $19, 776. IF SKIPPED AND FEMALE, THEN
P = $21, 202]
[Pre-Retirees] Now assume that at the time of your retirement, you can pur-
chase multiple units of the product.
For example, if you purchase 2 units, you will receive a guaranteed income of $200 per
month for the rest of your life, and pay twice the price.
If the price for each $100 per month is [SHOW P ], how many units of the prod-
uct would you purchase?
I will purchase unit(s). (Indicate 0 if you are unwilling
to purchase the product.)
[Retirees] Part a: Consider the following hypothetical situation. When you retired,
you were given an option by your financial service provider (e.g. bank, financial advisor,
or insurance company) to purchase a product that guaranteed you a monthly income
of $100 for the rest of your life. This income will stop when you die.
Please indicate the maximum amount of money you would have been willing to
pay for this product. (Note that this is a one-time purchase)
 Below $3,000 [Pa → $1, 500]
 $3,000 to $5,999 [Pa → $4, 500]
 $6,000 to $8,999 [Pa → $7, 500]
 $9,000 to $11,999 [Pa → $10, 500]
 $12,000 to $14,999 [Pa → $13, 500]
 $15,000 to $17,999 [Pa → $16, 500]
 $18,000 to $20,999 [Pa → $19, 500]
 $21,000 to $23,999 [Pa → $22, 500]
 $24,000 to $26,999 [Pa → $25, 500]
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 $27,000 to $30,000 [Pa → $28, 500]
 Above $30,000 [Pa → $31, 500]
[Determine: Pa = Midpoint value of selection]
[IF SKIPPED AND MALE, THEN Pa = $19, 776. IF SKIPPED AND FEMALE,
THEN Pa = $21, 202]
Now assume that at the time of your retirement, you could purchase multiple units
of the product.
For example, if you purchase 2 units, you will receive a guaranteed income of $200 per
month for the rest of your life, and pay twice the price.
If the price for each $100 per month is [SHOW Pa], how many units of the prod-
uct would you purchase?
I would purchase unit(s). (Indicate 0 if you would be
unwilling to purchase the product.)
[Retirees] Part b: Now, imagine that you are CURRENTLY given an option by
your financial service provider (e.g. bank, financial advisor, or insurance company) to
purchase a product that guarantees you a monthly income of $100 for the rest of your
life. This income will stop when you die.
Please indicate the maximum amount of money you are willing to pay for this
product. (Note that this is a one-time purchase)
 Below $3,000 [Pb → $1, 500]
 $3,000 to $5,999 [Pb → $4, 500]
 $6,000 to $8,999 [Pb → $7, 500]
 $9,000 to $11,999 [Pb → $10, 500]
 $12,000 to $14,999 [Pb → $13, 500]
 $15,000 to $17,999 [Pb → $16, 500]
 $18,000 to $20,999 [Pb → $19, 500]
 $21,000 to $23,999 [Pb → $22, 500]
 $24,000 to $26,999 [Pb → $25, 500]
 $27,000 to $30,000 [Pb → $28, 500]
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 Above $30,000 [Pb → $31, 500]
[Determine: Pb = Midpoint value of selection]
[IF SKIPPED AND MALE, THEN Pb = $19, 776. IF SKIPPED AND FEMALE,
THEN Pb = $21, 202]
Now assume that CURRENTLY, you can purchase multiple units of the product.
For example, if you purchase 2 units, you will receive a guaranteed income of $200 per
month for the rest of your life, and pay twice the price.
If the price for each $100 per month is [SHOW Pb], how many units of the prod-
uct would you purchase?
I will purchase unit(s). (Indicate 0 if you are unwilling
to purchase the product.)
Q14a Please indicate how important the following considerations were in answering the
previous question.
Very
Unimpor-
tant
Unim-
por-
tant
Neu-
tral
Im-
por-
tant
Very
Impor-
tant
I am concerned that I might outlive my assets
    
I am concerned that I would lose flexibility and
control in some of my own finances     
I am concerned that the financial service provider
might not honour this guarantee     
I am concerned that spending on this type of
product would lead to a loss of financial security     
I am concerned that my family would face
hardship if I were to die early     
Please specify any other important considerations
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Financial Management and Advice
Q15 [Pre-Retirees] As you age, there might come a time when it becomes difficult for you
and/or your spouse to manage your own finances. Please indicate how concerned you
are about this.
 Very Unconcerned
 Fairly Unconcerned
 Fairly Concerned
 Very Concerned
[Retirees] Part a: As you age, there might come a time when it becomes difficult for
you and/or your spouse to manage your own finances. Please indicate how concerned
you were about this when you first retired.
 Very Unconcerned
 Fairly Unconcerned
 Fairly Concerned
 Very Concerned
[Retirees] Part b: How concerned are you about this, CURRENTLY?
 Very Unconcerned
 Fairly Unconcerned
 Fairly Concerned
 Very Concerned
Q16 Some people seek professional financial advice to assist in their retirement plan-
ning.Which of the following best represents your situation?
 I have consulted with a financial advisor in the past and I will continue to do so in
the future.
 I have consulted with a financial advisor in the past but I do NOT plan to do so in
the future.
 I have NOT consulted with a financial advisor in the past but I intend to in the
future.
 I have NOT consulted with a financial advisor in the past and I do NOT intend to
in the future.
Q16a Please indicate how concerned you are about each of the following regarding profes-
sional financial advisors. Please select the one rating that best represents your opinion.
215
Appendix D – Chapter 4
Very
Uncon-
cerned
Fairly
Uncon-
cerned
Neu-
tral
Fairly
Con-
cerned
Very
Con-
cerned
Accessing high quality services     
Being a victim of a fraud or scam     
Not being able to assess the quality of the
service
    
The capability of financial advisors to
address my concerns or improve my financial
welfare
    
Professional financial advisors acting in their
own best interest rather than mine     
Please specify any other important
considerations
Q17 Please indicate how important it is to leave money for your heirs (select one importance
rating for each option)
If you were to die... Very Unim-
portant
Fairly
Unimportant
Neu-
tral
Fairly
Important
Very
Important
Within the next 10 years
from now     
10 to 20 years from now
    
Over 20 years from now
    
D.1.3 Preferences
General
The following questions are related to your risk attitude. Your risk attitude describes
your willingness to accept risk of gaining or losing money when managing your finances
and investments.
Q18 [Pre-Retirees] CURRENTLY, how would you describe your risk attitude with
respect to managing your investable assets?
 I avoid risk at all cost
 I am only willing to accept low risk
 I am willing to accept moderate risk
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 I can live with moderate to high risk
 I feel comfortable with high risk
 I do not have any investments
[Retirees] When you first retired, how would you describe your risk attitude with
respect to managing your investable assets?
 I avoided risk at all cost
 I was only willing to accept low risk
 I was willing to accept moderate risk
 I could live with moderate to high risk
 I felt comfortable with high risk
 I did not have any investments
Q19 [Pre-Retirees] When you retire, how do you expect your risk attitude to change?
 I expect to be more willing to accept risk when I retire.
 I expect my risk attitude to stay the same when I retire.
 I expect to be less willing to accept risk when I retire.
[Retirees] Which one of the following statements best describes your CURRENT risk
attitude compared to when you first retired?
 I am more willing to accept risk now than when I first retired.
 My risk attitude is the same compared to when I first retired.
 I am less willing to accept risk now than when I first retired.
Elicitation
Q20 In the following task, you will be presented with a list of hypothetical options. Each
option has a 50/50 chance of giving either a high payoff or a low payoff. We are
interested in which option you prefer the most.
First, take a look at the following example. You do not need to make a choice in this
example.
Option Low Payoff High Payoff [Expected Return] [Standard Deviation] [Implied CRRA range]
1 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $0.00 9.72 < ρ <∞
2 $9.50 $11.00 $10.25 $0.75 −∞ < ρ < 9.72
[NOTE TO PROGRAMMER: The last three columns are not shown to the respondents.]
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If you choose Option 1, there is a 50% chance that you will receive $10.00, and
a 50% chance that you will receive $10.00 (in this special case, you will receive
$10.00 for certain).
If you choose Option 2, there is a 50% chance that you will receive $9.50, and a
50% chance that you will receive $11.00.
Choosing any one of the options will not cost you any money.
Your task is to choose the ONE option you prefer the most.
Now it is time to choose. Consider the 10 options listed below. Remember that the
chances are 50/50.
Option Low Payoff High Payoff [Expected Return] [Standard Deviation] [Implied CRRA range]
1 $10.00 $10.00 $10.00 $0.00 9.73 < ρ <∞
2 $9.50 $11.00 $10.25 $0.75 5.87 < ρ < 9.73
3 $9.20 $12.00 $10.60 $1.40 3.74 < ρ < 5.87
4 $8.90 $13.00 $10.95 $2.05 2.48 < ρ < 3.74
5 $8.30 $15.00 $11.65 $3.35 1.74 < ρ < 2.48
6 $7.70 $17.00 $12.35 $4.65 1.36 < ρ < 1.74
7 $7.10 $19.00 $13.05 $5.95 0.88 < ρ < 1.36
8 $6.00 $22.00 $14.00 $8.00 0.26 < ρ < 0.88
9 $4.00 $25.00 $14.50 $10.50 0 < ρ < 0.26
10 $2.00 $27.00 $14.50 $12.50 −∞ < ρ < 0
[NOTE TO PROGRAMMER: The last three columns are not shown to the respondents.]
Among options 1 to 10, which do you prefer the most? Please indicate ONE
option using the number 1 to 10.
[RESTRICTION: Number 1 to 10]
Now, consider an alternative set of 10 options listed below. Remember that the chances
are 50/50.
218
D.1 Survey
Option Low Payoff High Payoff [Expected Return] [Standard Deviation] [Implied CRRA range]
11 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $0 9.73 < ρ <∞
12 $4,750 $5,500 $5,125 $375 5.87 < ρ < 9.73
13 $4,600 $6,000 $5,300 $700 3.74 < ρ < 5.87
14 $4,450 $6,500 $5,475 $1,025 2.48 < ρ < 3.74
15 $4,150 $7,500 $5,825 $1,675 1.74 < ρ < 2.48
16 $3,850 $8,500 $6,175 $2,325 1.36 < ρ < 1.74
17 $3,550 $9,500 $6,525 $2,975 0.88 < ρ < 1.36
18 $3,000 $11,000 $7,000 $4,000 0.26 < ρ < 0.88
19 $2,000 $12,500 $7,250 $5,250 0 < ρ < 0.26
20 $1,000 $13,500 $7,250 $6,250 −∞ < ρ < 0
[NOTE TO PROGRAMMER: The last three columns are not shown to the respondents.]
Among options 11 to 20, which do you prefer the most? Please indicate
ONE option using the number 11 to 20.
[RESTRICTION: Number 11 to 20]
Q21 In the following task, instead of payoffs with chances, please consider these hypothetical
payoffs that are made with certainty. This means that there is NO risk associated
with the payoffs.
This task has 7 scenarios. For each scenario, you are given the option to choose between
Payoff Option A: a lower payoff to be paid 1 month from today, or
Payoff Option B: a higher payoff to be paid 13 months from today.
First, consider the following example. You do not need to make a choice in this example.
Scenario Payoff Option A (pays
1 month from today)
Payoff Option B (pays
13 months from to-
day)
I prefer: Option A I prefer: Option B
1 $1,000 $1,020  
If you choose Option A, you will receive a payoff of $1,000 1 month from today.
If you choose Option B, you will receive a payoff of $1,020 13 months from today.
Choosing any one of the options will not cost you any money.
Again, there is NO risk associated with any of these payoffs.
Now it is time to choose. For each scenario below, please choose either Option A
or B.
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Scenario Payoff Option A (pays
1 month from today)
Payoff Option B (pays
13 months from to-
day)
I prefer: Option A I prefer: Option B
1 $1,000 $1,020  
2 $1,000 $1,040  
3 $1,000 $1,080  
4 $1,000 $1,140  
5 $1,000 $1,240  
6 $1,000 $1,340  
7 $1,000 $1,440  
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D.1.4 Retirement Planning Objectives
Inflation Risk
i. Subjective Inflation Beliefs
Q22 For this section, please consider the following hypothetical situation: Suppose that
you are 65 years old and you are JUST about to retire. Your employer will pay you
monthly pension income payments for the rest of your life. The pension will stop when
you die. Your employer presents you with the following pension options:
1. Match-Inflation Pension Option
This option pays a monthly pension that increases at a rate that exactly matches
inflation (i.e. the increase in the cost of living).
2. Steady Pension Option
This option pays a constant monthly pension that does not change.
In each of the following six scenarios, which option would you choose, as-
suming that you are 65 and JUST about to retire?
[EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE. SEE APPENDIX FOR OTHER CATEGORIES.]
First Monthly Income Payment I would choose...
Match-Inflation Option
This option provides income payments
that increase at the rate of inflation
Steady Option
This option provides income
payments that do not change
Match-
Inflation
Option
Steady
Op-
tion
$1, 551 $2, 358  
$1, 650 $2, 358  
$1, 752 $2, 358  
$1, 857 $2, 358  
$1, 965 $2, 358  
$2, 358 $2, 358  
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ii. Objective Inflation Information
Q23 Consider the same hypothetical situation where you are 65 years old and JUST about
to retire. This time, you will be provided with more information on what inflation will
look like in the future.
Suppose the Canadian government targets inflation to be 2% per year, but the actual
inflation in each year can be anywhere between 1% to 3%. You can expect inflation to
be 2% per year on average for the rest of your life, but you do not know for certain
what the actual future inflation rates will be.
To help you make a decision, the chart below presents 10 possible paths of how much
things that cost $1 today could cost you in the next 35 years. Keep in mind there is an
equal chance for any one of these paths to happen.
[INSERT GRAPH COLA]
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Age
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
$C
A
D
Future Cost of Something Worth $1 Today
Now, consider again the two pension options your employer presents you:
1. Match-Inflation Pension Option
This option pays a monthly pension that increases at a rate that exactly matches
inflation (i.e. the increase in the cost of living).
2. Steady Pension Option
This option pays a constant monthly pension that does not change.
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Consider Case 1.
If you choose the Match-Inflation Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $1,551 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
[INSERT PLOT MI1] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Match-Inflation Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
[IF CHOICE = “Match-Inflation Pension Option”, SKIP TO Q23A]
[IF CHOICE = “Steady Pension Option”, SHOW NEXT CASE]
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Consider Case 2.
If you choose the Match-Inflation Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $1,650 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
[INSERT PLOT MI2] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Match-Inflation Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
[IF CHOICE = “Match-Inflation Pension Option”, SKIP TO Q23A]
[IF CHOICE = “Steady Pension Option”, SHOW NEXT CASE]
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Consider Case 3.
If you choose the Match-Inflation Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $1,753 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
[INSERT PLOT MI3] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Match-Inflation Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
[IF CHOICE = “Match-Inflation Pension Option”, SKIP TO Q23A]
[IF CHOICE = “Steady Pension Option”, SHOW NEXT CASE]
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Consider Case 4.
If you choose the Match-Inflation Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $1,858 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
[INSERT PLOT MI4] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Match-Inflation Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
[IF CHOICE = “Match-Inflation Pension Option”, SKIP TO Q23A]
[IF CHOICE = “Steady Pension Option”, SHOW NEXT CASE]
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Consider Case 5.
If you choose the Match-Inflation Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $1,966 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
[INSERT PLOT MI5] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Match-Inflation Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
[IF CHOICE = “Match-Inflation Pension Option”, SKIP TO Q23A]
[IF CHOICE = “Steady Pension Option”, SHOW NEXT CASE]
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Consider Case 6.
If you choose the Match-Inflation Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
[INSERT PLOT MI6] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Match-Inflation Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
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Q23A Please rate the importance of the following reasons behind your choices between
match-inflation and steady pension options.
For each reason, please select the one importance rating that best represents your
opinion.
Very
Unimpor-
tant
Fairly
Unimpor-
tant
Neu-
tral
Fairly
Impor-
tant
Very
Impor-
tant
I want to maintain a stable and
adequate living standard     
I am worried that inflation will have a
severe impact on living standards     
I do not believe inflation poses high risk
to my retirement financial security     
The concept of the match-inflation
income option is difficult to understand     
Please specify any other important
considerations
Q23B Please indicate how you feel about the clarity of questions involving the match-
inflation pension.
 Completely clear
 Mostly clear
 Sometimes clear
 Sometimes confusing
 Mostly confusing
 Completely confusing
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Investment Risk
Q24 For this section, please consider a similar hypothetical situation.
Suppose that you are 65 years old and you are JUST about to retire. Your employer
will pay you monthly pension income payments for the rest of your life. The pension
will stop when you die. Your employer presents you with the following pension options:
1. Equity-Linked Pension Option
This option pays a monthly pension with payments linked to stock market perfor-
mance. Every year your pension will be re-evaluated based on the performance of
the stock market. This means that your pension income payments are uncertain and
will experience some ups and downs.
2. Steady Pension Option
This option pays a constant monthly pension that does not change.
To help you make a decision, for each case, we will present you 10 possible future paths
of what your future monthly pension will look like under the Equity-Linked Pension
Option.
Keep in mind there is an equal chance for any one of the paths to happen.
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i. Fair AIRs
Consider Case 1A.
If you choose the Equity-Linked Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,516 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths as shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
*Note the difference in the first monthly income payments.
[INSERT PLOT EL1A] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
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0
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11000
12000
$C
A
D
Monthly Pension Income
$2516
$2358
Equity-Linked Pension
Steady Pension
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Equity-Linked Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
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Consider Case 1B.
If you choose the Equity-Linked Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,675 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths as shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
*Note the difference in the first monthly income payments.
[INSERT PLOT EL1B] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Age
0
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$C
A
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Monthly Pension Income
$2675
$2358
Equity-Linked Pension
Steady Pension
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Equity-Linked Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
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Consider Case 1C.
If you choose the Equity-Linked Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,808 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths as shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
*Note the difference in the first monthly income payments.
[INSERT PLOT EL1C] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
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Equity-Linked Pension
Steady Pension
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Equity-Linked Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
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ii. High AIRs
Consider Case 2A.
If you choose the Equity-Linked Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,891 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths as shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
*Note the difference in the first monthly income payments.
[INSERT PLOT EL2A] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
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Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Equity-Linked Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
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Consider Case 2B.
If you choose the Equity-Linked Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $3,122 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths as shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
*Note the difference in the first monthly income payments.
[INSERT PLOT EL2B] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
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Equity-Linked Pension
Steady Pension
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Equity-Linked Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
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Consider Case 2C.
If you choose the Equity-Linked Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $3,317 .
I Your future monthly pension has an equal chance of being any one of the 10
coloured pension paths as shown in the chart below.
If you choose the Steady Pension Option,
I Your first monthly income payment will be $2,358 .
I Your future monthly pension will stay the same for the rest of your life, as shown
by the black line in the chart below.
*Note the difference in the first monthly income payments.
[INSERT PLOT EL2C] [EXAMPLE: HIGH, FEMALE, SEE GRAPH BELOW]
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
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Equity-Linked Pension
Steady Pension
Which option would you choose, assuming that you are 65 and JUST about
to retire?
 Equity-Linked Pension Option
 Steady Pension Option
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Q24A Please rate the importance of the following reasons behind your choices between the
equity-linked and steady pension options.
For each reason, please select the one importance rating that best represents your
opinion.
Very
Unim-
portant
Fairly
Unim-
portant
Neu-
tral
Fairly
Impor-
tant
Very
Impor-
tant
I am worried about stock market crashes
    
I am worried about persistent poor stock
market performance and deteriorating income
stream
    
The concept of the Equity-Linked pension
option is difficult to understand     
I prefer income payment options that are
easier for me to understand     
I expect to take some risk to gain exposure of
possible higher income in the long term     
I want to make sure I have enough income
later in life     
I expect my risk attitude would change as I
grow older     
Please specify any other important
considerations
Q24B Please indicate how you feel about the clarity of the questions involving the equity-
linked pension.
 Completely clear
 Mostly clear
 Sometimes clear
 Sometimes confusing
 Mostly confusing
 Completely confusing
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D.1.5 Demographic Information
Q25 What is the highest level of education you completed?
 Some high school or less
 High school graduate
 Trades or college certificate or diploma
 University certificate or diploma below the bachelor level
 Bachelor’s Degree
 Graduate or Postgraduate Degree
 Other professional degree
Q26 In general, would you say your health is ...?
 Excellent
 Good
 Fair
 Poor
 Very Poor
Q27 Do you own a home that you currently reside in?
 Yes
 No
Q28 Where is your permanent residence?
 In an area with a population of 1,000 or over
 In an area with a population under 1,000
Q29 Please explain what, if anything, you found to be unclear or confusing about the
questions in this survey.
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Thank you for participating in the survey! Your feedback is extremely valu-
able.
If you would like to receive a copy of the results of this study, please contact
Saisai Zhang at s288zhan@uwaterloo.ca.
We would like to assure you that this project has been reviewed and received
ethics clearance through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee.
Should you have any comments or concerns resulting from your participation
in this study, please contact the Chief Ethics Officer, Office of Research Ethics,
at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or ore-ceo@uwaterloo.ca.
If you have any general comments or questions related to this study, please
contact Mary Hardy at mrhardy@uwaterloo.ca.
[Exit]
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D.2 Economic and Pension Scenarios
This section reports the economic and pension scenarios used in projecting future Match-
Inflation and Equity-Linked pension options.
Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
t = 1 0.2564 −0.1299 −0.2911 −0.1796 0.0528 0.2483 −0.0169 −0.0403 0.0100 −0.0068
t = 2 0.0203 −0.0254 −0.2177 −0.0174 −0.0645 0.2605 0.1819 0.2270 −0.1021 0.2843
t = 3 −0.0577 0.2615 0.2279 −0.2377 −0.1893 −0.2063 0.2518 0.0699 0.1389 0.2594
t = 4 0.0310 0.3510 0.2458 0.0479 −0.1909 0.0662 −0.0207 0.3063 0.1808 0.0358
t = 5 0.1925 −0.0347 −0.0537 −0.1128 0.1535 0.0210 0.0107 0.0287 0.0982 −0.0989
t = 6 0.1107 0.0945 0.0058 0.0004 0.1539 0.3206 −0.0532 0.1834 0.0332 −0.0860
t = 7 0.3007 −0.2151 0.0888 0.0749 0.1143 −0.0051 0.1005 0.0444 0.5157 0.4137
t = 8 −0.1975 0.5197 0.0954 −0.0344 0.4234 0.1403 0.0828 −0.0534 0.0028 −0.0451
t = 9 0.0462 0.0927 0.2510 0.0697 0.2759 −0.0478 −0.1358 −0.2867 −0.0828 0.3903
t = 10 0.0352 0.0634 0.0294 0.2451 0.0210 −0.0347 0.2135 0.1344 0.2590 0.3130
t = 11 −0.0398 0.3265 0.2656 −0.1001 0.1306 −0.2342 −0.2080 0.1256 0.3775 −0.1662
t = 12 −0.0624 0.1417 −0.1429 0.3407 0.0271 −0.1582 −0.1425 0.1256 0.1104 0.0629
t = 13 0.0880 −0.0068 0.1982 −0.1279 0.0265 −0.0672 −0.1941 −0.1293 0.1712 0.1157
t = 14 −0.1075 −0.1955 −0.1529 0.3313 0.1357 −0.0712 0.3275 −0.1580 −0.1123 0.1065
t = 15 −0.0787 0.2795 0.2270 −0.0982 −0.3970 0.4607 0.3756 0.1079 0.2000 −0.0624
t = 16 0.1916 0.1362 −0.2682 −0.1929 0.0864 0.1082 0.2944 0.1061 −0.0236 −0.2810
t = 17 0.3660 0.0981 0.1824 0.1994 0.0800 0.1904 0.3206 0.3711 0.4648 0.2182
t = 18 −0.4468 0.2088 0.3607 0.0410 0.0803 −0.0956 0.0355 0.0513 0.1550 0.0586
t = 19 −0.4837 −0.0253 0.1118 −0.3147 0.2762 0.1226 0.0493 −0.0131 −0.1662 −0.1519
t = 20 0.4270 0.0570 0.0141 −0.0231 0.1059 0.2791 0.2227 0.0170 0.1939 −0.0207
t = 21 −0.0151 −0.2269 0.1408 −0.0287 −0.0527 −0.1419 0.1295 −0.0237 0.2143 0.0266
t = 22 −0.1083 0.1053 −0.1102 −0.3925 0.0410 −0.0446 0.2572 −0.1197 0.0868 −0.0749
t = 23 0.2602 0.0535 −0.0010 0.0511 −0.0978 0.1599 −0.0219 −0.0407 −0.2611 0.0610
t = 24 0.0494 0.1217 0.1959 −0.3409 −0.0469 0.1109 −0.0085 0.3203 0.1974 −0.1454
t = 25 −0.1372 0.1417 −0.3253 0.1646 0.1150 0.0546 0.1229 −0.0778 −0.2558 0.0843
t = 26 0.1251 0.2333 0.0139 0.2091 0.1850 0.2257 0.1987 0.0120 0.0139 0.0532
t = 27 0.1014 0.2908 0.0254 0.1685 0.0053 0.0861 −0.0771 0.1102 0.1773 0.1953
t = 28 0.1103 −0.1430 0.0498 −0.0115 0.0823 0.1968 −0.0679 −0.1709 0.0306 0.3370
t = 29 0.4325 0.0775 0.0561 0.3684 −0.1011 −0.1670 −0.0155 −0.2307 0.1724 0.1339
t = 30 0.1621 0.2339 −0.4552 0.0226 0.1834 −0.0329 0.0761 −0.0857 −0.0969 0.0201
t = 31 0.1628 −0.1172 0.2895 0.2713 −0.0290 0.1037 −0.1739 −0.2314 0.0323 0.1495
t = 32 −0.1207 −0.1058 −0.0173 −0.0725 −0.1285 0.0763 0.1280 0.0456 −0.0791 0.3253
t = 33 0.1440 0.1453 0.0278 −0.4301 0.3343 −0.0413 0.0088 0.0006 0.0000 −0.1181
t = 34 −0.1332 0.1029 −0.0846 0.0350 0.0399 −0.3200 0.0346 −0.1885 0.3023 −0.3280
t = 35 −0.0833 0.1600 −0.2699 0.3690 −0.1293 0.0909 0.0606 −0.1247 −0.0460 −0.0061
Table D.1 Total Log Returns of Equity used in Equity-Linked Pension Options.
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Scenario 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
t = 1 0.0187 0.0156 0.0133 0.0200 0.0199 0.0299 0.0296 0.0269 0.0121 0.0277
t = 2 0.0296 0.0135 0.0239 0.0226 0.0141 0.0257 0.0157 0.0279 0.0121 0.0277
t = 3 0.0234 0.0163 0.0230 0.0149 0.0300 0.0176 0.0269 0.0190 0.0253 0.0178
t = 4 0.0128 0.0149 0.0298 0.0283 0.0174 0.0110 0.0261 0.0258 0.0213 0.0261
t = 5 0.0229 0.0160 0.0182 0.0105 0.0274 0.0202 0.0266 0.0296 0.0230 0.0143
t = 6 0.0196 0.0289 0.0240 0.0178 0.0152 0.0191 0.0247 0.0136 0.0181 0.0217
t = 7 0.0254 0.0196 0.0282 0.0295 0.0279 0.0109 0.0248 0.0121 0.0223 0.0150
t = 8 0.0154 0.0174 0.0185 0.0273 0.0294 0.0252 0.0281 0.0277 0.0111 0.0131
t = 9 0.0144 0.0177 0.0184 0.0243 0.0171 0.0255 0.0221 0.0203 0.0203 0.0275
t = 10 0.0176 0.0101 0.0261 0.0227 0.0185 0.0175 0.0240 0.0261 0.0133 0.0195
t = 11 0.0171 0.0223 0.0286 0.0237 0.0271 0.0249 0.0141 0.0166 0.0195 0.0196
t = 12 0.0270 0.0146 0.0277 0.0233 0.0104 0.0105 0.0106 0.0116 0.0255 0.0254
t = 13 0.0150 0.0130 0.0220 0.0279 0.0184 0.0207 0.0162 0.0127 0.0138 0.0240
t = 14 0.0190 0.0281 0.0174 0.0231 0.0138 0.0274 0.0293 0.0295 0.0160 0.0294
t = 15 0.0207 0.0238 0.0128 0.0291 0.0102 0.0210 0.0239 0.0245 0.0188 0.0199
t = 16 0.0210 0.0150 0.0289 0.0289 0.0158 0.0117 0.0176 0.0169 0.0266 0.0160
t = 17 0.0267 0.0290 0.0258 0.0142 0.0235 0.0118 0.0204 0.0107 0.0276 0.0244
t = 18 0.0207 0.0103 0.0211 0.0150 0.0286 0.0207 0.0142 0.0215 0.0115 0.0219
t = 19 0.0208 0.0118 0.0295 0.0131 0.0264 0.0285 0.0131 0.0168 0.0259 0.0144
t = 20 0.0198 0.0182 0.0114 0.0269 0.0180 0.0270 0.0187 0.0127 0.0216 0.0163
t = 21 0.0149 0.0279 0.0268 0.0173 0.0266 0.0213 0.0205 0.0283 0.0142 0.0224
t = 22 0.0191 0.0152 0.0245 0.0145 0.0228 0.0218 0.0263 0.0136 0.0209 0.0100
t = 23 0.0135 0.0295 0.0296 0.0292 0.0268 0.0264 0.0251 0.0166 0.0293 0.0295
t = 24 0.0256 0.0173 0.0107 0.0173 0.0156 0.0151 0.0232 0.0117 0.0126 0.0138
t = 25 0.0155 0.0205 0.0202 0.0179 0.0221 0.0200 0.0298 0.0190 0.0298 0.0274
t = 26 0.0275 0.0282 0.0295 0.0171 0.0287 0.0217 0.0244 0.0148 0.0111 0.0155
t = 27 0.0298 0.0220 0.0276 0.0183 0.0176 0.0195 0.0126 0.0223 0.0275 0.0175
t = 28 0.0263 0.0251 0.0111 0.0276 0.0277 0.0236 0.0254 0.0228 0.0289 0.0228
t = 29 0.0157 0.0125 0.0129 0.0229 0.0190 0.0139 0.0254 0.0226 0.0246 0.0278
t = 30 0.0102 0.0209 0.0192 0.0158 0.0296 0.0284 0.0238 0.0243 0.0228 0.0232
t = 31 0.0136 0.0194 0.0298 0.0196 0.0142 0.0175 0.0126 0.0209 0.0171 0.0154
t = 32 0.0191 0.0115 0.0216 0.0130 0.0106 0.0135 0.0188 0.0295 0.0168 0.0185
t = 33 0.0217 0.0152 0.0294 0.0265 0.0260 0.0183 0.0259 0.0284 0.0256 0.0103
t = 34 0.0154 0.0286 0.0191 0.0179 0.0294 0.0144 0.0218 0.0195 0.0179 0.0178
t = 35 0.0103 0.0118 0.0148 0.0161 0.0248 0.0228 0.0272 0.0260 0.0223 0.0177
Table D.2 Annual Inflation Rates used in Match-Inflation Pension Options.
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D.2 Economic and Pension Scenarios
Low & Female Low & Male
Cases Match-Inflation Steady Match-Inflation Steady
1 465 707 515 759
2 495 707 545 759
3 526 707 576 759
4 557 707 608 759
5 590 707 641 759
6 707 707 759 759
Med & Female Med & Male
Cases Match-Inflation Steady Match-Inflation Steady
1 931 1415 1029 1517
2 990 1415 1090 1517
3 1052 1415 1152 1517
4 1115 1415 1216 1517
5 1179 1415 1281 1517
6 1415 1415 1517 1517
High & Female High & Male
Cases Match-Inflation Steady Match-Inflation Steady
1 1551 2358 1715 2528
2 1650 2358 1817 2528
3 1753 2358 1920 2528
4 1858 2358 2026 2528
5 1966 2358 2135 2528
6 2358 2358 2528 2528
Table D.3 First monthly pension payments for choices between Match-Inflation and Steady
pension options.
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Appendix D – Chapter 4
Low & Female Low & Male
Cases Equity-Linked Steady Equity-Linked Steady
1A 755 707 806 759
1B 802 707 853 759
1C 842 707 893 759
2A 867 707 918 759
2B 937 707 986 759
2C 995 707 1044 759
Med & Female Med & Male
Cases Equity-Linked Steady Equity-Linked Steady
1A 1510 1415 1611 1517
1B 1605 1415 1706 1517
1C 1685 1415 1786 1517
2A 1735 1415 1835 1517
2B 1873 1415 1973 1517
2C 1990 1415 2088 1517
High & Female High & Male
Cases Equity-Linked Steady Equity-Linked Steady
1A 2516 2358 2686 2528
1B 2675 2358 2844 2528
1C 2808 2358 2976 2528
2A 2891 2358 3058 2528
2B 3122 2358 3288 2528
2C 3317 2358 3480 2528
Table D.4 First monthly pension payments for choices between Equity-linked and Steady
pension options.
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